return to ICG Spaces home    ICG Risk Blog    discussions    newsletters    login    

ICG Risk Blog - [ InfoT Public ]

Wolfowitz survives his tsunami. Or perhaps he was the tsunami

  #

It was done in a month, from mention as candidate to formal confirmation as president of the World Bank. Early on, I had the feeling of a wave, a tsunami, of commentary pro and con - no one seemed neutral in the slightest - surrounding the nomination and it was not clear at the onset that it would end easily or favorably for Wolfowitz. As one of the daily news aggregators that I follow is News & Broadcast from the World Bank Group, it proved to be an interesting study of watching 'the patient examine itself' as Wolfowitz's candidacy progressed from murmur through reality, affront and reaction, political calculus and negotiation, 'beauty contest' interviews, resolution, and appointment.

First a word about the structure of News & Broadcast. There are some five or six survey articles in descending priority drawn from a wide spectrum of news sources. Following those is a Briefly Noted section that has a few sentences on a variety of subjects. While Wolfowitz's passage can almost be gleaned from the titles and their order in the aggregation, I will offer some observations. Unless otherwise noted, all citations are from World Bank:

March 1 & 2, Briefly Noted: Wolfowitz and Carly Fiorina are mooted as candidates to replace Wolfensohn. Wolfowitz would be "highly controversial" yet he was staying put as OSD.

March 3, Story 4: Europe diplomatically focused on Wolfowitz's lack of development experience, not as an architect of the Iraq war. Trust in, and credibility of, World Bank would falter. At least five other candidates in the scrum.

March 16, press release: World Bank receives formal US nomination of Wolfowitz for Presidency

March 16, Washington Post: Europe is stunned, "much surprise, little enthusiasm and some outright opposition in Europe." Minuscule US-European relations could be undermined. Two interpretations, neither good, "going to take him away from U.S. policy" or the US "has to give sop to the far right." Private environmental and aid organizations largely hostile. Praise from UK only.

March 17, Stories 1 & 2: "a lightning rod of controversy… a bitter fight on the World Bank board… decision to send [Bush's] hawkish deputy defense secretary to the world's leading development institution underlines [Bush's] eagerness to see multilateral organizations advance America's foreign policy… European sources said Wolfowitz's name was circulated informally among board directors several weeks ago and was rejected." "There are going to be a lot of very unhappy people but they may be as upset about the process as about the person… They were supposed to consult us and there was no consultation."

Issues of reform and redirection of the bank. Common concern over US "trying to turn the World Bank into an agency of the "war on terror", adopting a political mission with democratization and political lending criteria to match. Wolfowitz compared to Robert McNamara in which "Pentagon leaders identified with controversial wars taking the same exit route to new careers at a time the wars were unresolved." Wolfowitz vows to wage war on poverty, believing "deeply and passionately in the mission of the World Bank," looks forward to "meeting the European executive directors and the European finance ministers and development ministers."

March 18, Stories 1 & 2: Europe reacts "coolly," ranging from "outright hostile -- "a disaster," one critic said -- to the tepid, with diplomats cautious in their language," yet "Most European Union diplomats however dismissed any idea of a united front to block the nomination." "many bank insiders and observers predict that the odds strongly favor Wolfowitz eventually getting the job, [although the furor] indicated that at the very least a fight will rage for several weeks before the board approves him." A veto would create "vast ill will in the US [and] it would be far too easy for Bush to put forward a much worse candidate than Wolfowitz. It would be politically impossible for the Europeans to cast a veto twice."

Germany wants to "avoid any disagreement [with the US as] Germany is hoping for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council – and for that the country needs the agreement of the United States." France "would not want to antagonize [the US] at a time when it was pushing its own nationals for important jobs at international institutions." European members of the World Bank's board seek to interview Wolfowitz separately for the job of president while the World Bank's Staff Association sought to meet (interview) Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz's romantic relationship with Shaha Riza in the bank's Middle East and North Africa department is noted. Critics call for an overhaul of the "gentleman's agreement" process under which the World Bank chief is generally nominated by Washington and the head of the IMF by Europeans.

March 21, Washington Post: "In a sign of the antipathy toward Wolfowitz at the World Bank's headquarters, staffers last week were e-mailing each other a video clip in which the Pentagon official was skewered on "The Daily Show," the satiric news program, for having miscalculated the problems involved in rebuilding Iraq."

Wolfowitz continues to stress "that he attaches prime importance to the bank's goal of fighting poverty," and has "been scoring points by harking back to his experience in Indonesia… where economic development was the most important issue on the agenda." Charm offensive is necessary to overcome "handicaps" and suspicions over US "intentions in choosing him."

March 21, Story 1: Wolfowitz had first interviews with World Bank members. "Although there is no set process to select the president, experts said this was the first time in recent World Bank history that shareholders had asked to interview a nominee." The European Union invites Wolfowitz "to present his future plans if confirmed" but denies "that the invitation amounted to an "audition."" Euro nonprofit groups continue to pressure governments to reject the nomination. The European Parliament's development committee expressed "great concern" over the nomination.

Wolfowitz makes his views known, vowing that there would be no "regime change" at the Bank, that "he would come to the bank with an open mind and no political program," that the bank's mission "is by nature multilateral" and that "the Bank should make Africa a priority." World Bank staff association is "swamped with complaints from employees over the selection of Wolfowitz." Alarm is widespread.

March 22, Story 1: "German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said Germany would not try to block Wolfowitz's candidacy [making] it clear that a European-led challenge to Wolfowitz is not in the offing" and the board will not likely accept an alternative candidate should the developing countries put one forward.

Wolfowitz was the victor that day if not earlier. Wolfowitz is increasingly described as "a very serious and credible candidate."

March 23, Story 1: In what I took as going through the motions, saving face, and soothing anxious constituencies, "European Union finance ministers agreed Tuesday that US nominee for World Bank chief Paul Wolfowitz is a "serious candidate," but said they want to hear his views in person, possibly in the next 10 days." "[P]eople familiar with the situation in Brussels said key European Union finance ministers had agreed informally not to oppose his candidacy… US officials in Washington said they now assume Wolfowitz will be approved by the World Bank's 24-member executive board, which is expected to meet March 31. European Union nations are slowly moving toward endorsing [Wolfowitz and that] there were no "very negative attitudes" toward the former US deputy defense chief [and] he is taken as a serious candidate by everyone."

March 24, Press release: Wolfowitz met 23 March with "Executive Directors representing European Union member countries of the World Bank" to hear his views on the bank's "overarching goal" (poverty reduction), its status as a "finance and knowledge institution," the role of multilaterals and bilateral development agencies, corporate governance, et al.

March 24, Story 1: "Wolfowitz virtually sealed his election as World Bank president Wednesday [23 March] after meeting with members of the bank's board, who were impressed and reassured by his answers to their questions." But in a continuation of political theater, "The self-styled G-11 World Bank executive directors from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, who represent 108 bank member countries [state that] We were pleased with the exchange that we had with him." Wolfensohn said [that] he expects US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to be appointed his successor and predicted he would do "a fine job."

March 28, Story 1: Wolfowitz continues to stress that he "will focus on measures to boost economic growth, cut poverty and clamp down on graft around the globe."

March 30, Story 1: The EU gave Wolfowitz "a green light on Wednesday by calling him the "incoming president of the World Bank" on the eve of a board meeting to choose a new head of the development bank."

March 31, Story 1: The EU backed Wolfowitz's nomination as World Bank chief Wednesday as the "US deputy defense secretary promised to work closely with Europe and mount a major fight against global poverty… Wolfowitz refused to give an immediate pledge that he would select a European as his senior deputy, and ruffled feathers by linking aid and development to the Bush agenda of promoting political freedom and good governance. "He told us nothing and gave nothing away.""

April 1, Story 1: World Bank Executive Board "unanimously approved Paul D. Wolfowitz Thursday as the bank's next president, a move that for the first time will put a Bush administration appointee at the helm of the giant anti-poverty institution." "Europe-representing executive directors [issued a hopeful statement designed for European press] that they expect Wolfowitz to focus on poverty eradication, work in partnership, enhance the voice and participation of developing and transition countries, apply the spirit of multilateral principles and address other issues."

Now that the new king was crowned, the old king could be criticized: "[E]ven Europeans hope that Wolfowitz will bring order to the Bank's management. James Wolfensohn, the outgoing president, has been criticized for being little interested in the Bank's core business of lending [preferring the] championing [of] new programs. So the Bank has been ill-focused and plagued by mission creep."

Opinion: I will be pleasantly surprised if his tenure turns out well as my thoughts lie with The Economist, the Financial Times and The Daily Show:

The Economist: It is doubtful that Wolfowitz's zealotry, albeit in that noble cause, is right for the Bank. Its job is alleviating poverty, and the relationship between democracy and the relief of poverty is, let us say, complicated. Think of China. The Bank needs a realist more than a visionary.

The Financial Times: To put the unilateralist architect of the Iraq war in charge of the world's premier multilateral development agency is, many must think, to put a fox in charge of the chicken coop. Wolfowitz's comments on the likely costs of the Iraq war and prospective popularity of the invading forces in Iraq put his judgment in question. But, above all, the world would view a bank directed by Wolfowitz as no more than an instrument of US power and US priorities. Every piece of advice the bank gave and condition it set would be made illegitimate, in the eyes of recipients, by the perception that it served the interests of the world's "sole superpower". The impact on the bank's legitimacy would be hugely damaging.

For someone so closely identified with the Bush administration, and who has consistently made the promotion of democracy the top goal, Wolfowitz's more persistent challenge may be to demonstrate his ability to lead an institution of all the bank's members. He says he will not use the World Bank to further democracy but argues that democracy can be a side product that emerges from economic and social development. Other officials point out that, as a former cold warrior, he has long recognized the advantages of tolerating some regimes, however autocratic… Bank insiders stress the importance of delivering a consistent message across countries…

I hope that the poor will not suffer further.

Briefly Noted… The Financial Times reports that Paul Wolfowitz, US deputy secretary of defense, has emerged as a leading candidate
March 1, 2005

Briefly Noted… The New York Times reports that Carleton S. Fiorina, who lost her job as chief executive of Hewlett-Packard almost three weeks ago, has emerged as a strong candidate
March 2, 2005

Wolfowitz World Bank Shortlisting Raises Questions Over Qualifications
March 3, 2005

Nomination For Presidency Of The World Bank
Press Release
March 16, 2005

Nomination Shocks, Worries Europeans
Some Say Selection of War Proponent Could Undercut Improved U.S. Relations
By Keith B. Richburg and Glenn Frankel
Washington Post
March 17, 2005

Bush Picks Wolfowitz For New World Bank President
March 17, 2005

Views And Opinions: Wolfowitz's Nomination To World Bank Draws Praise, Criticism
March 17, 2005

Europe Cool, Aid Groups Dismayed Over World Bank Role For Wolfowitz
March 18, 2005

Commentaries and Editorials: The challenge ahead for the World Bank
March 18, 2005

Wolfowitz Strives To Quell Criticism
By Paul Blustein
Washington Post
March 21, 2005

Wolfowitz Meets World Bank Shareholders
March 21, 2005

Wolfowitz Closing In On Bank Post
March 22, 2005

Wolfowitz Dating Muslim Woman Causes Stir
Barbara Ferguson, Arab News
Wednesday, 23, March, 2005 (12, Safar, 1426)

Statement By Group Of Executive Directors On The World Bank’s Selection Process
Press Release No.:2005/397/S
March 23, 2005

EU Sees Wolfowitz As 'Serious Candidate' For World Bank Job
March 23, 2005

Statement By World Bank Executive Directors Representing EU Member Countries On Their Meeting With Paul Wolfowitz
Press Release No.:2005/401/S
March 24, 2005

Developing States Meet Wolfowitz On World Bank Job
March 24, 2005

Statement By World Bank Group’s Board Of Executive Directors On Presidential Selection
Press Release No.:2005/403/S
March 25, 2005

Wolfowitz To Meet Europeans In Luxembourg: Sources
March 25, 2005

Wolfowitz says he will focus on cutting poverty if named World Bank president
March 28, 2005

EU Calls Wolfowitz "Incoming World Bank President"
March 30, 2005

EU Ministers Back Wolfowitz Candidacy, Commitment To Make Fight Against Poverty Top Goal As World Bank Chief
March 31, 2005

Board Approves Wolfowitz as World Bank Leader
April 1, 2005

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

China: a planners' preference defense industry succeeds in spite of systemic shortcomings

  #

China's military-industrial complex is a study in contrasts. Effectively unique in the third world/developing world in that it produces a complete range of military equipment that includes "small arms, armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, warships, submarines, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles; is one of the oldest and largest defense sectors, yet faces system shortcomings that have evinced difficulties in "translating theory and design into reliable weapon systems":

  • Technologically backwards defense industries (much indigenous design equivalent to 1970s-1980s technology
  • Critical R&D gaps (aeronautics, propulsion, microelectronics, computers, avionics, sensors and seekers, electronic warfare, and advanced materials.
  • Systems integration and program delays
  • Inefficient, wasteful production dogged by excess capacity
  • Consistently poor production quality control
  • Small and sporadic production runs
  • Inadequate funding
  • Centralized and personality-centric production management leading centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and risk-averse state-owned enterprises (SOEs)

One wonders if it matters, given the criticality of the arms sector in a planners' preference economy in a postwar environment in which the PRC's political and economic evolution had outstripped a military people's doctrine perfected in WWII that came to be seen as a massive gap in power projection, international legitimacy and primacy, and an inability to exercise a "sovereign right over territories it claims as integral to the PRC." The PRC commenced a "massive drive to modernize its conventional and strategic forces to levels comparable with the [US across] the entire spectrum [of] equipment, structures and systems, doctrine and human resources" with a specific focus on:

developing limited power-projection capabilities to deal with a range of possible conflict scenarios along its periphery, especially in maritime areas. The PLA is acquiring military capabilities designed to defend Chinese sovereignty and territorial interests and, in particular, to pose a credible threat to Taiwan in order to influence Taiwan's choices about its political future; ...These capabilities are also intended to deter, delay, or complicate U.S. efforts to intervene on behalf of Taiwan."

Despite the aforementioned deficiencies, some remarkable weapons systems are now appearing that had "their genesis in design and development" decades ago:

  • Dong Feng 31 (DF-31) three-stage, solid-fuel, mobile ICBM , employing endoatmospheric decoys, and delivering a "single megaton-yield warhead or up to five multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) with a selectable yield of 20, 90 or 150 kilotons" at a range of 8,000 kilometers using inertial guidance with celestial nav correction to a reputed 100 meter CEP. The DF-31 places all the US west coast, all US Pacific and Indian ocean assets, all of Europe, and parts of Russia and India within range. The enhanced DF-41 will be able to target the entire US.
  • Jian-10 (J-10) fighter (based on the Israeli Lavi using US technology), improved variants of the XAIC Jianhong JH-7 (FB-7) fighter-bomber, Hongqi-9 (HQ-9) long-range SAM (based on Russian S-300P/SA-10 Grumble, US Patriot technology (ostensibly via Israel)) and preexisting Chinese systems), the Type 039 Song class) diesel-electric submarine, and the Type 052C Lanzhou Class guided missile destroyer (DDG)

Despite these remarkable accomplishments, overall defense efficiency remained low and sluggish, the result of which was an overhaul of the Chinese defense complex in the 1990s. The vast Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), created in 1982 by merger of four large defense groups, was broken up to be replaced by a General Armament Department (GAD) responsible for overseeing defense procurement and new weapons programs, in effect, becoming the PLA's purchasing office. The SOEs were reformed into eleven defense industry enterprise groups (DIEGs) intended to function as "true conglomerates, integrating R&D, production, and marketing" that would compete against one another for PLA procurement contracts thereby becoming more innovative and efficient by downsizing under a policy of "letting the strong annex the weak."

Reforms still have not introduced market forces nor have they addressed the "the lack of advanced technical skills and expertise, compartmentalization and redundancy, and a bureaucratic/risk-averse corporate culture":

  • Competitive bidding and market pricing have yet to appear in the procurement process
  • DIEGs have yet to compete with one another
  • Defense industry rationalization in both manpower and plant closures is glacial
  • Massive subsidies continue to flow to the defense sector to retire its debt

Given the desire to reach peer status with the US, one might expect the Chinese military-industrial complex to remain selectively productive yet inefficient and suboptimal overall as cubic acres of dollars are applied to deliver key components:

It could be argued [that] that simply throwing more money at the defense industry has had a considerable impact - through increasing procurement and therefore production, and by providing more funds for R&D.

Bridging the Gap: PRC Missile Modernization and the Changing Deterrence Environment
By Vijai K Nair
CHINA BRIEF
Volume 5 Issue 7 (March 29 , 2005)

The PRC's Defense Industry: Reform Without Improvement
By Richard A. Bitzinger
CHINA BRIEF
Volume 5 Issue 6 (March 15 , 2005)

A Paper Tiger No More?
The U.S. Debate over China's Military Modernization
Richard Bitzinger
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, December 2003

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

The value of "least tech" or "most efficient tech" in subverting complex civilian systems

  #

I had a recent opportunity to comment on John Robb's The Dark Side of the Long Tail, an application of the work of Chris Anderson and others on the effects of globalization, new production tools, and the Internet in shifting market dominance in certain industries from a few providers (which in terms or warfare would be called nation states) to a long and sustaining 'tail' of niche suppliers (such as terrorists and criminal gangs).

In support of applying this shift of a "limited, truncated distribution of violence" (force projection by nation states) to various nonstate actors, Robb presented three trends:

  1. A democratization of the tools of warfare. Niche producers [are] made possible by the dislocation of globalization. All it takes to participate is a few men, some boxcutters, and a plane (as an example of simple tools combined with leverage from ubiquitous economic infrastructure).
  2. An amplification of the damage caused by niche producers of warfare. The magic of global guerrilla systems disruption which turns inexpensive attacks into major economic and social events.
  3. The acceleration of word of mouth. New groups can more easily find/train recruits, convey their message to a wide audience, and find/coordinate their activities with other groups (allies).

I offered this clarification to point 1, that the simplicity was not in the box cutter but in the elegance of the surveillance that identified a box cutter as a sufficient means to gain the ends:

I would submit that the key is not the simplicity of the box cutter but the richness and patience of the sustained surveillance that preceded the attack, a surveillance trajectory that went through a process of broad information gathering, target evaluation and selection, advanced target surveillance once selections were made, et al. Their asymmetrical surveillance process is designed to gather actionable information while reducing discovery prior to putting the attack into motion. They did not use an assault rifle because they were able to determine that a box cutter would suffice, i.e., they used no more complexity than the task demanded.

Nice datum: In a discussion of supposedly low-tech highjackers using box-cutters, the authors of Safe: The Race to Protect Ourselves in a Newly Dangerous World cautioned against such simplistic thinking, punctuating it with an example of the terrorists paying close attention to US airline procedures and airframe peculiarities. They say that they are the first to document that the hijackers found that the collision avoidance systems could be turned off in a Boeing but not in an Airbus, thus they only hijacked Boeings.

In their surveillance, they were anything but simplistic, and it is that surveillance maturation that I submit that we are not now attempting to detect and counter. Such a failure will only guarantee the arrival of one or more shooter teams.

Robb agreed, noting that:

Terrorists are increasingly able to substitute thinking for weaponry. This is done by transforming civilian systems into weapons. In this new model low tech weapons + good planning + complex civilian systems = an attack on par in damage with the best weapons systems of the western world.

My follow-on was:

Agree with the concept of "transforming civilian systems into weapons" as it offers maximum efficiency at minimized cost and risk of disclosure and execution. For your readers, however, I would like to substitute "least tech" or "most efficient tech" in your equation of 'low tech weapons + good planning + complex civilian systems = an attack on par…' as we cannot lull ourselves into believing that adversaries will only use low tech solutions (augmentations) in order to achieve their aims.

11 September is an excellent example in identifying generic control of a flight deck for terrorist aims as the critical path to success, not necessarily a low tech process. Box cutters were only a means to gain access to, and control of, the flight deck. Following is a snippet from an earlier Low risk terrorist access to the flight deck:

"Terrorist supply chains, or asymmetrical attacker Supply chains, are not built for commercial efficiency but for detection avoidance at least until the attack is in progress. The terrorist risk calculus is not based so much on survival as on mission success. In terms of using aircraft as weapons, the critical path in the terrorist chains has been access to, and control of, the flight deck. [The] plan that matured into the 11 September airliner attacks started as the attempted purchase of light twin aircraft that were to be modified for aerial spraying (but in this case the liquid tanks were intended to transport flammable materials onto the target rather than spraying). Only when that plan failed, did the attackers turn to airliners. Control of the flight deck remained the critical path element.

Post 11 September, airline passengers are now alert to the fact that they will be part of the missile, rather than being held for some form of ransom, and so are much more likely to resist the hijackers. Given that risk to mission success, where is the next least defended flight deck? Three that come to mind are: Freight and cargo aircraft, Bizjets and executive jets, and Medivac and executive helicopters."

In closing I noted that this was not a scenario-based analysis but a risk-based process analysis. Scenario planning is consumptive of resources, ultimately paralytic as to 'protect everything is to protect nothing,' yet usually misses the scenario that delivers the payload.

Safe: The Race to Protect Ourselves in a Newly Dangerous World
Martha Baer, Katrina Heron, Oliver Morton, & Evan Ratliff
HarperCollins, 2005

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

"Minus the landmines," a southern US border reminiscent of Iraq

  #

That US Customs could be "stunned" to detect a 200 yard tunnel with a "cement floor and an intercom system [passing under] two streets and an apartment complex" from Mexicali to Calexico, CA, is curious as when I last wrote on this matter a year ago, the DEA had analyzed 21 complete and incomplete tunnel systems, some 1000 feet long with reinforced construction, cart and rail systems, lights and ventilation. 20 of 21 were near ports of entry in Arizona and California (as New Mexico has few border towns to act as a terminus and Texas has the Rio Grande River). (See While we're looking the other way -- tunnels?).

Proceeding similarly unabated is the brazen overland traffic in the no-mans land of Arizona's Naco strip is so severe that DHS has deployed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for border surveillance. Compare this recent observation with earlier reports in Other than Mexican: from the Triborder area to the Naco strip:

it’s hard to communicate how totally out of control the situation has gotten. Think back to the LA riots. If you were out in the street when all hell was breaking loose — would you have felt safe? The border area is less dynamic, but still very dangerous. Automatic gunfire is a common sound. Seeing dope mules with Ak47’s work drug loads over the border is a common sight. [W]hile I realize that the idea of wearing a weapon just to walk around sounds kooky, and even dangerous, your readers have to understand how totally out of control this place is. I can honestly say – it is as dangerous as the Iraq/Iran border — minus the landmines.

US-Mexican relations bifurcated in a post 11 September world in which the US became fixated on border security as Mexico retained its focus on the free Northward flow of migrant workers that provided an essential social safety valve while remitting significant sums back to family members in Mexico. While some question improved US skills in monitoring and interdicting illegal entrants, Mexico is ramping up its efforts to keep its nationals flowing north.

As the southern border tightens and US attention to a guest-worker program fades, President Vicente Fox has described the US 'anti-immigrant' measures as "the work of "minority, xenophobic, discriminatory groups" who do not recognize the contributions of the three million Mexicans who work illegally in the United States."

The Mexican foreign ministry had published (and may still publish) upwards a million copies of a practical self-help Spanish language guide in illustrated comic book form for migrants planning a trip north - and still maintains the book on the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores' website. The booklet deals with the dangers of scouting and crossing the river, food and clothing for desert trekking, heat and sunstroke, concerns over smugglers called coyotes or polleros, impacts of using false documents or lying to authorities, passive escape attempts but if apprehended a thorough description of their rights under US law. There is also a radio station, La Poderosa XERF 1570 AM, for updates.

Mexico seems resistant to recognizing that its migrants are but one of four streams heading north, each with its own threats to the US, and that until the others are contained, its migrants will also be restrained: 

  • 'Conventional economic migrant worker flow
  • "Other Than Mexican" (OTM) illegal alien category, i.e., "other than Mexico or other central and South American countries" non-Latin categories as diverse as Asian and Middle Eastern
  • Drug shipments by any means
  • Terrorists from al Qaeda and its affiliates

The problems along the border are so severe along the Arizona border that an unarmed civilian patrol called the Minuteman Project has been formed to provide a visual alert that US federal assets cannot, a step which the NY Times describes as "alarming," an adjective I accept only in describing the nature of the uncontained threat but not the Minuteman concept itself. Notice that federal authorities are not complaining, nor are they contemplating the kind of legal challenges to the Minutemen that the Mexican government are raising.

One only has to follow the money from South America's Tri-Border area (TBA) northward to wonder 'when, how many, and how often' and not 'if.' I urge readers to the reference citations of the earlier note for substantive background - and the fact that while most US border patrol officers will only speak under anonymity, a local Border Patrol station stated for the record, "Our policy is to turn any OTM's over to the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security" -- some 5,510 from Oct 2003 to July 2004.

Southern migration has morphed from an economic to a security issue and it will only worsen in the near to medium term.

At Mexican Border, Tunnels, Vile River, Rusty Fence
By JAMES C. McKINLEY Jr.
New York Times
March 23, 2005

GUÍA DEL MIGRANTE MEXICANO
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores
Mexico

Interview with John Smallberries, Minuteman Project Volunteer
LaShawn Barber
Mar 15, 2005

Mexican migrant activists brace for Arizona anti-migrant patrols as Mexican goverment plans legal action
March 1, 2005
Associated Press/North County Times

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

Retaining the 'Mandate from Heaven' and Taiwan trumps access to EU arms

  #

As most US nationals and, I surmise, most EU nationals have little understanding of the micro-politics of intra-Taiwan affairs and the reflections of those politics upon Beijing, it is too easy to see Beijing as having "lost" something in the EU's continuance of its post-Tiananmen arms embargo. Not so. Neither do the western high street press understand the nuance of the Beijing-Taipei axis, or if their journalists do, they are not given the ink to describe its nuances properly. The Chinese are so sensitive to Taiwanese actions that what we see as 'overreaction' is a litmus test of Chinese attention.

Not particularly inflammatory, the Anti-Secession Law passed by the National People's Congress made explicit what was always implicit, authorizing "China to use military force if Taiwan moves decisively toward or declares formal independence." China is in the unenviable position of threatening war and it hopes for peace as the CCP "would not survive the economic slump that would follow even a limited war on Taiwan." The problem is that the CCP would fall the sooner for not acting against Taiwan in first instance.

While the Chinese protest the embargo's continuance much as the Indians pro forma protest the sale of F-16s to Pakistan, let none miss the essential critical path:

  1. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains the 'Mandate from Heaven' for continuation of governance, i.e., "Chinese leadership could not survive politically if it were to allow Taiwan to become independent"
  2. Hu Jintao as President must continue to solidify power, especially as he assumes military leadership from former president Jiang Zemin, against a backdrop of "rising domestic public opinion [that] was blaming Beijing for not having the spine to act against Taiwan"
  3. China maintains the focus and pressure on its renegade state, Taiwan, making explicit what was always implicit, while regaining some initiative against Taipei after a decade of feckless reaction
  4. China continues to purchase the bulk of essential military modernization from Russia, and secondarily Israel, both unaffected by the EU boycott

Everything else is acceptable collateral damage which in the case of the EU embargo is only a temporary setback. The greatest losers are actually the French, Germans, English and other EU members that were looking forward to selling "state-of-the-art military hardware and technology to China" that they would try to cloak under the dual use rubric.

Understanding Asia benefits from looking through an Asian lens, yet written in English for we non-Chinese speakers to absorb. One of the sites that does a good job in this respect (after the FEER was gelded) is the Asia Times (along with the Asian WSJ, which is politically less ossified than its US parent). I would refer readers to Laurence Eyton's Taiwan independence forces rejoice. (Do not be put off by the title as Eyton's title refers to the slight buoyancy to the under-10% pro-independence sector.)

Eyton gives readers a thoughtful analysis of the interactions, missteps, and counters of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Kuomintang (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) that gave rise to the Anti-Secession Law which is now "dogged by the law of unintended consequences" in that it has "generated outrage in Taiwan itself… increased pro-independence sentiment… gained more supporters for Taiwan's arms budget [and] caused the US and Japan to clarify their intentions regarding the Taiwan Strait" although I believe that the Japanese government was well on the way to promulgating a stronger anti-Chinese stance well before the secession law. Once one gains an understanding of Taiwan's constitutional processes and public opinion, it does seem that fears by the Chinese of secession and the US of a declaration of independence are unwarranted.

China appears to have been one of many that misinterpreted Taiwan's 2003 Referendum Law which was:

plainly aimed at preventing any reunification deal that lacked a referendum's democratic imprimatur; the intention was specifically to prevent the opposition "selling out" Taiwan should it regain power. China - and others - mistakenly thought, however, that the Referendum Law was to be used to try to further Taiwan independence. Partly this was a result of misinformation [from] Taiwan's opposition parties, and partly it was the result of Chen and the DPP making promises [that] that they in fact had no chance of keeping… Chen would never call a referendum on independence, not because of China's threats or the United States' constraints, but simply because it would never pass. While fewer than one in 10 Taiwanese wants reunification in the foreseeable future, prudent thinking among the Taiwanese means hardline pro-independence support rarely reaches 20% in polls.

I would direct readers to Zhiqun Zhu's Secession bill shows China's wisdom for understandable drivers of Chinese behavior. I agree with Zhu that passage of an anti-secession law was "relatively easy [but the difficulty will be the charm offensive needed for] winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese public."

As for the ban, it is likely that it will only extend to 2006 as the current EU president from Luxembourg was not enamored at bringing the embargo issue forward. The next EU presidency falls to the UK whose diplomats believe that "lifting the ban would be exceedingly controversial and quite possibly unpopular at home." The European Commission was pleased for the hiatus as the European Parliament, Amnesty International (whose December 2004 report says that China's human rights are getting worse not better) and much of the EU nationals were questioning lifting the ban before the Anti-Secession Law. The Chinese are skilled, realistic diplomats who can be expected to continue calling the arms embargo "political discrimination not in line with today's reality," question how the as yet hazy EU-China "strategic partnership" is to be made tangible, and to confront journalists and analysts for what it calls "unfavorable" and "biased" reporting on China.

That is a small price to pay for governance and Taiwan. Francesco Sisci makes an interesting point that China may be able to claim global acquiescence if the international community, which dislikes the law but does not want to offend China, fail to condemn a law authorizing war.

China's Law On Taiwan Backfires
By Edward Cody
Washington Post
March 24, 2005

Taiwan independence forces rejoice
By Laurence Eyton
Asia Times
Mar 19, 2005

The Dragon squeezes Taiwan
By Bruce Klingner
Asia Times
Mar 15, 2005

Secession bill shows China's wisdom
By Zhiqun Zhu
Asia Times
Dec 21, 2004

Anti-secession bill reveals China's fears
By Li YongYan
Asia Times
Dev 21, 2004

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

Fractional orbital bombardment systems then and now

  #

A much earlier, clumsy but threatening Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) came to mind as a recent mention of DARPA’s FALCON (Force Application and Launch from CONUS) program crossed my desk:

The demonstration common aero vehicle system will be able to fly 3,000 nautical miles in approximately 800 seconds and deliver a 1,000-pound penetrator munition. An enhanced version of this demonstration system will be able to fly 9,000 nautical miles in approximately 3,000 seconds. The common aero vehicle and its enhanced version will also be able to "turn" to hit targets up to 800 and 3,000 nautical miles, respectively, off a straight trajectory. For the most part, common aero vehicles require the same technologies as hypersonic cruise vehicles, but also need a more rigorous thermal protection system to prevent their payloads from melting at re-entry speeds as high as Mach 25. By comparison, the hypersonic cruise vehicle will return to its base at speeds of approximately Mach 3-4.

In the early 1960s, the USSR needed to overcome the West's forward base advantage in Turkey, Europe, and Asia where IRBMs and bombers could attack the Soviet Union. Failing the quid pro quo of placing missiles in Cuba, the USSR sought an alternative to forward basing in the ability of the Vostok launches "to orbit a space vehicle and then land it in a specific target."

While Khrushchev alluded to the capacity as early as 1962 in noting, "Global rockets can fly from the oceans or other directions where warning facilities cannot be installed," the USSR began testing FOBS in 1965-67 despite being a signatory to the UN 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. While it did not grab the attention of the US electorate then focused on Vietnam and a presidential election, I can assure you that it galvanized the US defense community:

The primary perceived advantage of a fractional orbit bombardment system was a shorter time of visibility to defense sensors in the target area because the orbital portion of its trajectory (around 160 km) was lower than that of a ballistic missile’s trajectory (which would normally reach a peak altitude of about 1,300 km)... Fractional orbit bombardment weapons could also approach their intended targets from any direction, even from the south, making them invisible to the U.S. early warning sensors of the time.

In order to marginalize US surveillance and warning, the Soviets surrendered accuracy for the more complex maneuvering required and payload for the added fuel needed to achieve orbit and the subsequent deorbit maneuver. Until the advent of SLBMs and spaced based missile warning sensors (which detected launches regardless of trajectory altitude), FOBS caused the US much anguish due to the uncertainty as to when a payload would be deorbited onto target and where it would strike.

FOBS was, in fact, one of three drivers that produced modern space based Infrared (IR) missile early warning, the other two being the need to assume the nuclear detection mission and the geosynchronous orbit that replaced earlier polar orbits. (The system that became the Defense Support Program (DSP) first "provided critical backup" to existing radar sites, then "co-equal status" with the radars, and ultimately replacing the radars a decade later.)

FOBS was a large system, developed in parallel to the US Titan-2 ICBM, based on the R-36 second generation ICBMs featuring multiple warheads and orbital flight trajectories.

The R-36-O was the only orbiting military nuclear weapon ever deployed... Since orbiting of nuclear weapons was a violation of international treaty, the Soviet Union conducted all tests on a 'fractional orbit' basis - i.e. the test warheads were deorbited after less than one orbit of the earth. The launches were however logged and tracked as satellites by international treaty… The system was in service at 18 silos at Baikonur from [1969 to 1983 until demolished under SALT-2 or converted to] orbital launch vehicle use.

The standard warhead yield was 5 MT with a CEP of 1 KM.

We have long applied McLuhan's four Laws of the Media, AKA the McLuhan Tetrad, to the impact of technology advances. The Tetrad states that "any given medium [new approach or technology] will amplify, obsolesce, retrieve and reverse some other medium or human faculty." The shifts in technology that obsoleted FOBS has matured into means that enable FALCON:

[The hypersonic Common Aero Vehicle (CAV)] will provide both an expendable and future reusable Military Space Plane [MSP] system architecture with the ability to deploy multiple payload types from and through space to a terrestrial target. A CAV will be able to achieve high terminal accuracy, extended cross range and be highly maneuverable in a low cost expendable or single use package supporting multiple military mission areas.

An overarching goal of CAV is to be cost competitive with cruise missiles and other precision guided munitions (PGMs). The same CAV would also be common to a large number of launch systems, including RLVs [reusable launch vehicles], expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), retired Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and air launch from a variety of platforms. Using a once around launch where the SOV [Space Operations Vehicle, a reusable first stage and booster for the MSP] does not go all the way to orbit can increase payload from 20-60%, depending on SOV configuration.

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

Jihadist strategy formulation reaches maturity, uniting tactics, fulfilling doctrine

  #

Jihadist warfighting has taken a quantum leap in formulating strategy in two volumes. Time will tell if it is maturity or response to disappointment with achievements to date.

A Jordanian analyst, Bassam al-Baddarin, has drawn what he believes is a coherent long term strategy until 2020 from the works of al-Qaeda's ‘strategic brain' Muhammad Makkawi, an Egyptian known as Sayf al-Adel. Ulph rightly questions if the ideas "predate events, or whether they constitute a ‘moving target' that takes as much from the unfolding of events as it purports to steer them." Time will tell, but it's clear that strategy is a rising idea that must be promulgated and transmitted, and even if it is being 'steered,' it becomes a workable handbook and proselytizing tool.

Makkawi/Sayf al-Adel outlines a strategy to regionalize the struggle against the US, drawing it into an extended war of attrition in the Arab region (now achieved), then provoking a rising of the Islamic Nation (now underway). I find it interesting that al-Baddarin reports that al Qaeda believes the US has "defined five objectives: ending the Palestinian intifada; controlling Lebanon's Hizbullah; effecting the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon; promoting the success of the Iraqi election process; and securing the oil fields in the Arabian Gulf region and maritime crossing points." What seems like desirable US policy is seen by al Qaeda is "the draining of the superpower's military resources," and indeed could be if the terrorists can extract a sufficiently high cost.

Abu Bakr Naji has written a remarkable strategy treatise, filling a void between doctrine and tactical matters such as the al Battar paramilitary series, that steps through a "strategic program towards empowerment" or "the phase of transition to the Islamic state" as seen through the eyes of an everyday mujahid, Idarat al-Tawahhush, "The Management of Barbarism," which is an extension to his Tuhfat al-Muwahhideen fi Bayan Tariq al-Tamkeen, "Gift of the Monotheists on the Way to Empowerment."

"Management of Barbarism" refers to a period of "savage chaos" after the collapse of a superpower or enemy regional state and is the first of five themes:

  1. Definition of ‘Management of Barbarism'
  2. Path of Empowerment
  3. Most Important Principles and Policies
  4. Most Pressing Difficulties and Obstacles
  5. Conclusion, demonstrating jihad as the ideal solution

"Management of Barbarism" is unique in that it:

  • Places extraordinary value the media, both in its admission of failure to build overwhelming support for Islamist aims, and the need to counter target government and "western media control of information delivery"
  • Promotes the use of maximum violence as a deterrent against the goals of Jihad
  • Outlines future desired 'crusader and infidel' targets within and outside current Islamic lands, i.e., soft targets, economic interests, and petroleum facilities
  • Advances pragmatism over doctrinal propriety and legal literalism in dealings with the enemy
  • Reduces individual reverses to secondary importance

Jihadist strategy is contained in Path of Empowerment in three phases:

  • Disruption and Exhaustion, exhausting the enemy while attracting converts
  • Management of Barbarism, establishing internal security, social administration, public services, and religious control
  • Empowerment, extending Management by continuing disruption and exhaustion activities, forming logistics lines with Management zones

Prime attention is given to media and propaganda strategy for winning support, recruitment, and deterrence. Attacks against soft, economic, energy, and commerce targets are underway on a global scale.

Most Important Principles and Policies is a thorough tactical treatment including mastering transition, chains of command, adopting "tested military principles," commencing and managing violence, understanding international politics, establishing security, intelligence and counterintelligence, education and training.

When mujahideen demands are not met, prisoners are to be taken and "liquidated horrifically."

Most Pressing Difficulties and Obstacles address attrition and believer casualties, lack of trained administrators, poor behavior, over-enthusiasm, infiltration, and schism.

Use of the media and the "number of attacks and threats of attacks by mujahideen on media offices and individuals in Iraq [including awe-inspiring execution], demonstrates that the value of this arm of the strategy is well understood, and indeed appears to be following the textbook."

The Conclusion asks "Is there any Easier Solution than Jihad? The answer is no, the outcome is global domination through Jihad, with maximum violence for as long as it takes.

Marxism was a lark in comparison and that took three generations.

AL-QAEDA'S STRATEGY UNTIL 2020
By Stephen Ulph
TERRORISM FOCUS
Volume 2 Issue 6 (March 17 , 2005)

NEW ONLINE BOOK LAYS OUT AL-QAEDA'S MILITARY STRATEGY
By Stephen Ulph
TERRORISM FOCUS
Volume 2 , Issue 6 (March 17, 2005)

"Voice of Jihad" Author Publishes al Qaeda Playbook
Northeast Intelligence Network
3/18/2005

Al-Qa'ida book on managing savagery
Jihad Watch
March 09, 2005

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

"Launch and leave" is not recommended for critical states as the Ukraine, Part 2

  #

As noted in Part 1, the Ukraine is in a fragile state despite the post election victory of its Orange Revolution. Russia will attempt to recover it as an essential part of the "near abroad" states that formed the USSR, even as the Ukraine struggles with the dysfunctions visited upon it by four generations of Soviet planners preference style economy.

While a part of the USSR, the Ukraine was an essential element of Russian industry, defense infrastructure, and agribusiness. One of the Ukraine's most saleable and quality assets is its defense industry output:

Ukrainian industry is participating in Russian programmes to deliver Sukhoi/Irkut Su-30MKI multirole fighters to the Indian Air Force and Sukhoi/KnAAPO Su-30MKK multirole fighters to China... These contracts involve the delivery of missile systems that were designed during the Soviet era and still incorporate Ukrainian hardware and subsystems. These include the Kh-59M (AS-18 'Kazoo') medium-range TV-guided missiles, deliveries of which were completed to these export customers in 2003-04. This co-operation is not seen as desirable by Russian industry, which is trying to 'Russianise' major weapon systems that currently require hardware imports from countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Until this process is completed - and in some cases this may not be practical - the importation of hardware will have to continue… In the longer term, Russian manufacturers want to end their present dependence on hardware and subsystems from Ukraine. The Kh-59M missile modernisation programme that resulted in the Kh-59MK, Kh-59MK2 and Kh-59M2 variants uses radar or TV seekers of Russian manufacture.

This is but the tip of an accomplished Ukrainian defense industry that it well aware that it is going to be shut out of an enormous Russian revenue stream, primarily to China and India, and has to find offsets either by direct or indirect means.

China already purchases equipment as diverse as turbofan engines to heavy lift transports from Ukraine and I would expect to see that accelerate. Ukraine has only to look at certain US allies as role models: Israel has long been a supplier of advanced military technologies to China, diverting US technology in the bargain. Forced to discontinue what was to be the first domestically built Israeli jet fighter, the Lavi, based on the US F-16 with $1.5 billion in US funds, the Israelis transferred the design to China where the Lavi's near identical twin appeared as the F-10. The Israeli STAR-1 cruise missile technology which can loiter above a battlefield for a considerable time searching for targets and incorporates US stealth technology and parts. Only the most fierce US diplomatic pressure prevented the Israelis from selling its Phalcon phased-array radar systems to China as part of a Chinese AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System).

Arms embargos have long been easy to circumvent given the web of private dealers and corrupt state entities, notably the former USSR where Russia, Poland, Romania, Belarus and Ukraine figure prominently. Of these former Soviet states, Ukraine was said to be the exception in that it provided direct government approval and assistance to weapons and technology exports to embargoed nations, notably Iraq, but given the level of government corruption in Russia and Belarus, it is hard for this observer to call the line between official action and corruption. It is clear that cash strapped economies exported, and will continue to export, weapons technology for hard currency.

Expert observers rightly observe that the best one can do is defer sales and make them more costly. I would not expect a shift in Ukrainian behavior just because Yushchenko has replaced Kuchma. There is a school of thought that Russia incentivized Ukraine and Belarus to sell to countries like Iraq as part of its plausible deniability. If correct, I would expect this to continue with Belarus but am not as certain with regards to Ukraine.

I fear that then SecState Powell's comment to Yushchenko before his inauguration that, "The United States wants to do everything we can to help you meet the expectations of the Ukrainian people after this turmoil," will go the way of Wolfowitz's earlier speech in Poland that, "We will not forget Poland's commitment. Just as you have stood with us, we will stand with you." Nothing happened then and many Poles see only US "ingratitude and indifference."

If we weathervane again, as I assume we will, we can only expect Ukraine to look to its own devices with the assets within its control. Yushchenko has said, "Our place is in the European Union," and that Ukraine will "become an honest nation" creating new jobs with appropriate salaries, fighting corruption, enforcing taxes, and making business transparent. Expect to see the means of achieving those goals in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea.

Ukraine participates in Russian export deals
JANE'S MISSILES AND ROCKETS - MARCH 01, 2005
Date Posted: 16-Feb-2005

How Russia keeps China armed
By David Isenberg
Asia Times
Nov 19, 2004

Many Helped Iraq Evade U.N. Sanctions On Weapons
By Craig Whitlock and Glenn Frankel
Washington Post
October 8, 2004

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

Staying off the Wall of Sheep and ahead of advancing technology

  #

The Wall of Sheep, originally the Wall of Shame, is a Defcon hacker tradition where attendees sniff traffic on wireless and wired networks for plaintext usernames and passwords, projecting them against a conference wall. In such an environment as a hacker convention, one would think that attendees using the Defcon network would encrypt their logins, but yearly many do not. Much sensitive traffic beyond usernames and passwords are also intercepted. It is sad that the message that "The Wall has shown people the importance of using encryption, not just at Defcon but in all network traffic" does not gain a wider audience.

Careless, inefficient, or unaware, these sheep mimic far too many of the general user community who are far less attuned to the threats around them. We like to merge vocation and avocation is tracking the process of technology in an attempt to remain conversant.

Two that caught my eye were BlueSniping (Bluetooth interception) from more than a mile away with homebuilt equipment and the remote physical device fingerprinting and tracking "without the fingerprinted device's known cooperation."

Bluetooth adherents would have you believe that the technology is safe from hackers, but it is not. Defcon 12 (2004) showed a Bluetooth sniper capable of finding and attacking Bluetooth devices from a distance, even detecting devices through building walls, using a 12.9 dBi Yagi antenna attached to a Bluetooth card in a PDA or laptop.

The newer BlueSniper uses a form of Personal Internet Communicator (PIC), a small computer using Intel XScale processors as an embedded Internet appliance, sans display, that is the size of a pack of chewing gum, hence the name Gumstix, that readily harvests Bluetooth devices. The use of a Hyperlink 14.9 dBi Randome directional antenna that is also used for wardriving provides the gain that it key to the unit's range. The Gumstix runs an embedded version of Linux with an MMC flash memory slot to save Bluetooth scaning data:

Since the computer is so small and consumes little power (three AAA batteries provide 6-8 hours of runtime), other interesting Bluetooth scanning devices can be made. You could make a very small handheld Bluetooth sniffer that could be carried in your pocket or perhaps thrown in the bushes outside of a building. This could passively scan for devices until you retrieved it to look at the results.

Others have thought of Gumstix applications:

As a Bluetooth device, I think you could package a board into either a headset or a handset that actually talks to Bluetooth-capable mobile phones and applies heavy encryption to scramble calls. Drug dealers and terrorists would love them, except of course, they'd probably be conspicuous by their encryption. So instead find a way to use the board to do audio steganography, somehow encrypting a real voice conversation into a completely fake conversation. Spy agencies would love/hate them.

At a distance of .75 miles:

It didn't take long for the MAC address of Bluetooth devices to appear on the laptop's screen... The building was .75 miles (a little over 1 km) from our position. As more Bluetooth devices started appearing, John said, "This building is full of Bluetooth! Look we got some Blackberries!" He also explained that, with multiple guns, it would be possible to track a single Bluetooth device as the person walked around.

Given this capability, I find the Bluetooth Special Interest Group's (SIG) Wireless Security briefing to be underwhelming.

Employing no hardware at all, and immediately available for surveillance and forensics applications, adversaries can now achieve device fingerprinting and, in the case of mobile devices, tracking efforts with high reliability. Using only passive and semi-passive techniques that examine minute deviations in TCP timestamps called clock skews, a fingerprinter can consistently identify a physical device even when NAT (Net Address Translation) or a firewall is used, and the fingerprinter is "thousands of miles, multiple hops, and tens of milliseconds away from the fingerprinted device, and when the fingerprinted device is connected to the Internet from different locations and via different access technologies."

Only a "small amount of data" was required for one or more of the tests to succeed on multiple OS's including Windows XP, Win2K, Mac OS X Panther, Red Hat and Debian Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Pocket PC 2002. Just as laser printers have been found to have traceable hardware characteristics, your device and its location is now identifiable. One wonders how long it will take for "Possible countermeasures include masking time skews with better random number generation techniques" to enter the marketplace. Too long, I think, for high value targets.

Users that do not pay attention to an attacker's capabilities regardless of what their vendors tell them - such as "Bluetooth devices must be within 10 Meters of each other for the attacks to occur" - will only join the Wall of Sheep.

Tracking PCs anywhere on the Net
By Renai LeMay
CNet News
Mar 04, 2005


Gordon Housworth



Cybersecurity Public  InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

Implications of US plans for Iraqi national infrastructure privatization

  #

In Secret US plans for Iraq's oil, Greg Palast develops ideas posted in Adventure Capitalism. Those ideas mirror Antonia Juhasz's reporting in Ambitions of Empire, Part 1: Extreme Makeover: The Americanization of Iraq and Ambitions of Empire, Part 2: Understanding and Opposing the Colonization of Iraq.

His premise is that the US administration had two conflicting plans for dealing with Iraq's oil production as a part of a broad privatization and restructuring effort, with 'neocons' at OSD against State 'pragmatists' and 'Big Oil' commercial interests. The zinger, if substantiated:

The sell-off was given the green light in a secret meeting in London headed by Ahmed Chalabi shortly after the US entered Baghdad, according to Robert Ebel [a] former Energy and CIA oil analyst... [Falah] Aljibury... claims that plans to sell off Iraq's oil, pushed by the US-installed Governing Council in 2003, helped instigate the insurgency and attacks on US and British occupying forces. "Insurgents used this, saying, 'Look, you're losing your country, you're losing your resources to a bunch of wealthy billionaires who want to take you over and make your life miserable,' We saw an increase in the bombing of oil facilities, pipelines, built on the premise that privatisation is coming."

Leaving aside imputed motives and focusing on outcomes, the following neutral and primary source materials go far in substantiating the privatization claims:

The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraq's Economic Transition
by Robert Looney
Strategic Insights, Volume II, Issue 8 (August 2003)
Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC)
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California

Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century
Edward L. Morse, Chair
Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director
Sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University and the Council on Foreign Relations, 2001

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
"Due to the dissolution of the CPA, this site for the CPA-Iraq Coalition will no longer be updated. It will remain available for historical purposes until June 30, 2005."

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Official Documents

  • Regulations are instruments that define the institutions and authorities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
  • Orders are binding instructions or directives to the Iraqi people that create penal consequences or have a direct bearing on the way Iraqis are regulated, including changes to Iraqi law.
  • Memoranda expand on Orders or Regulations by creating or adjusting procedures applicable to an Order or Regulation.
  • Public Notices communicate the intentions of the Administrator to the public and may require adherence to security measures that have no penal consequence or reinforces aspects of existing law that the CPA intends to enforce.

  • Order 12 Trade Liberalization Policy (Annex)***Rescinded per Order 54 Sec 3 Para 4*** 26 February 2004
  • Order 54 Trade Liberalization Policy 2004 with Annex A (Amended per Order 70) 04 April 2004
  • Order 37 Tax Strategy for 2003 19 September 2003
  • Order 39 Foreign Investment (Amended by Order 46) 20 December 2003
  • Order 46 Amendment of CPA Order 39 on Foreign Investment 20 December 2003
  • Order 40 Bank Law with Annex A **Rescinded per Order 94 Sec 3** 19 September 2003
  • Order 94 Banking Law of 2004 with Annex A 07 June 2004

Technical Assistance for Economic Recovery, Reform and Sustained Growth in Iraq
USAID contract to BearingPoint
Go to C.1. Statement of Work, Pages 4-11, then to Section J - List of Attachments, Page 40, then Annex B, Page 76; Annex C, Page 84; Annex D, Page 91; Annex E, Page 106.

Gordon Housworth



InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  

discussion

  discuss this article

Prev 26  27  [28]  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  Next

You are on page 28
A total of 68 pages are available.

Items 271-280 of 673.

Pages: [1 - 25] [26 - 50] [51 - 68]


<<  |  September 2019  |  >>
SunMonTueWedThuFriSat
1234567
891011121314
15161718192021
22232425262728
293012345
6789101112
view our rss feed