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Musing through the offerings at IDEX 2005, the 7th International Defence Exhibition, February 2005, at UAE's Abu Dhabi was another occasion to reflect on the rapidly increasingly capable, low cost, threat posture migrating into the hands of small to moderate states, as well as nonstate actors. Without pretending to be an expert on either, I attempt to remain conversant with both geopolitical strategy and military technology so that one informs the other in building risk assessments and their trend lines.

As opposed to, say, Farnborough and Eurosatory, IDEX is specifically designed to build the military capabilities of "emerging markets of the Middle East, Gulf and Asia," with the aim to both "arm local armed forces with the state-of-the-art weapons" and provide "those forces with the comprehensive technical know-how." It goes without saying that this technology is often worthy of developed nations and may be in fact lead the inventories of first world militaries as there is no/low legacy drag. It is instructive to look at the IDEX exhibitors (key in Russia, for example) and the attending delegations.

While much is made of the potential lapse or ebbing of US unipolarity, military superiority and force projection (a trend that I believe is currently in progress), the assessments become all the more sharp when one knows what a 'second tier' state can field against the US in a limited regional confrontation. In Desert Storm, for example, the Iraqis had the superb South African G5 self-propelled artillery that outgunned its US counterpart. The US prevailed for other reasons, but it is an example of the growing capacity of second and third tier states to acquire first tier capability -- and some of those states have recognized that they need the "comprehensive technical know-how" and battlefield management tools just as much as the weapons themselves.

The trickle down process continues to nonstate actors (witness Hezbollah's recent building and flying a UAV over Israeli territory unintercepted - with a video payload as proof of the flight) rapidly complicates US calculations on the low end guerrilla warfare and insurgency end. (See John Robbs global guerrilla warfare defined as a combination of open source innovation, low(er) tech weapons, and a jostling 'bazaar' of agent transactions and interactions).

Compound that with the emerging first-tier state status of China and India, and the threats that will flow from such large economies and their manufacturing base:

A combination of sustained high economic growth, expanding military capabilities, active promotion of high technologies, and large populations will be at the root of the expected rapid rise in economic and political power for both countries.

• Because of the sheer size of China’s and India’s populations—projected [to] be 1.4 billion and almost 1.3 billion respectively by 2020—their standard of living need not approach Western levels for these countries to become important economic powers.
• China [is] now the third largest producer of manufactured goods, its share having risen from four to 12 percent in the past decade. It should easily surpass Japan in a few years, not only in share of manufacturing but also of the world’s exports. Competition from "the China price" already powerfully restrains manufactures prices worldwide.
• India currently lags behind China [but] it also will sustain high levels of economic growth.

I like to say, 'Follow the demographics,' both rising and falling, that, short of Malthusian checks, will point to unavoidable shifts and their implications. Large consumer cultures and growing manufacturing capacity pave the way for substantial military expenditures (witness the US in the 20th century). Shrinking/contracting economic bases (either in comparative or absolute terms) such as in the US and Europe will force a retraction or reduction in capacity, or at least the frequency of committing that capacity.

While much has been made of "the China Price" in the commercial industrial sector, i.e., 'Cut your price 30% to 50% or lose your customers,' the concept applies just as strongly in the military sector, perhaps more so -- and it applies beyond China to India, Brazil, Indonesia, and others. The US and Europe are facing, and will continue to face, steeply rising capability on offer at prices significantly under US/EU systems. It will be increasingly hard for second and third tier states to accept that cost delta as the capability delta narrows.

Gordon Housworth

The successor to Global Trends 2015, authored before 11 September, is Mapping the Global Future for 2020, authored afterwards with a very different worldview. Global Future speaks more to themes rather than taking individual nations to task. (After all, we may need such a state as a valued ally tomorrow and require the papering over of its excesses, e.g., Uzbekistan.) It speaks of "pervasive insecurity" and an "arc of instability":

Lagging economies, ethnic affiliations, intense religious convictions, and youth bulges will align to create a "perfect storm," creating conditions likely to spawn internal conflict. The governing capacity of states, however, will determine whether and to what extent conflicts actually occur. Those states unable both to satisfy the expectations of their peoples and to resolve or quell conflicting demands among them are likely to encounter the most severe and most frequent outbreaks of violence. For the most part, those states most susceptible to violence are in a great arc of instability from Sub-Saharan Africa, through North Africa, into the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and South and Central Asia and through parts of Southeast Asia. Countries in these regions are generally those "behind" the globalization curve.

Terrorist groups (of which al Qaeda is merely one and not necessarily the most dangerous one in the longer term), criminal groups (which can include drugs but here is meant a broad-spectrum of criminal activities), and drug groups (entities devoted to production and distribution) have already hived off enclaves in all of these areas as well as significant outposts in the 'distribution targets' such as the US and Europe (often utilizing immigrant streams in mini-mart and gas stations). There is already co-opetition between these groups which we make easier by creating areas for them to establish operations and to secure documentation to sanitize people, tools (such as ships), and product. Disease (such as AIDS), natural disaster, and simple geography (as in out of the way places too hard to reach and police, e.g., Pacific islands, parts of PNG) make their contributions.

Rotberg proposes a useful taxonomy of nation-states: strong, weak, failed, and collapsed. While I will touch on some issues of the taxonomy, a weblog entry will not do this justice. See Rotberg's The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, in Why States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Robert Rotberg (ed.), Look at the maps at the end of the PDF and you will see a depressing dispersed global supply chain that can conceive, manufacture, and delivery mayhem anywhere in the world. And since the following criteria are not about to receive redress anytime soon, we will be needing to predict and interdict state decline on a global basis:

I imagine that many readers will see 'interdict' in military terms which is actually too late, too costly, and too ineffective. My intent is commercial and political interdiction, but that is the very area that US nationals are the worst at. We love to be crisis managers and we too often reward and promote those in both commercial and diplomatic spheres for that ability while overlooking those who have vision and the ability to plan for the long-term, resolving problems before they mature. In this area we are at a significant disadvantage to, say, the Chinese.

Recent US actions have created in Iraq an especially potent node in this chain while depriving us of the attention, manpower, and monies needed to proactively deal with the entire chain. As I expect this chain to expand, not contract, the distraction has grave consequences.

Gordon Housworth

Blowback can take decades or even generations to make itself apparent, and I submit that the same original event will cause repeated 'blowbacks' which are not recognized as part of a continuum. Think how much we owe to the British, for example, for their manipulation and balkanization of tribal landscapes in Africa and Asia. The UK handed power in Rwanda to the Tutsis over the Hutu. Whenever one sees a 'straight-line' boundary on maps today, it is generally the work of Colonial powers not perceiving value in a landscape, i.e., it had no military, commercial, or diplomatic value to one or more Colonial states. Those tidy lines repeatedly divided tribal areas and are a bane of the OAU to this day.

At other locations, the British intentionally divided tribal lands in order to weaken them, e.g., the Durand Line which divided ethnic Pashtuns in half, making their dream of a Pashtunistan stillborn, as it drew a boundary between Afghanistan and then British India (this part of which later becomes Pakistan).

Bowing to the inevitable quest for independence, the UK passed the India Independence Act in 1947, creating two dominions, India and Pakistan, that lesser states could join. In order to provide Pakistan with the port of Karachi, Balochistan, over its objections, was 'given' to Pakistan. (Desiring independence from both Pakistan and India, Balochistan was invaded by Pakistani forces after partition.) Kashmir's indecision over which dominion to join causes agony to this day.

Pakistan is a compote of Sindh, Punjabi, Baloch, Pashtu, Bengali (from Bengal and Bangladesh), Urdu-speaking Muslims (muhajirs (refugees) from India), and tribal groups predating British presence such as the Amb, Chitral, Dir, and Hunza. There are no ethnic Pakistanis, but led by a military elite trained by British officers, the compote went to war with India in 1949.

Fast forward to 2000 before Pakistan became an essential partner in the GWOT, before sanctions were lifted, before a massive nuclear weapons effort and proliferation were overlooked, and military aid, debt forgiveness and restructuring commenced in earnest. NIC's Global Trends 2015 said of Pakistan:

Pakistan... will not recover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive politics, lawlessness, corruption and ethnic friction. Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change in the face of opposition from an entrenched political elite and radical Islamic parties. Further domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the makeup and cohesion of the military—once Pakistan's most capable institution. In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government's control probably will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi.

Arab News and Middle East News, respectively, identify Kamal as follows:

Kamal Al-Aswadi is "a fighter from Samarra [and] a businessman with ties to Saddam’s entourage, but wrapped himself in the cloak of radical Islam after the dictator’s regime collapsed. The military believes he relies on funding from Abu Mussab Al-Zarqawi’s movement and built his armed wing around tribal connections."

Kamal Hamud al-Suwaidi "once had business ties with Saddam's entourage. Since the US-led invasion, Suwaidi declared himself a Wahabbist and has forged ties with Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi's Unity and Holy War faction, which funds him."

General Izzat Ibrahim Al-Durri was "Saddam's top deputy [and is] the man many believe is directly orchestrating much of the insurgency."

Mohammed Hadosh "was Saddam’s top bodyguard in Tikrit and the military believes he funds rebel activities in Baiji, home to Iraq’s largest refinery."

Rashi Taan Kazim is "a former governor in Al-Anbar [and] the point man for Baathist activity in Diyala. The military believes he funds groups, supplies weapons and "uses religious ideology to recruit extremists", in an example of the insurgency’s blurred lines."

Hussein Ali Muzebar "trained as a fighter in Afghanistan for three or four years before returning to Iraq around the time of the invasion. He is said to receive money from Al-Qaeda-linked groups, including Zarqawi, and to have plotted car bombings in Samarra."

Haiytham al-Saba "known as The Lion, is a young farmer who vowed to fight the Americans after his brother was killed in the aftermath of the invasion."

Taha Yassem al-Azoze "is a Salafist whose family opposed Saddam and had a brother killed by the jailed dictator and has plotted attacks against the Americans."

Abdul Rahman "is a criminal who decided to join insurgent activities."

Najam Abdul al-Takhi al-Nissani "is considered part of the insurgency's criminal element. He has published death lists of collaborators and reputedly receives funding from Fallujah and counts as many as 30 followers among his blood relatives."

Iraqi Rebels Grow Strong in Saddam’s Old Haunts
Arab News (Saudi Arabia)
Agence France Presse
11 January, 2005 (30, Dhul Qa`dah, 1425)

Bumpy road ahead to peaceful Samarra
Middle East News
SAMARRA, Iraq (AFP)
October 05, 2004

Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words
Middle East Watch
Human Rights Watch
Feb, 1994

Gordon Housworth

Red Eminence (l’Eminence rouge), Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal et duc de Richelieu
Gray Eminence (l’Eminence grise), François Joseph le Clerc du Tremblay

Provisional Iraqi election results (which become official after a three-day validation and challenge period) show an 8.55 million turnout, 58% of registered voters, under the expectations at poll closing.

The major groups (which often contain more than one party) in contention were:

• United Iraqi Alliance, connected to Ali al-Sistani
• Kurdish Unity List, led by Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani
• Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, led by Fay'iq Muhammad Ahmad Kubi
• Iraqi Islamic Party, led by Muhsin Abd-al-Hamid
• Iraqi List, led by Iyad Allawi
• Independent Iraqi Democrats Movement, led by Adnan Pachachi
• Iraqiyun (Iraqis), founded by Ghazi Ajil al-Yawir
• Iraqi National Unity Grouping, led by Nihru Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Kasanzan al-Husayni
• People's Union List, led by Hamid Majid Musa
• Constitutional Monarchy Movement, led by Sharif Ali bin al-Husayn

The news in the major winners was that the United Iraqi Alliance won at the low end of predictions:

• United Iraqi Alliance, 47.6%
• Kurdish Unity List (PUK and KDP et al), 25.4%
• Iraqi List, 13.6%
• All others, 13.4%

The major losers were the Iraqiyun (Iraqis) and Independent Iraqi Democrats Movement parties. No surprise that there was almost no turnout among Sunnis and that the highest turnout was among Kurds.

My attention is now on what I call the Red and Gray Eminence, how the other factions deal with them, and how the US influences that process:

• Iraqi Islamic Party is the Red Eminence, the visibly non-voting Sunni minority, the '0' of the 6:2:1:0
• Kamal and the other guy, which seem to be respective CIA and DoD insurgent specters beneath the Islamic Party

How the US deals with its perception of the insurgent threat will have a real-time affect on the willingness and political calculations of the voting parties to deal with the Red Eminence, and it with the others.

Gordon Housworth

Blog speed

The National Security Archive produces excellent Electronic Briefing Books, "online access to critical declassified records on issues including U.S. national security, foreign policy, diplomatic and military history, intelligence policy." On 10 February, 2005, the Archive released Bush Administration's First Memo on al-Qaeda Declassified. A citation was on Australian news the same day, factoring time zones, possibly from AFP sources in DC. dKOS picked it up and had it out on a blog entry at 10 Feb, 2005 at 18:40:42 PST. The full memo PDF is here. Distribution would have occurred without dKOS, but slower.

Traditional journalists have rightly commented that some bloggers rush materials on-line without sufficient fact checking and that due process should reign, which means the journalists' due process speed and not the medium's speed. Rubbish says I, these people might as well be Xerxes flogging the sea. Highstreet press has acknowledged the trend by permitting/nudging their serving journalists to put their own blogs.

The key for an open source analyst as myself is identifying an accurate datum regardless of provenance:

Figures vary on the percentage of open versus covert sources, but 90+% figures consistently cling to the open source category. Yes, one must apply the same critical analysis as one would do with classified data, starting with validity of source and validity of datum from source, but the data is there and it is often free of a central overriding institutional filter.

The scouring, refining, and gathering of competent blogs is time-consuming, but it has become an essential component of our I&W (Indicators & Warning) process. Blogs are often mixes of personal and 'core subject' material that it is maddening at times, but in terms of Asia, Africa, and the Persian littoral, they yield a form of battlefield surveillance outside the control of governments that constrict the mainstream press - and offer an early warning ability that we used on occasion.

Blogs have become the tripwire equivalent to ProMED in medical circles. We say ProMED first, CDC, second, and WHO in the back of the bus. (This ranking is on an organizational response level as some CDC and WHO staffers are on ProMED.)

Uproar Brings Focus on Role Of Bloggers
By David Snyder and Matthew Mosk
Washington Post
February 11, 2005

Free Expression Can Be Costly When Bloggers Bad-Mouth Jobs
By Amy Joyce
Washington Post
February 11, 2005

Your Blog or Mine?
By JEFFREY ROSEN
New York Times
December 19, 2004
Has scrolled to archive but can found here and as PDF here

Blog Interrupted
By April Witt
Washington Post
August 15, 2004

Gordon Housworth

It is regrettable to see that dKOS has pulled down the counterattack thread which I recently cited in what I would respectfully submit to be a thoughtful and complementary review of dKOS' open source activity in F is for fake; P is for Propagannon.

"Sorry. I can't seem to find that story," is not a sufficient replacement for a valid discussion thread of a legitimate issue.

It would appear that dKOS is guilty of the same actions that I have laid to your political opponents:

Their political opponents were tracking the research as revealed by the removal of embarrassing pages or sites soon after Kossacks reported them.  These passive countermeasures were fruitless as documented images were captured before reporting. To my mind, these after-the-fact removals were evidence of culpability and an acknowledgement of the merit of the discoveries.

I have an excerpt of that thread and post it here in the hopes that the original dKOS thread will reappear:

Other than that, keep up the rigorous analytic process as evidenced in Plame & Propagannon: We've Only Just Begun.

To dKOS' political opponents: You may not like the message, but you would do well to adopt the medium and professional rigor.

The nation can only benefit from such a debate.

Gordon Housworth

Agitprop has taken a leap with the addition of Propagannon, the "general tactic of a government or political party using a fake reporter to pollute the press pool."

Those expecting a polemic of any kind should move on. This note deals with the intersection of deception, national security breach, open source analysis, shadowing and passive countermeasures, power of weblogs, national security (again), political judgment, lapse of mission, and counterattacks. The locus of many of these threads pass through a single weblog.

When I spoke of the committed collector in Value from the fringe, I had not envisioned one as large, distributed, and committed as Daily KOS whose dKosopedia describes itself as a "collaborative project of the DailyKos community to build a political encyclopedia. The dKosopedia is written from a left/progressive/liberal/Democratic point of view while also attempting to fairly acknowledge the other side's take."

For an open source analyst, dKOS is remarkable rich resource by virtue of its management, rigor, enforcement control on contributors, frequent timelines, and features such as a political glossary Kossary. It's political adversaries appear to recognize the reach and diligence of dKOS by the attention that its opponents pay to the threads under development. Its threads are so enormous, so extensively researched, that I will merely cite some exemplars in the themes that I see interacting:

1. Deception in the creation of a sham journalist of extraordinarily dubious professional and personal credentials.
2. National security breach, laced with possible further deception in which said sham journalist may have been given the original Plame "leak" and that all subsequent investigative efforts were unfortunate red herrings.
3. Extraordinary open source analysis by the Kossacks, a modern day Baker Street Irregulars, Sherlock Holmes' street urchins who aided Holmes and were paid a shilling a day (plus expenses), with a guinea prize (or one pound, one shilling) for a vital clue (Kossacks work for zeal, not money).
4. Shadowing of Kossack research by political opponents employing near real-time, passive countermeasures.
5. Power of weblogs and dedicated contributors that form a distributed, human parallel processor array -- call it the Sixth Estate.
6. National security (again), this time for said dubious journalist, employing an alias, obtaining White House access, passing FBI background checks and repeatedly receiving press day passes from the White House press secretary.
7. Political judgment of those who would initiate such shallow deceptions.
8. Lapse of mission of both Fourth and Fifth Estates who appear omissive in the fulfillment of their charter.
9. Counterattacks, a not unreasonable concern.

Kossacks were able to marshal assets as diverse as facial recognition analysis, website and network analysts, gophers (to verify addresses, most of which were bogus), specialist researchers, subscribers to paid research, etc. It was a massive human parallel array that often returned answers to questions posed within minutes.

Their political opponents were tracking the research as revealed by the removal of embarrassing pages or sites soon after Kossacks reported them.  These passive countermeasures were fruitless as documented images were captured before reporting. To my mind, these after-the-fact removals were evidence of culpability and an acknowledgement of the merit of the discoveries.

I find it appalling that these exposes were unimpeachably done by a blog while the highstreet press was shamefully missing in action. It fell to specialist journals such as Editor & Publisher to expose their miserable failures -- such as quashing well-researched analyses of the 'bulge.' Built largely on the back of work by Kossacks, Rep. Louise Slaughter was able to field an open letter "regarding James "JD" Guckert (AKA Jeff Gannon) of Talon News" that caused Guckert/Gannon to immediately close his website and leave the White House press corps.

What judgment would field such a shallow deception failing all four of deception's classic components: security, plausibility, adaptability, and integration?

Gordon Housworth

Wags would say that exit polls and early precinct reports appear to be no more reliable in Iraq than they were in the US. The current tally of 4.6 million voters has reduced the Iraqi United Alliance from 67% (which would have theoretically given it a commanding mandate) to 51%. Kurds have moved into second with 25%. The Allawi alliance is reduced to 13%. Sunni voting is so effectively near 0 that the Shiite Iraqi United Alliance and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 'won' the vote in Salah al-Din Province, the Sunni-dominated region that is home to Saddam Hussein.

As US highstreet news is not delivering the requisite base knowledge underlying Iraqi voting (al Jazeera does better), I will offer some underpinnings here:

Iraq is divided into 18 provinces (Arabic: muhafazat, singular - muhafazah, Kurdish: پاریزگه Pârizgah), referred to in Iraqi government documents as Governorates, which are further divided into Districts. I still doubt that many readers have a grasp of Iraq geography, administrative regions, and demographics. Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (HIC) has a superb collection of geographic and thematic maps, and satellite imagery, of which here are but a few: Iraq (large), Governorates (provinces), Districts, Tribes in Iraq, and Population by Governorate.

The "Sunni Triangle" is too often painted as a convenient handkerchief of a triangle when fully more than a third of Iraq, the Sunni Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din Governorates are declared 'hostile provinces' and they collectively abut Najaf, Karbala, Badhdad, Taamin, and the three Kurdish provinces of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. Kurds would claim Taamin as theirs but for the forced resettlement of Sunni arabs to displace Kurds under Hussein). While on the subject of Kurds, the constitutionally-recognized Kurdistan Autonomous Region includes parts of a number of northern provinces, and is largely self-governing in internal affairs. (However if you ask the Kurdish National Congress, you will get a somewhat more extensive map of what they call Kurdistan.)

A bluff perhaps but I think it has a basis in fact. I also think that the Shiites are flexible enough -- and not nearly as doctrinaire as many US nationals might think -- that they can reduce their '6' in order to increase the x to a politically acceptable number.

Gordon Housworth

Part 1

Enter Intel, a chipset manufacturer that is promoting "white box" (generic PC) and "white book" (generic notebook) devices using generic designs, cases and hardware modules. Intel's intent is said to be the creation of a family of more compliant suppliers and so escape their current vulnerability to the two US giants - Dell and HP. 

Intel seems to be pursuing an approach that mimics the "beggar/maker-prince/maker" process that we see emerging among US automotive OEMs.  (As Intel provides roughly a fifth of the world's server products (at higher margins than PCs) and so competes with their server customers, it may be to Intel's advantage to suppress their current troublesome generic PC vendors while created a wider market for their chip sets.)

For those readers unfamiliar with beggar/maker-prince/maker, we see OEMs in a number of sectors, automotive included, that perceive themselves increasingly captive to powerful Tier One suppliers. To escape that burden, we believe that the OEMs are in the process of elevating smaller suppliers (making princes out of serfs) while taking business away from the leading suppliers for future models (making beggars out of kings).  The result in both automotive and electronic market sectors is to leave the top of the manufacturing tier in stronger control of its supply chains. 

Lenovo, then called Legend, abandoned their PC designs and subbed back to Taiwan (though manufacturing still occurred in China) in order to achieve greater price volume advantages.  While not an expert on the tax matters of foreign subsidiaries I am told that the formation of a new foreign subsidiary in China allows the foreign company to restart the clock on tax relief and other advantages offered to the foreign firm.  This may account for the growing number of subsidiaries formed in China by Taiwanese firms. This is likely one contribution to the significant overcapacity on the manufacturing side that has led to depressed margins for many of the Taiwanese OEMs and ODMs. I should think that Taiwanese manufacturers would look favorably on supporting Lenovo branded line of computers.

Lenovo may actually perceive themselves as a branded marketing channel akin to Dell and HP, taking advantage of excess "Taiwanese" manufacturing capacity and the white box and white book push by Intel.  An unintended consequence of Intel's action could be that Lenovo instantly harvests a world-class PC and laptop design and manufacturing capability that rivals Dell and HP.  The lengthy transition that the market had factored into Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's PC unit could thereby be collapsed into a process of well-under a year.

Extension to other segments: There is an interesting connection between laptop and supercomputer design.  It would appear that the technology in high-end density servers mimics that of laptops in that they all require means to deal with power efficiency, heat management and switching/docking mechanics.  This recognition of thermal efficiency indicates that the push for absolute power has shifted to efficient use of power.  This same skill in thermal efficiency may impact future supercomputer design.  If so, acquiring these skills in laptop design could allow Lenovo a leap into more efficient and smaller supercomputer designs.

Secondary implications: Taiwanese manufacturers have been aware of the coming shift to China as the principal manufacturing center and have been searching for ways to increase their price-volume curves as well as defining replacement industries to enter.  For a number of the major firms, that decision appears to have been made but that is the subject of a future note.

Lenovo: The making of a legend?
Mary Hennock
BBC News
8 December, 2004

Gordon Housworth