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'Dirty Bomb' worries continue

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I found it most interesting that US fears of a radiological dirty bomb over the previous Christmas-New Years holiday were based not upon specific recent information but upon the belief of US officials that al Qaeda was making every effort to detonate such a device. (Remember that TOPOFF 2 employed a radiological attack on Seattle as one of its two attack scenarios.) Thus a radiological device may or may not have been the primary threat. Our focus on it may or may not have been warranted, but the hall of mirrors only deepens. We must separate 'devices' from means, timing, and symbology. A radiological device is certainly easier to make that a fissile package, but after news reports such as the one below one wonders if al Qaeda will drop the idea for fear of discovery. Perhaps the US is trying to force it to drop the idea instead and so move on to other avenues.

The operative device can still be, or in parallel be, an aircraft. The US is certainly focused on the threat from an aircraft outside the country. Some six Air France cancellations, nearly as many BA cancellations, and a few Mexican flights are evidence of that but is the threat from one or more passengers on board; is the intent to splash the aircraft, dive it into a high value target, deliver a device or device component to the US for combined effect in crashing the plane or for later use, a cover for something else, or some of the above. We and the French are seeking to interview those that did not show up for certain flights. The French report that one individual was thought to have 'a small bomb whose components might get past airport security.'

If we are to believe the unclass ruminations of US intel, al Qaeda is fixated on aircraft, planning to seize inbound aircraft and studying our air traffic system for weaknesses. I suggest that al Qaeda is fixated on large volume explosives, of which an aircraft is one. It is not clear that they are fixated on aircraft per se. Al Qaeda is known for doing the unexpected, for exploiting our weaknesses, attacking that which we overlook. Is al Qaeda attempting to focus our attention on aircraft while it envisions another means of attack. Moving from a domestic flight, where security is presumed good (and I wonder of the truth of that), to an arriving international flight, where security might be less attentive, is certainly a simple adjustment to a proven plan. Given the current US focus on inbound hijacked aircraft, will al Qaeda be put off and move on to something else.

Symbology, timing, and potential casualties have links. The ability to carry off any significant attack on US soil would be a needed symbol of al Qaeda renaissance. The ability to do so in the Christmas to New Years window would have increased the symbology many fold. Public celebrations associated with the holidays would assemble a target rich environment, nearly all soft and highly vulnerable physically and emotionally. An attractive target to be certain. Was that the original target or are they waiting for the stand-down from Orange when chances of success are higher. Was the stand-down timing the original plan or now the fallback plan.

The difficulty in parsing this out is made all the worse by attempting to sift through incomplete intel with some significant portion coming from third party foreign governments who, for their own secrecy needs, are shielding primary sources. It is very hard in such conditions to gage credibility of source and individual datum from source.

Is an attack on US interests still a priority event for al Qaeda, or is it a parallel event to efforts in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, or will it be deferred until al Qaeda can attempt to 'realign' the governing elites of Saudi Arabia (provides oil and a politically stable Arab center) and Pakistan (which already has divertible nukes, is resisting fundamentalist aims, and will ultimately support a US-led attack on al Qaeda strongholds in its northern territories). Some or all of the above.

I do not envy the burden on US intel at the moment.



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Foreign Visitors to U.S. enter Digital tracking

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My take is that the real-time entry process of inkless fingerprinting of the right and left index fingers with an immediate digital photograph generated to compare against watch lists will partially solve the name translation issue of non-romance language names -- such as Arabic -- that have proliferated in many federal databases drawn from US research and data provided by foreign governments. Arabic names are also much more complex than romance names and so increase the likelihood that misspellings will proliferate around a given individual. If we have valid prints (and that is a security issue in and of itself), we can tie them to the individual regardless of the name and spelling on the passport.

"The information will be instantaneously compared with government security databases and watch lists. If there is no match to a suspicious or wanted person, the traveler will be allowed to proceed. If any alerts are raised by the database check, the traveler will have to step aside for further questions.

Arrival and departure information would then be automatically reconciled, a big improvement over the current system that involves paper records. The government expects to dramatically reduce the number of foreigners who overstay their visas. Overstays account for about a third of the estimated 10 million illegal immigrants in the U.S."

This digital inventory control system called US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) used by US US immigration to track foreign nationals with visas entering the US at certain air and seaports is going to have to be vastly easier and faster to use when the vehicle and pedistrian crossings begin to use the system:

Foreign Visitors to U.S. Will Cross Digital Divide
Starting today at major hubs, travelers will be scanned. Some expect delays and loopholes.
By Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Times Staff Writer
Los Angeles Times 5 Jan 2004

Gordon Housworth



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Nuclear weapons versus adequate buildings

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In response to a colleage displeased with the fact that a developing nation (in this case, Iran) could allocate monies for nuclear research but not adequate builidngs and building codes, I see two aspects: national imperative and local practice:

National imperative:

National imperative as interpreted by a ruling elite rarely takes into account the needs of its poorest citizens. Sometimes that national imperative includes WMD, nuclear in particular, and sometimes it contents itself with small arms as do, say, a number of smaller African states. Syria chose chemical weapons as its means of gaining strike parity with Israel.

While the comments made by the Guardian are stronger that I would have expected from a center-left publication, they would apply equally well to the former Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, DPRK (North Korea), and South Africa, all of whom spent profligately on their nuclear programs while many citizens suffered. It would translate well to Brazil and Argentina whose Air Force and Navy, respectively, kept alive a nuclear program that did not reach critical mass but spend they did. In both of these cases, the poorest suffered from many higher needs, a nuclear ambition among them. I have heard the Guardian’s admonition on misplaced funding applied to the US (by some US nationals as well as Europeans) and to Israel. Both nations spend massively on nuclear weapons while some of its citizens go wanting.

I make no value judgments, save for the fact that it is unfair to single out Iran as if it has committed some special offence.

Local practice:

The US, the EU, and often Japan enjoy a level of enforced building codes unknown to the rest of the world. (And one does not have to be large to be in the ranks of the developed. Singapore is small but profitable and has made many of the same strides as have its larger brethren.)

Most of the world suffers a periodic stream of collapsed buildings that drop for no apparent reason save for sharp construction practices. It is interesting that only the developing world can afford such high enforcement as it is costly and reroutes monies in the economy. The combination of financial wealth and lower birthrates has resulted in more money to support relatively fewer citizens. Extraordinarily high birthrates leave most third world governments overwhelmed with no ability to support its poorest -- with or without a nuclear program.

Some of you may have spent more time afoot in the third world than I, but if you have, you cannot but marvel at the lack of reinforcing rod and other structural omissions. Faced with no shelter at all, I have watched the poor gladly build simple brick structures. Under the same imperative, you may have watched the wretched poor of Bangladesh build flimsy structures on the floodplains at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal. In both cases, their citizens will die when nature strikes -- and in Bangladesh it is a near annual certainty with the cyclone season. In comparision, Iran gets off lightly.

Again, I make no value judgments, save for the observation that we in the developed world are all too willing to apply standards to our neighbors that many of our own countries could not have passed a few generations ago.

Gordon Housworth



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From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan

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It is astonishing that the US so grossly underestimated Pakistan's skills, aggressive marketing, capacity to assemble a covert supply chain of component manufacturers, and its specific enrichment support to Libya, Iran, and the DPRK. But as the threads ultimately began to become clear, "political necessity" intervened to prevent our curbing the "Nukes 'R' Us" approach of a significant segment of the Paki military, intelligence, and scientific corps. This could be the "blowback" -- unintentioned consequence -- of all time in that the critical path of fissile package production is, short of outright theft, enrichment and not the design and manufacture of the device itself. If the technology is now reasonably available, and everyone in need knows where to order it, it makes the production of nuclear weapons all that much easier for both state and stateless entities. I am of the camp that a certain segment will continue to proliferate -- for a combination of financial, nationalistic, and religious grounds -- despite whatever government assurances are made to the contrary.

It would not surprise me to see critical Pakistani technologists go the way of Gerald Bull, a truly remarkable weapons designer assassinated in Brussels in March 1990 by the Israelis for his work in helping Iraq build a "super-cannon" to attack Israel. Bull extrapolated his work on HARP (High Altitude Research Project) that fired instrumented cannon rounds over 80 miles into the upper atmosphere. Iraq was building enormous underground tunnels to house these super-guns pointed at Israel. Israel exercised its national interest after repeated warnings to Bull had no effect.

Gordon Housworth



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Lost in Translation (inability to translate what we intercept)

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I've seen few substantial items other than Lost in Translation on the translation morass since October 2003, but I doubt things have improved in a few months. Having been involved with integrating less cleared (lower clearance level) "mumblers" into past data fusion efforts in the past, this must be a security agony. Think of having to give highly sensitive COMINT (communications intel) traffic to a foreign national -- there is almost no effective way to compartmentalize it -- and then second guess their translations as to technical and cultural accuracy. This is an Achilles Heel for us well into the future. I do wonder what the "after-session" or end-of-assignment restrictions are on these foreign translators. I wonder if they have or will have HAR (hazardous Area Restriction) travel limits:

Lost in Translation
The Feds listen in on terrorists every day. Too often they can’t understand a word they hear
By Daniel Klaidman and Michael Isikoff
Newsweek
Updated: 1:45 p.m. ET Oct. 30, 2003

Oct. 27 issue - The clash of civilizations rages in some surprising places, and one of them is the large room in the FBI’s Washington, D.C., Field Office that houses a unit known as CI-19. In one set of cubicles sit the foreign-born Muslims; across a partition is everyone else.

They have the same vital job: to translate supersecret wiretaps of suspected terrorists and spies. But the 150 or so members of CI-19 (for Counterintelligence) segregate themselves by ethnicity and religion. Some of the U.S.-born translators have accused their Middle Eastern-born counterparts of making disparaging or unpatriotic remarks, or of making "mistranslations"failing to translate comments that might reflect poorly on their fellow Muslims, such as references to sexual deviancy. The tensions erupt in arguments and angry finger-pointing from time to time. "It’s a good thing the translators are not allowed to carry guns," says Sibel Edmonds, a Farsi translator who formerly worked in the unit.

To fight the war on terror, the FBI desperately needs translators. Every day, wiretaps and bugs installed under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) record hundreds of hours of conversations conducted in Arabic or other Middle Eastern languages like Farsi. Those conversations must all be translated into Englishand quicklyif investigators are to head off budding Qaeda plots against the United States. Today, more than two years after the 9/11 attacks, the FBI is still woefully short of translators. FBI Director Robert Mueller has declared that he wants a 12-hour rule: all significant electronic intercepts of suspected terrorist conversations must be translated within 12 hours. Asked if the bureau was living up to its own rule, a senior FBI official quietly chuckled. He was being mordant: he and every top gumshoe are well aware that the consequences could be tragic.

Snip

The FBI is still overwhelmed. Because of a threefold increase in FISA wiretaps to monitor the terror threat, the bureau has struggled to keep up. Mueller has been adamant about trying to monitor conversationsin real timein the dozen or so truly urgent terrorism investigations. But he has been disappointed again and again. One FBI official described an oft-repeated awkward scene in the director’s office: a top investigator comes to brief Mueller on a high-priority case, the kind that appears in the Threat Matrix shown to President George W. Bush every morning. During the course of the presentation, it becomes obvious that there are significant gaps in the case. The sheepish agent finally admits that hours of wiretaps have yet to be translated. Mueller, a no-nonsense ex-Marine, swallows his exasperation and tersely instructs his subordinates to "do better."

In theory, there are rules for prioritizing which conversations are to be translated first. Can the information be obtained elsewhere? Is the speaker a known Qaeda member? Is there other intelligence suggesting urgency? In practice, says one street agent, "it all depends on how loud you scream on the phone to headquarters."

Gordon Housworth



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TSA helped JetBlue share live passenger data with contractor

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The diversion of JetBlue passenger information has vastly more impact than the recent Northwest Airlines privacy glitch (mainly because the census data that the NW info was cast against was a standard, sanitized test set without passenger specific data). In the JetBlue instance passenger specific data was merged with other commercial sources to obtain SSNs, home info, income, dependents, vehicles, and occupation.

And that is just the beginning in terms of data that can today be gathered and merged in credit, criminal, government, real estate, vehicular, and demographic data at the zip code and geo code level. The types of demographics that are readily available are:

Name
Date of birth
Possible AKAs for subject
Social Security number
Possible other Social Security number
Possible other names associated with SSN
Possible addresses associated with subject
Possible real property ownership
Possible deed transfers
Possible vehicles registered at subject’s addresses
Possible watercraft
Possible FAA aircraft registration
Possible UCC filings
Possible bankruptcies, liens, and judgments
Possible professional licenses
Possible FAA pilot licenses
Possible DEA controlled substance licenses
Possible business affiliations
Possible relatives
Other people who have the same address as the subject
Possible licensed drivers at subject’s addresses
Neighbor phone listings for subject’s addresses

One of the contractors went so far as to present a "Homeland Security Airline Passenger Risk Assessment" to other contractors using the JetBlue data. That genie will just never get back in the bottle in terms of guaranteeing that the passenger data is completely scrubbed. (And I said scrubbed, not deleted, as a 'delete' merely clips off a file pointer leaving the balance of the file intact for later forensic recovery. One has to scrub, or actively overwrite, the data a minimum of three times to satisfy DoD5220.22-M. PGP notes that 'security continues to increase up to approximately 28 passes.')

And this will go on as while Congress eliminated funding for Pentagon TIA program, it left intact a similar research program at DoD ARDA (Advanced Research and Development Activity), using some of the same contractors who had worked on the TIA effort. "ARDA sponsors corporate and academic research on information technology for U.S. intelligence agencies, and is developing computer software dubbed "Novel Intelligence from Massive Data," which performs many of the same kinds of data-mining activities rejected by opponents of TIA. The ARDA project is vastly more powerful than other data-mining activities such as the Department of Homeland Security's CAPPS II program to classify air travelers or the six-state, Matrix data collection system funded by the Justice Department."

Your mileage may vary on the merit of these systems. It will be interesting to see the outcome of the class action suits on this one.

Gordon Housworth



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Three carrier strike groups engage in nationwide virtual exercise

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What I find intriguing about this exercise is that it is one in which US Naval forces do not have "assured access" to the theater of operations and the scenario is classified. When a major physical sea-land-air exercise was executed on the west coast of the US prior to the Iraqi invasion, the sea/land/geographical/climatic terrain bounded by the exercise could only be Iran or Iraq. In a simulated exercise, there is no such disclosure. Now where are seas to which we have no assured assess?

Seas without physical assured assess are often called marginal seas, i.e., a sea bordering a continent and separated from an ocean by any combination of land features like an island, archipelago, or peninsula; or waterways like a strait or channel. Such seas are often seen by the dominant littoral partner as a Mare Clausum (Closed Sea) or Mare Nostrum (Our Sea), e.g., Russia views the Sea of Okhotsk as such a closed sea and gets greatly exercised when the US projects naval assets into it. Likewise, the US gets grumpy should a major competitor project force into the Gulf of Mexico.

Next one asks, where are marginal or closed seas adjacent to an area of geopolitical interest to the US? China/North Korea have the South China Sea, East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and Sea of Japan. Russia has the Sea of Okhotsk, Black Sea, and Baltic Sea. I would not include marginal seas such as the Red Sea and Persian Gulf as they do not make good locations for carrier battle group maneuver and thus attacking aircraft to the littoral are launched externally. While locales such as the Arctic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea could be on the table, I find it unlikely.

If I were going to operate against Bin Laden and al Qaeda assets in Pakistan and Iran, I would be interested in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea (again assuming that I eliminate the Persian Gulf due to maneuver room), but at least in the latter case, we have operated there in recent years.

For the moment, I lean to the three China seas, especially when "the exercise involves trying to assist another country."

See also U.S. Fleet Forces Command

Gordon Housworth



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Military "scope creep" into domestic intelligence gathering and law enforcement

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When the WSJ article, Is Military Creeping Into Domestic Spying And Enforcement?, can describe the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) as a "nonprofit, left-leaning think tank in Washington" you have a calibration of my comment that the "WSJ is to the right of Genghis Kahn as the NYT is to the left of the Jacobins" (with the Post center right on that spectrum despite what a lot of untutored conservatives say about it). FYI, when people have either asked me about editorials from these and other papers, or have sent me editorials, my stock response is 'I do not read or track them as they are even more excessive that the center of their reporting and I prefer to think for myself' (based on my own reading). I do follow specific reporters on specific topics that have delivered what I call a good track record.

Continuing this diversion, I think FAS is excellent and use much materials from it and other NPs and NGOs in my own analysis. (Groups like this have the time and the commitment to collect solid data streams, almost like a Reuters stream of continuous news, instead of the 'hop-around, spot light here, spot light there' habit of most any newspaper.) I also think that FAS thinks about things that need attention and I am a center-right fellow that has not been called 'left-leaning' in recent memory.

All that said, there is -- must be, I believe -- an adjustment must be made in our interpretation of posse comitatus in light of the kind of terrorist (domestic and foreign) threats that we now face. (Also while I see little in regards to cooperation between domestic and foreign terrorist, I feel that is a matter of time and opportunity just as it has been in earlier marriages of convenience between certain Patriot right and Black militant groups.) It is a very delicate balance, just as is adjusting, or bridging, the historically divided roles of CIA and FBI. We generally haven't minded the military assisting in drug interdiction but the actions of CIFA (Counterintelligence Field Activity) established by DoD in February 2002 strike much closer to home. I think it not possible to have a seamless and proactive threat defense (spanning early external detection through final domestic facility perimeter defense) without altering the roles of many federal agencies, the military included. Your mileage may vary, but I would use the same caution as I would in tinkering with, say, the Bill of Rights, which is just another way of framing this question:

Is Military Creeping Into Domestic Spying And Enforcement?
By ROBERT BLOCK and GARY FIELDS
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
March 9, 2004

"...Another little-known Pentagon group, the Counterintelligence Field Activity, was set up two years ago. With 400 service members and civilians stationed around the globe, the CIFA was originally charged with protecting the military and critical infrastructure from spying by terrorists and foreign intelligence services. But in August, Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, issued a directive ordering the unit to maintain a "domestic law-enforcement database that includes information related to potential terrorist threats directed against the Department of Defense."

The CIFA also works closely with the FBI and is conducting some duties for civilian agencies. For example, according to Department of Agriculture documents, the CIFA is in charge of doing background checks on foreign workers and scientists employed by the department's agricultural-research service. The group also provides information to the Information and Security Command, or Inscom, the Army's main intelligence organization, based at Fort Belvoir, Md."

Gordon Housworth



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C.I.A. Chief Says He's Corrected Cheney Privately

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It is art to "correct" an administration official as important as Cheney without being seen to disavow that same administration. Note that Tenet mentions a correction to a B-Team member, Doug Feith, who is a senior member of Rumsfeld's latest alternative to Langley's A-Team. While that must be a special treat, Tenet will no doubt do it gracefully. (B-Teams have been around at least since the 1970s, but for the purposes of this note, I refer to the current team.)

I have wondered how the B-Team came to such different conclusions, some better and some worse that CIA. This B-Team sees many sitting intel officers as constrained bureaucrats that cannot dissent from a 'mainstream' view. There are also a goodly number of what might be called neocons in this B-Team who bring a different strategic lens. But there must be more, I think. Feith has said that Rumsfeld is interested in the limits of future knowledge and the inability to make predictions: "His big strategic theme is uncertainty… The need to deal strategically with uncertainty. The inability to predict the future. The limits on our knowledge and the limits on our intelligence."

I have the impression that this need to accommodate a very imperfect predictor of the future allows in a wider array of threats -- not a bad idea in theory. I have seen comments to the fact that this team "looked at the same intelligence materials that the CIA reviewed for its assessment. But, in addition to looking at the "hard data" of intelligence itself, the commission members also studied significant "gaps" in U.S. intelligence collection capabilities." One would think that Langley also does that but the B-Team disagrees. I agree with their concern as to whether US intel collection is adequate to the task of detecting an ongoing weapons program in the future. We did, after all, miss the Iranian, Libyan, and for a long time, the Pakistani and Iraqi progress. I would tend to put that on the A-Team and, it might be fair to say, a series of administrations that directed them.

I get the feeling that the B-Team also shifts to the more dire end of the spectrum -- again, not a bad idea as it is too easy to underestimate an adversary. Yet the B-Team absorbed the entirety of Ahmed Chalabi' grossly optimistic predictions of a docile, grateful postwar Iraq and dismissed a very different opinion from State so they are no better than the A-Team in believing what they wish to be true. It would also appear that DoD and the B-Team ignored a body of research that would have eased the current post-conflict condition. (Post-conflict is fourth phase of the US military model, preceded by deterrence and engagement, seize the initiative, and decisive operations. Army doctrine states that post-conflict planning has to start well before what the lay reader calls the war itself, i.e., decisive operations.) I put that down on the B-Team.

The early evidence indicates that A-Team assets focused through the third phase, decisive operations, while the B-Team had the fourth phase, post-conflict. If that is true, I put that down on both teams. My jury is still out but it is fair to say that I am as interested in the processes of discovery and analysis of the A and B Teams as I am in their divergent conclusions:

C.I.A. Chief Says He's Corrected Cheney Privately
By DOUGLAS JEHL
March 10, 2004
New York Times

Gordon Housworth



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Comment: 'Security product to strike back at hackers'

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Responding to a colleague's comments on 'Security product to strike back at hackers':

+++ It sounds to me that in many cases its use would be illegal, not to mention the liability for hurting ISPs and clogging routers in the process.

I quite agree that it would be illegal and be open to civil liability as well as being seen as an aggressor's "info war," but then states regularly engage in acts that would illegal if performed by a non-state asset. No question. That will not deter states from pursuing it but rather drive them to seek increasingly covert means to carry it off.

+++ Vigilante justice in the US went out a while ago.

Interesting thought as I wonder if it exists in different guise in response to different threats. Vigilantism rose in response to a lack of perceived authority and control, as in the case of San Francisco. There, as in other areas employing it, it is ultimately suppressed as a majority of citizens come to feel that a 'state' alternative can again handle the matter. In most cases the vigilante, victim, criminal, and bystander are all in the same judicial or political region. Things become far less clear when the perp is in another state, and where in that state he or she may not be seen as a perp at all, e.g. if the irregulars are on our side, they are freedom fighters; if on their side, a terrorist; and if we're undecided, a guerrilla.

Much of the growth of SOCOM (special operations) troops as humint & intel gatherer, recon, combatant, resistance organizer, and infrastructure builder/stabilizer could be seen as projecting a vigilante presence behind the lines of a foreign state. I do think that the SoCom focus is needed and ultimately caused far less casualties, collateral damage, and secondary effects than do larger operations. Yet I am still waiting for a German commando team to come into the US and wipe out some of the Neo-Nazi sites that globally peddle things online that are verboten in Germany. (The Germans regularly protest and we regularly deny based upon our first amendment rights.) It will be a good litmus test of our support of extraterritoriality.

While I separate extraterritoriality into two parts, the statute law part in which, say, the EU accuses the US of attempting to export its legal system and the covert war part, I see both linked by what is called 'globalism' in that a state or stateless actor, weapon, construction technology, component, or operational tradecraft can quickly move across the globe such that the actual "theater of operations" transcends traditional borders. 'Local' takes on a new meaning and the global legal system has yet to adapt to it.

Covert force projection, even preemption, are practiced by many states but the US drew fire by formalizing what had been a de facto condition. Interestingly, no one is taking on the Russians who have long made no bones about their willingness to do so, up to and including the doctrinaire pre-placement of nuclear landmines and depot level busters, the first use of BW agents, et al at the very onset of war.

We are in a new state of war and we will be discussing how to negotiate it for years to come.

Gordon Housworth



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