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A survey of US POW interrogation and Abu Ghraib in particular, Part I

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As interrogation is the word of the moment, I thought it useful to review the comments by US military and civilian sources as well as a view from abroad (all citations at bottom):

The Post's Pentagon Approved Tougher Interrogations notes the highly refined and legally reviewed and approved processes in place at Guantanamo. A classified list of approved techniques were "tightly controlled, limited in duration and scope, used infrequently and approved on a case-by-case basis." Whether you approve or disapprove of the steps approved, my point is that they were rigorously constructed, reviewed, and enforced on both prisoner and guard to the point that two guards were disciplined for less serious infractions that at Abu Ghraib.

While "similar guidelines have been approved for use on Iraqi "high-value detainees,"" the unclass press does not indicate "whether similar guidelines were in effect at the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison. Any in and out of government want to determine if the excesses at Abu Ghraib was this or a similar aggressive interrogation posture taken to extreme or was it a local product of the mix of unsupervised and unaccountable command by both military intelligence and civilian contractors, and utterly untrained reservists inexperienced in the task.

It should be remembered that in 2002, the Washington Times' Army General Shamelessly Caters to Guantanamo Terrorists and BBC's 'Too nice' Guantanamo chief sacked chronicled the removal of the Brigadier General in charge of the Guantanamo Camp Delta prison for being "too nice" to the prisoners and interfering with the Major General in charge of interrogation. One of the mentioned faults was a "decision to allow the Red Cross to put up posters advising detainees they need only provide their name, rank and number during questioning." If I read correctly, there was a desire to keep the prisoners in an 'enemy combatant' status in order to give interrogators greater leeway.

The Times' Mistreatment of Prisoners Is Called Routine in U.S. Is a window into the treatment of prisoners in domestic state prison that included physical and sexual abuse similar to what has occurred in Abu Ghraib. It is common knowledge in the justice system that perps will usually plead out to a federal crime over a state offence as the federal prison system has by far the better treatment. Treatment of state prisoners is not secret or hidden. It has just passed below the level of public concern. Texas, for example, entered into a consent decree over crowding and guard violence against inmates to include permitting "inmate gang leaders to buy and sell other inmates as slaves for sex." It is an understatement to say that in "some jurisdictions in the United States there is a prison culture that tolerates violence, and it's been there a long time."" What the article does not make clear is that the federal and military prisons (for serving military convicted under the UCMJ) are regularly held up as models of prisoner treatment.

In my note Linear connection from Abu Ghraib to the Stanford Prison Experiment I addressed what can happen -- will happen is a better phrase -- in an unsupervised environment of unskilled guards. I maintain that virtually any similar 'experiment' will collapse into treatment that mimicked Abu Ghraib, i.e., how "effortless it is even for the trained to become prison monsters (the untrained have almost no hope of escaping the downward spiral). A now famous simulated prison experiment was carried out just a few years later (1971) in a Stanford University basement. Called the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE), a group of 24 young men were randomly selected as guard and prisoner… The transformation occurred within 24 hours: acting guards became genuine, even sadistic, guards while acting prisoners became genuine passive or rebellious prisoners." I believe that the treatment seen in many state prisons is right in line with this default condition.

On to Part II

Pentagon Approved Tougher Interrogations
By Dana Priest and Joe Stephens
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, May 9, 2004; Page A01

'Too nice' Guantanamo chief sacked
BBC News
Wednesday, 16 October, 2002, 11:50 GMT 12:50 UK

Mistreatment of Prisoners Is Called Routine in U.S.
By FOX BUTTERFIELD
New York Times
May 8, 2004

Israeli lessons for the US in Iraq
By Khalid Amayreh in the West Bank
Al Jazeera
Friday 07 May 2004, 2:48 Makka Time, 23:48 GMT

In Abuse, a Portrayal of Ill-Prepared, Overwhelmed G.I.'s
By DOUGLAS JEHLand ERIC SCHMITT
New York Times
May 9, 2004

Gordon Housworth



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Detecting a stealth directed bot net attack

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In response to Directed bot nets, a private member asked, "Is there a way to figure out what "problem" one might have already?? Are Macs equally vulnerable as PCs?"

Readers are welcome to weigh in with their own comments as my reply is that it is not easy and that there is an active component to my safety checking for a bot net product that may not be producing a failure signature on your machine.

First and foremost, have a good virus scanner and keep it current by downloading/checking for updates daily. (Our service sends us notices and when we start getting them during the day, we immediately upgrade.) Many known attacks will compromise a machine such that other malware can climb atop it.

Second, have firewalls in place even for a lone PC. (If you have a DSL or Cable Modem "always on" condition, it is criminal not to have one as your dedicated IP address gets swept such that you become a known target. Sometimes -- such as for Roadrunner which may dynamically allocate an IP address within their domain -- attackers will sweep the domain looking for live targets.) We use hardware firewalls that are much more resistant to being compromised or disabled by an attack. You can also add a personal software firewall such as the free version of Zone Alarm which will more easily alert you to outbound traffic requests that might give away a resident bot net. We shut down most ports as a matter of course.

Beyond that, I check the SANS Institute Internet Storm Center which opens with a 'Handlers Diary' of what is going on in the world in terms of network threats. As an obsolescing techie, I am not unfamiliar with ports (think of them as windows into your operating system) so that when ISC talks of ports, sources, targets, trends, and services, I can read the map. Some simple definitions from their pages:

  • Port: The port targeted
  • Source: distinct source IP scanning for a given port -- these are the attackers
  • Target: distinct IP targeted by these sources -- these are just as stated -- targets
  • Service: service(s) commonly used on this port -- for our purposes, the attacking apps

ISC adds millions of records daily and their reports can be set to flag trends, i.e., new sources, targets, and services that warrant more investigation.

If this is not daunting for you, then what I look at are Today's Diary, Daily Archive (to the right of Today's Diary), Top 10, and Trends. ISC has all manner of reports with which you look at activity on a specific port, etc., but that gets beyond my attention span and skill level to do something meaningful with it.

If a reader has a better approach for tying to spot an emerging bot attack, I am all ears.

FYI, while I love the CAIDA site (Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis), my primary use for this site is as an encyclopedia of the Web's topology. The paths that interest me are Analysis and Tools (mainly Taxonomy and Visualization). Under the spell of many of the fine visualization tools, the web takes on the aura of the living three-dimensional animal that it is.

P.S. To the reader's last question, there are relatively few Mac attacks in comparison to Wintel or Linux/Unix.

Gordon Housworth



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Nearly halfway to $100 a barrel oil

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Some of my colleagues and I share grim jokes about $100 a barrel oil. It is not that great a joke when one considers if everything went wrong at the same time.

Spot crude prices exceeded $40 a barrel on Friday with most countries producing at capacity. The governor on both the production and price of oil has been Saudi Arabia as it is the only country with sufficient lifting volumes and the willingness to vary that volume to stabilize prices.

I have often questioned friends as to what we would do in the face of a collapse of the House of Saud -- personally I think that it would make Iraq look like a walk in the part. Recent attacks on western staff along the Persian littoral in Saudi and Iraqi sites have raised fears of something worse.

The Saudi attacks at Yanbu were made worse by the fact that three of the Yanbu attackers worked inside its industrial zone. Western firms are clamoring for heightened security precautions with varying degrees of success. Western security and vetting procedures for oil sector hirings run afoul of Saudi tribal norms that take insult when a firm ignores the personal recommendation of a relative. Additional 'guns, gates, and guards' will do no good if the armed guard at the gate is one of theirs.

And not all oil and oil field firms are equal in need. Aramco operations in the Eastern Province have been targets predating the 1990 Kuwait invasion. Aramco's private security force, in concert with Saudi military, monitors oil and gas pipelines from its wellheads to its refineries and the port of Yanbu. Their facilities are above others in their security and fortifications. Others are not as fortunate, and if jihadists can attack Yanbu there is the chance of destabilizing much of the oil sent on to the US. Attacking enough soft targets to force expat staff to leave is a head start on reducing its operating efficiency.

If the Saudis are to stabilize the price of oil and oil futures they must take some remarkably quick measures to secure the critical path of getting oil from wellhead to tanker beyond the Straits of Hormuz.

At Oil Installations in Mideast, Fears Are Running High
By SUSAN SACHS
New York Times
May 8, 2004

Gordon Housworth



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Even our Arab advocates can find few good things to say about us

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It is instructive to listen to the comments of the few modestly pro-Western Arab democrats on the impact of US policies on the region.

While English-language Arab news sites speak to a smaller, wealthier and more westernized group than the audience attracted to the more popular Arabic newspapers, they are the leading constituency for reform efforts promoted by the US. (Note that the Arab 'problem' with the US has increasingly become the Muslim 'problem,' i.e., our unilateral support of Israel and our collapse as honest broker, have become the primary lens by which our actions, even our intent, are judged.)

Columnist Ghassen Charbel writes in Dar al Hayat, a leading Arabic daily based in Beirut and London, that the average Arab has "difficulty in understanding the American administration's insistence on weakening the moderates' position" and "The 'Bush Declaration' [about the Palestinian right of return] makes it more difficult to get Arab cooperation in extinguishing the Iraqi fire, and offers a chance to the roaming fighters in search for a chance to fight America and Americans, to do so. "

The Kuwaiti Arab Times editor-in-chief, Ahmed Jarallah, writes from the most pro-US Arab nation (and one of the very few that have begun to alter a largely feudal governance system) that, "The Arabs are going through yet another cycle of pain and anger," but ladles part of the blame on Arabs for their internal divisiveness" noting that Arabs "still act in groups and organizations with each hating the other. We have miserably failed to act as one."

The Yemen Times continued that thread in an article, Humiliation in daylight, noting:

Our Arab regimes felt the shock of the words uttered by Bush in a remarkable fashion. They first couldn’t believe what they heard, but then, they couldn’t but swallow their defeat in public relations. What is there for them to say but denounce and condemn the action of Bush in deciding on behalf of the Palestinians?

It is a pity that not even one single state came out with a strong-worded message asking the US administration how it could act like this on behalf of Palestine and the Arab and Muslim world. In fact, the Bush-Sharon meeting presented last week was indeed a strong message to the Arab world, saying that they cannot care less about the Arab regimes or nations. In some sense, they have the right not to care about the region because its leaders were stripped of their power a long time ago. All they have is local might to oppress their own people, but when it comes to the moment of truth, they cannot even hold a regular summit on time.

It is indeed humiliation with the bitter meaning of the word. I cannot imagine the feeling inside each and every Arab leader, who does know deep inside that his opinion is as nothing for the USA and Israel, and whether he approves or disapproves a move in the White House simply makes no difference.

Shift to Iraqi-Americans and the complaints rise sharply with very sharp, even pointed, criticism of the Bush administration that goes well beyond their seconding that the prison events "deeply damaged the United States throughout the Muslim world."

And as for the other nine-tenths of the Arab world, the US enjoys a barren landscape.  Most forget that bin Laden was dismissive of Palestinian needs and only annexed them into his political calculus as he needed to widen his base. In turn, we seem to have assumed a new role in the region, that of an al Qaeda recruiting incentive.

Arab Democrats Feel Betrayed by Bush
By Jefferson Morley
washingtonpost.com Staff Writer
Tuesday, April 20, 2004

Iraqi-Americans, Split on Prospects, See Little Progress
By JOHN M. BRODER
New York Times May 7, 2004

Arabs Rage at Bush's America
By Jefferson Morley
washingtonpost.com Staff Writer
Thursday, May 6, 2004; 9:30 AM

Gordon Housworth



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Linear connection from Abu Ghraib to the Stanford Prison Experiment

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I should comment on my own tangential experience with prison camps. In our field, it was common to go to an "escape & evasion" school where you were released in the bush with limited resources and had to make good your escape, either reaching a 'rescue point' or remaining at large for three days, lest you be sent to the prison camp. What they don't tell you is no matter if you escaped or were captured, you go to the prison camp in order to understand what you could expect from incarceration by VC/NVA. Our camps were run by Hawaiians, nicknamed "pineapples," so as to better simulate likely Asian captors.

In short, we almost all wanted to kill those good folks as they did their jobs all too well and it was hard to separate the real from the simulation. One camp commander incited remarkable fear and hatred -- and he was on our side.

Now let me show you are effortless it is even for the trained to become prison monsters (the untrained have almost no hope of escaping the downward spiral). A now famous simulated prison experiment was carried out just a few years later (1971) in a Stanford University basement. Called the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE), a group of 24 young men were randomly selected as guard and prisoner. Nine selected as prisoners were housed in three cells, monitored 24X7 by surveillance cameras, while three guards were assigned to an 8-hour shift. (Remaining prisoners and guards were on-call for replacements.)

Local Palo Alto, CA police added to the experiment's realism by making surprise arrests of the nine men selected to serve a two week prison term. The transformation occurred within 24 hours: acting guards became genuine, even sadistic, guards while acting prisoners became genuine passive or rebellious prisoners.

The SPE was filmed in its entirely and visitors to the SPE site can view film clips from the documentary, Quiet Rage, made from that film footage as well as a substantive photo slide show of the SPE with commentary by the event's creator, Psychology Professor Philip Zimbardo.

Quiet Rage makes clear that:

"if you put "normal" people in a psychologically unhealthy environment like a prison or a jail, they will become infected by their exposure to the diseased situation. Professor Zimbardo is a prime example. In spite of his professional training he was so infected by his involvement as administrator of the SPE that if an outsider hadn't intervened to shake him back to reality, it would have gone on for days longer with perhaps catastrophic consequences - possibly even resulting in the physical injury or death of a prisoner or guard."

The events that terminated the experiment a week early was guards ordering prisoners to strip and using 'a rudimentary sex joke' to humiliate them. Sound familiar to Abu Ghraib? It did to Zimbardo who said, "I was not surprised that it happened… I have exact, parallel pictures of prisoners with bags over their heads [from SPE]." Zimbardo went on to say that in Iraq, as in Stanford, "It's not that we put bad apples in a good barrel. We put good apples in a bad barrel. The barrel corrupts anything that it touches."

One guard was nicknamed "John Wayne" by prisoners due to his sadistic behavior, yet this fellow was gentle and polite outside of the prison basement. Transformation occurred when he put on his guard's uniform. Four Stanford prisoners suffered emotional breakdowns.

Such experiments as Stanford and the Yale Obedience to Authority electric shock "teaching" experiments (in which a white lab coated researcher (authority figure) ordered students to give increasingly more powerful shocks to victims (actors wailing under fake voltage loads) who gave incorrect answers) are considered unethical and no longer performed.

I think that it should be noted in the Obedience to Authority experiment, that while most students showed anguish as they complied, 65 percent still obeyed commands to administer the maximum, potentially lethal electric shock.

Getting to Abu Ghraib is effortless, especially for the untrained and unskilled in the proper interrogation of prisoners.  I would add that I class many of its actions as gratuitous abuse falling short of systematic torture in support of aggressive interrogation, i.e., it was ineffective for whatever outcome it was supposed to support.  In my experience, torture makes reassembly of the interrogatee problematic.

The video, Quiet Rage: The Stanford Prison Experiment, is available for $110. It is worth the watching.

Simulated Prison in '71 Showed a Fine Line Between `Normal' and `Monster'
By JOHN SCHWARTZ
May 6, 2004
New York Times

Gordon Housworth



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Harvesting jihadists from within the federal prison system

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"Groups promoting extremist brands of Islam have gained a foothold in American prisons." No surprise here, Black separatists and White Supremacists have long preceded them, so why not this growing prison minority of 9,000. The only surprise is that the DoJ inspector general and US authorities were surprised that recruitment and radicalization was in play in the federal prison system and that no one had looked for said actions in the system since 11 September..

The problem mimics that of Europe in which there are too few religious leaders to minister to their flock and that there is insufficient vetting of all those leading prison prayer sessions, be they authorized chaplains, contractors, volunteers or inmates. Add to that the FBI's traditional unwillingness to share information on those who might have terrorist connections.

Prison chapels are a popular locale to transmit a message, religious or secular, as they are among the few areas in which inmate groups can meet, often without guard supervision. Add to that parts of prayer sessions conducted in Arabic, a general lack of sensitivity on the part of guards as to detect what constitutes a radical religious message, and you have an opportunity for abuse. While some but not all chapel services are videotaped, I think it doubtful that a hostile message could be trapped. Prison officials have admitted as much in noting that they might not be in a position to detect radical religious messages. In an unintended bit of understatement, an associate warden said, "Not a whole lot of folks are in tune with that stuff."

The guilty will hide among legitimate Muslim clergy and leaders who reasonably profess "unfair scrutiny and criticism because of their religious beliefs." It is a tall order for prison authorities to discriminate the perps. Early data indicates that unsupervised inmates allowed to lead worship meetings are a major offender.

Still, it must be watched as this is another disenfranchised, alienated group that could wrap themselves in a rigid religious blanket.

Report Warns of Infiltration by Al Qaeda in U.S. Prisons
By ERIC LICHTBLAU
New York Times
May 5, 2004

Gordon Housworth



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The other war for oil: China and Japan

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"China and Japan are locked in a fierce diplomatic and economic struggle to win access to Russian oil." And to China's chagrin, it appears that the Japanese are winning after Beijing believed it had secured a pipeline deal. Japan (which has virtually no oil and so imports all) and China (whose current 1/3 import level will rise to nearly 2/3 in a generation) bring that oil through an increasingly risky Malacca Straits for which China's brown water (inshore) navy is unable to mount a defense. Both want Russian oil and are willing to spend a packet to get it. While the Chinese line to city of Daqing is half the cost of the Japanese line to the port of Nakhodka, the Russians benefit by avoiding a single market dependency (China) and in gaining both foreign (Japanese and global) and Russian domestic clients.

While the PRC has, I believe, eclipsed India as Russia's major arms purchaser, the Russian decision shows the limits of Moscow's willingness to cooperate with its 'strategic partner' in Asia. Left unsaid is Russian fear over rising Chinese hegemony into some traditionally Russian lands north of the Amur (which Beijing felt that Imperial Russia stole from China and which it still softly disputes).

China has already demonstrated its strategic will to guarantee its energy security (witness the Lunnan to Shanghai natural-gas pipeline) and so has again looked to the "Stans" by resuscitating a oil pipeline to Kazakhstan, an area strategic to Russia which only recently lost Kazakhstan in the breakup of the USSR.  Yes, it remains within the CIS, but that is a far cry from Russian economic and military control.

I suspect that the Japanese will insert much needed technology into eastern Russia, which I think that the Russians would want to proliferate westward (in lieu of US players). Add to that Japan's decision to embark on a ballistic missile shield in 2003 (ostensibly against the DPRK but the same defensive footprint will cover current Chinese launch trajectories) and I see an increasingly interesting diplomatic contest in northeast Asia.

The oil wars: In the pipeline
Apr 29th 2004 | BEIJING AND MOSCOW
From The Economist print edition

Malaysia offers naval escorts through Malacca Straits
April 19, 2004
Pacific Business News

China's Demand For Oil May Make Thailand Canal A Reality
By Franz Schurmann
From WBAI Pacifica Radio
Jul 22, 2003, 20:35

Gordon Housworth



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Some of you ask, What is Osmium tetroxide?

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Osmium tetroxide was listed in the possible chemicals sought by al Qaeda in Al Qaeda's Euro-chemists stress the simple and the practical because, I believe, its inclusion in an event that I did not report:

Chemical 'bomb plot' in UK foiled
BBC NEWS
Published: 2004/04/06 21:33:53 GMT

In any case, the best OsO4 article is Osmium Tetroxide - a New Chemical Terrorism Weapon? from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Unless you're really curious, read the first section and then jump down to the last two sections:

  • Appearance in a Recent Terrorist Plot
  • Viability of OsO4 as a Chemical Terrorism Weapon
  • Conclusions

CNS Research Story
Osmium Tetroxide - a New Chemical Terrorism Weapon?
By Michelle Baker and Margaret E. Kosal
Monterey Institute of International Studies
April 13, 2004

Gordon Housworth



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Sasser's primary infection to home and student PCs

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Home users and students represent as much as 80 percent of the Sasser worm, thus Sasser will persistence as these users "don't generally know what to do" to remove the worm. (Remember the difference between virus and worm; a virus requires Homo Boobus to do something such as opening an email whereas a worm probes for vulnerable systems and installs itself.)

That would indicate that there is fertile ground for the much more dangerous Gaobot/Agobot worm. I do wonder if a new worm will have to carry a Sasser-scrubber so as to overcome the frequent rebooting that Sasser brings but perhaps not, and of course, if a user scrubs Sasser without patching the OS, they will remain vulnerable to the next worm.

To my point: I wonder when ISPs will begin to make good on their threats to disconnect unpatched or repeat offenders from their network. Yes, users will feel distress and will forget that it was their error that put them in the lurch, but something has to be done to remove this reservoir of willing hosts.

As the backlash will inevitably turn back to the majority Wintel OS provider, I can only assume that this will add further incentive to MS to produce more 'trustworthy' releases sooner and to overhaul its cumbersome patch procedure. (I still maintain that MS can defeat many of its putative rivals by producing a secure OS.)

Yes, security is a 24 X7 job, but unless it is easy to enforce, even the most diligent will start to slack. And buy someone else's product even if, like Linux or Unix, they actually have more faults than Microsoft.

Sasser keeps squirming into homes, businesses
By Robert Lemos
Staff Writer, CNET News.com
Story last modified May 4, 2004, 2:01 PM PDT


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Al Qaeda's Euro-chemists stress the simple and the practical

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I suspect that the opportunity horizon for unskilled Muslims across Europe matches that of France: Forever a Muslim and Arab, never French, never financial opportunity, and the only acceptance to be found within the religion of Islam. Put that magnitude of alienation into the hands of the wrong cleric, and there is an instant jihadist.

I also suspect that the only reason that we have not already had ricin and other low-grade biochemical attacks is the disruption and denial of the Afghan sanctuary housing such labs as the Derunta facility near Jalalabad. This is yet one more pointer to the value of identifying and controlling lawless areas, and why poverty, famine, and AIDS in distant areas are so deadly to us in Europe and the US.

Accessibility is key to the interest in ricin, botulinum toxin, potassium cyanide, and osmium tetroxide. "Biological and chemical weapons are more important than ever to al Qaeda, but the new emphasis is on the simple and the practical." How much simpler than this: a spare bedroom doubling as sewing room by day, work at night with windows open to dissipate fumes, coffee decanter to blend ingredients, spoons and newspaper to dry the product, and store in old Nivea skin cream jars.

The French arrest of Menad Benchellali was a breakthrough that led to discovery of other European cells. Ricin-making tools or toxin traces, along with detailed instructions have been found in raids on al Qaeda-affiliated cells in Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Georgia and Kurdish Iraq. Al Qaeda will make or buy anthrax when and where it can, but in the interim, low tech toxins will do.

"French officials believe the Spanish, British and French cells were communicating with one another and coordinating their activities, especially those related to obtaining toxins and poisons. Members of all three groups had spent time at the same Pankisi Gorge camp [after leaving Derunta]." Both European and US counterterrorism assets are not convinced that all members of the network have been identified.

While ricin is indeed not well suited as a military-scale WMD, it would do very nicely in a building, amphitheater, hockey rink, or train station. Given that only small amounts need to penetrate the skin or be ingested in order for lethality to ensue, I have already conjured up a series of simple weapons to accomplish the task.

I could also see a ricin attack as the booster or precursor to a larger event that would be masked by the system noise of the ricin attack.

Van Hulst's comments are mirrored by Jeffrey Bale at the Monterey Institute of International Studies: "There's no doubt that the groups we're seeing today could carry out such an attack. What surprises me is that that they haven't already done so."

As I wrote in an earlier note, the Euro-ricin threat was not getting coverage or traction in the US -- as if it can't happen here.  This article is the first that I have seen in the US mainstream press:

An Al Qaeda 'Chemist' and the Quest for Ricin
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, May 5, 2004; Page A01

Gordon Housworth



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