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When clients for risk assessment/risk pricing take on a risk of their own


While virtually every risk client will subscribe to the idea that there is added value in managing risk, i.e., shifting from the default condition of accepting risk to the pricing of risk though such mechanisms as mitigants, offsets, and transfers, the client rarely sees themselves as among the criteria of risk.

Risk clients commonly divide themselves into one of three categories:

  • Finance/risk managers without operations skill
  • Finance/risk managers with operations skill
  • Operations/in-country managers

Finance/risk without operations skill can include screen and securities traders, both of whom can be sophisticated in risk calculation so long as there is a valid pricing mechanism. Problems can emerge when they move beyond known risk market boundaries or the nature of risk calculation changes.

Finance/risk with operations skill are often investors in hard assets whose strength in risk management can vary significantly. Their focus will usually be on a P&L or balance sheet at the parent. Those that are good strategic risk managers see the value added of an early accurate risk pricing when procurement costs remain low.

Operations/in-country managers often place a priority upon being P&L accountable operators.

We have had the opportunity over time to question players in all three categories from both the US and Europe along with members from their operational ranks, as well as their banks, risk committees, and information brokers. The patterns that emerge makes one wonder how risk is effectively priced in many organizations.

The collective pattern that emerges from the Financial/Risk side of the commercial client is breathtaking in five characteristics:

1. Believe that they are well informed even when they are ill informed

This particular culture of decision making can be a difficult barrier to cross as this senior management group can be surrounded by sympathetic staff that can fend off information that competes with received wisdom.

2. Not invented here (NIH)

This is seen frequently when dealing with risks in already established areas, and may or may not extend to the consideration of a new country. My experience is that the entity "with the risk franchise" does not give it up and permit the entry of a more valid estimation or method between it and the ultimate customer.

3. Arrogance

4. Inability to distill

The actual condition is that they can’t analyze what they have, so they become, as we like to say, better informed without the ability to act. In such cases, one of the greatest services that we can render is to offer counterintuitive facts and data with the means to back them up.

5. Competitive bad advice

Headquarters staff can have a high degree of relationship with banks and pseudo-forecasters. This link can continue even when both are considering a new country outside their prior expertise. It is striking how may clients are unhappy with the recommendations from banks, noting that banks did not have a high capability in risk assessment, but rather gravitated to such areas as economic forecasts and foreign exchange (FX) rates. Their reports were said to be studded with caveats such as, "assuming the shah remains in power..."

To be continued in part 2

Gordon Housworth

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Repeal the Scottish Enlightenment; fund the Tammany Hall Institute of Graft and Corruption


The US once had a citadel dedicated to graft and corruption, the Tammany Society, a social organization that morphed into a political, then governmental interloper, that rose to its zenith under Boss Tweed in the 19th century. When the New York Times joined with the expose led by Thomas Nast and Harper's Weekly in 1871 to publish the contents of the New York County ledger books, it was found that thermometers cost $7,500 and brooms $41,190 each. A carpenter colleague of Tweed was paid $360,747 for a month's work.

And what did we do with that asset? We suppressed it (or tried to with varying degrees of success). As I watch what passes for governmental due-process and intergovernmental relations in much of Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, East Asia, and South America -- and now the Iraqi Regime Finance and Procurement analysis, I have begun to wonder if that was a strategic error.

As I wade through the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (see volumes below), I find myself reading on multiple levels, e.g., what happened to the known chem-bio assets and why, what was the nature of the threat when, what could Iraqi infrastructure achieve, but my compelling issue has become what the text tells me about the nexus of individual greed in public politics (as recipient and complicit partner) and with the achievement of state aims (as giver and orchestrator):

Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate and implement strategies, policies, and methods to terminate the UN's sanctions regime established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations' member states and other international players' resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis.

An essential Iraqi tool for achieving its aims while evading sanctions was an oil voucher program designed to influence "individuals, companies or entities" in the UN administration, UN member states and the UN Security Council itself:

The Ministry of Oil (MoO) controlled the oil voucher distribution program that used oil to influence UN members to support Iraq's goals. Saddam personally approved and removed all names of voucher recipients.

Three Council permanent members, Russia, France, and the PRC were the leading recipients of negotiable vouchers that could be resold at substantial profit to oil firms or other buyers. Iraq exploited the Oil For Food program "to give individuals and countries an economic stake in ending sanctions" to the degree that the volume of activity was seen as "grossly obvious" to the point that distortions extended beyond Iraq to international markets and organizations. Iraq rounded out its effort with oil smuggling, dual-use equipment smuggling, and illicit government-to-government trade agreements.

I wager that many states will use the report as either a primmer for their own efforts or a report card on their progress of illicit procurement or influence.  Consider how states such as France, Russia, and China influence political actions in certain states and how funds flow to any level of those recipient state(s) that is deemed essential to achievement of the initiating state aims. Readers should look at The G-24 and the IMF; foxes vie for control of the henhouse for a view of how much of the world works.

The US, along with a modest number of states, must look especially tedious in many areas of the world, Africa and the Stans to name two, where plundering the public purse for private gain is considered a right of office, when it attempts to restrict the actions of its nationals by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and must resort to threats of public disclosure to the offending state in order to affect any kind of legitimate order. Having worked under FCPA I and II, where II stated that plausible denial was no longer a defense, I can attest to the difficulties in competing against certain states.

I am concerned that we will be increasingly outflanked by competing states, originator and recipient, able to play the grey area while proclaiming rectitude. It should be remembered that where democracies and their institutions have stuck to date has been those rising from the Scottish Enlightenment and adjacent Anglo-European states and we are now outnumbered. It would be sad if it is we who are obsolescent. Do we now need Boss Tweed?

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD
30 September 2004
Key Findings
Volume 1, Regime Strategic Intent & Finance and Procurement
Volume 2, Delivery Systems, Nuclear
Volume 3, Chemical & Biological Warfare

Hussein Beat Sanctions With Bribes
By Robin Wright and Colum Lynch
Washington Post
October 7, 2004

Many Helped Iraq Evade U.N. Sanctions On Weapons
By Craig Whitlock and Glenn Frankel
Washington Post
October 8, 2004

Gordon Housworth

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Will it take a second pandemic to move flu vaccines from private enterprise to national defense?


I predict that flu vaccines in the developed world will follow the trajectory of AIDS drugs in the third world: similar lethargy, death toll, threats to bypass patents to produce generic substitutes, and finally various forms of production and/or resale agreements that allow wider local ministration to the disease. The step that bothers me is the death toll part.

With the avian influenza strain A(H5N1) on our doorstep, we seem to have forgotten the 20+ million dead of the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu pandemic in an era that predated today's global transportation systems as well as the 2002-2003 near miss of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) which itself is still not contained yet has lulled many into a sense of complacence as WHO notes that "SARS has entered a time of great danger" as "people tend to become overconfident and lower their guard when outbreaks wane."

The breeding grounds of Asia in which cages of chicken and birds are stacked atop monkeys and small mammals, in turn stacked atop pigs remain as do the humans who slaughter them on the same tables. A(H5N1) "continues to kill the majority of people it infects. Health officials are expressing worry that the longer the H5N1 strain remains active, the greater its chance to acquire genetic material from more common types of influenza, creating a virus that is highly lethal and readily passed among humans. That could occur if a person caught avian and human strains of flu simultaneously." China recently disclosed that "scientists had detected two strains of bird flu, including H5N1, in pigs. Since pigs can contract human influenza, they could also serve as the source of a hybrid strain that could cause a pandemic."

Think when, not if, and you have a grasp of the looming problem. Think death toll of startling proportions with consequent economic interruption. (During the SARS epidemic, we created a hierarchy of symptom to impact to interruption for clients in order to predict when and where global supply chains would fail. The list started with restaurants closing and ended with regional economic collapse.)

We have utterly failed to solve the "chronic mismatch of public health needs and private control of production of vaccines and drugs" for a variety of reasons:

  • Expensive investment and production costs not recovered unless there is a pandemic
  • Unsettled intellectual property rights over new vaccine manufacturing techniques
  • Financial liability of fielding new vaccines without lengthy safety tests
  • Profit margins for vaccines is less than prescription drugs
  • A(H5N1) negates the normal method for making flu vaccines
  • Only two vaccine manufacturers, Aventis Pasteur and Chiron Corporation, wiling to proceed

The non-solution is to stockpile an expensive, limited production antiviral, Tamiflu, that may only work if "given in the first two days after the onset of symptoms," too late for most. The discovery that A(H5N1) "is more active at cooler temperatures" suggests that the summer slowdown will ebb into winter. And should the disease strike, distributing limited stocks of vaccine and antivirals will become a madhouse of strife and blackmarketeering.

So back to AIDS as an example. When do we leap past the death toll step and involve governments in the directed production of vaccines and antivirals as a matter of national security, at lease national economic continuance?

The bright spot seems to be more on early detection than upon containment and cure. In an approach that I think essential in searching for a "disease without a name," i.e., a bioagent or disease variant not yet identified with a protocol for treatment, or the presence of multiple agents -- natural and manmade, I applaud the research into syndromic systems such as ESSENCE (Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics) for the National Capitol Region (NCR), composed of the District of Columbia and 12 local jurisdictions, and BioSense for larger regions, eventually the entire nation. Departing from traditional disease reporting systems that focus on a specific, already known disease such as "tuberculosis, chicken pox or measles, they look for unusual clusters of general symptoms such as high fevers and respiratory distress, which could be warnings of emerging diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome."

I am aware that "Syndromic surveillance only sets off alarms [and no] matter how well a syndromic surveillance system performs, its benefits ultimately depend on how effectively it is integrated into the broader public health system." That is not cause for rejection but for more research and embedding as the most frequently used detection algorithms can detect both fast-spreading and slow-moving agents.

The lessons learned from Nevada's 2003-2004 influenza season showed that syndromic surveillance identified the influenza season earlier, allowed better tracking as the season progressed, and was good as the people evaluating the data.

Now we need the vaccines.

Experts Confront Hurdles in Containing Bird Flu
New York Times
September 30, 2004

Lethal Bird Flu Reemerges In Four East Asian Countries
By Alan Sipress
Washington Post Foreign Service
September 15, 2004

Investigation of Disease Outbreaks Detected by "Syndromic" Surveillance Systems
Julie A. Pavlin
Journal of Urban Health, New York Academy of Medicine Vol. 80, No. 2, Supplement 1 2003

Gordon Housworth

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The G-24 and the IMF; foxes vie for control of the henhouse


The Group of 24 ministers (G-24) attacked an International Monetary Fund (IMF) surveillance proposal even before the IMF could issue a press release. The IMF's intent was to "issue public praise for countries that follow sound economic policies and don't want to borrow from the agency" for those countries who wished to volunteer for the rating. In what was a shield for continued corrupt practices, the G-24 said the proposal would minimize lending to low-income countries and while the "instrument has been presented as 'voluntary,' there is a high probability that it would in fact become a requirement for lending, grants, and debt relief."

It is the understatement of the quarter century for the IMF to note that it "has historically had problems with that requirement - blowing the whistle on a country with poor policies might help avert a financial crisis by spurring reforms. But it might also trigger a crisis by frightening investors." (The 1999 Contingent Credit Lines program offering states "with sound economic policies that were at risk of financial "contagion" from similar countries with poor policies" expired in 2003 with few takers due to fears of being seen as weak.)

It is most interesting to see who the G-24 are and how its member rank on Transparency International's 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index.

The G-24 or the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development was established in 1971 with the objective "to concert the position of developing countries on monetary and development finance issues." G-77 member state are welcome to attend G-24 meetings as observers while the People's Republic of China "enjoys the status of "Special Invitee" and addresses the plenary sessions of the G-24." G-24 member states are drawn from three regions: Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia.

G-24 member countries are as follows:

  • Region I (Africa): Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
  • Region II (Latin America and the Caribbean): Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
  • Region III (Asia and developing countries of Europe): India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Syrian Arab Republic.

It is instructive to track the G-24 member states on Transparency International's 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index.

TI's 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index measures perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). On 133 countries rated, the cleanest, Finland was 1, and the worst was Bangladesh at 133. "Seven out of ten countries score less than 5 out of a clean score of 10, while five out of ten developing countries score less than 3 out of 10… Nine out of ten developing countries urgently need practical support to fight corruption."

As the Corruption Perceptions Index has been, like the Economist's Big Mac index, a reliable comparative measure, it is interesting to see how the G-24 faired, or failed as the case may be. Note that certain countries tie, such as Columbia and Peru at 59.

By CPI rank, then country:

43 Trinidad and Tobago; 48 South Africa; 54 Brazil; 59 Colombia, Peru; 64 Mexico; 66 Sri Lanka, Syria, China (not a G-24 member, but as it is granted Observer status); 70 Egypt, Ghana; 78 Iran, Lebanon; 83 India; 88 Algeria; 92 Argentina, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Philippines; 100 Guatemala, Venezuela; 118 Cote d’Ivoire, 132 Nigeria.

Unrated by TI as there were only two reports, but this author would mark them towards the bottom, with the DRC below Nigeria, especially as the DRC is a major blood diamond exporter through al Qaeda channels:

Gabon; Democratic Republic of Congo

That said, and knowing China's efforts to build diplomatic favor among world's weaker but still instrumental regional states, China's Xinhua statements take new meaning when it urges the IMF "to develop effective lending facilities to assist countries in the prevention of financial crisis," i.e., not this one, and in the "absence of appropriate crisis prevention mechanisms, [the IMF] should play a much larger role in reserve accumulation," i.e., make more funds available for "shrinkage."

Think what fun it will be if Wolfensohn does not seek another five-year term at World Bank. The foxes will demand "greater clout within the IMF and the World Bank." It is not too difficult to imagine a structure in which funds of developed economies are eased into grey area coffers.

IMF Plan To Promote Good Economic Policy Gets Cool Reception
World Bank Development News
2 October 2004

Gordon Housworth

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Invisible reallocation of supply chain vendors based on perceived threat to buyers


A satisfied customer is not the same thing as a loyal customer. Walker Information, a 65-year-old firm that tracks customer loyalty, has tried to draw the distinction and today is releasing the results of a survey that determines which IT companies engender the most loyalty. The results... show a correlation between customer loyalty and financial performance [where] brands that scored high in customer loyalty had higher operating-profit margins, aggregated over three years, compared with negative profit margins for what the company calls the "loyalty laggards." Walker evaluated more than 50 brands in five categories: software, services, networking, servers and workstations, and storage systems.

Walker arrives at its rankings through detailed interviews that charted buyers' feelings on everything from product quality to customer service and post-sales support. Of all the IT buyers interviewed for the report, only 44 percent said they feel loyal to a majority of their suppliers, 30 percent feel "trapped" by at least some of their vendors, and almost 25 percent are actively looking to swap their IT providers for somebody different.

I wonder how this low loyalty to IT vendors, to the point of buyers feeling "trapped" by their current relationship with certain suppliers, transfers beyond the IT sector into the wider corporate supply chain.

It has been my experience that while many industrial firms have made a strategic IT commitment to the likes of Microsoft or Cisco in volume purchases that significantly lower the per seat product cost, they exhibit a very different -- lower and more transient -- loyalty to the suppliers in their product supply chains.

Based upon our work in the automotive sector, we can say that OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) -- or vehicle manufacturers -- in this relentlessly cost sensitive sector have less than rigid loyalty to suppliers and certainly feel "hostage" to certain suppliers, especially those suppliers who dominate the market in a specific part/subsystem or even a high percentage of overall industry production to all OEMs. OEMs are reacting by reallocating their part production awards to other than the industry leader, irrespective of that supplier's ability to provide a technically and financially acceptable component.

This does not mean that OEMs will award business to firms with substandard performance, quality, and robustness, but rather that they will select among a group of suppliers capable of providing a peer level of performance in order to reduce the dominance of particular suppliers in critical market subsystems. I hasten to add that "critical" may be based upon internal OEM criteria not available to the supplier who would otherwise presume that they have the business based upon being the incumbent supplier offering a competitive cost and functional bid for a subsequent model year.

Companies were then grouped into three categories: loyalty leaders, loyalty limbo and loyalty laggards.

Were I an automotive supplier, I would launch an immediate, sustained competitive tracking of all my competitors' current and forecast business with all OEMs, my competitors' percentage of business with each OEM, and of the buyers' opinions at each OEM of my firm in order to see which supplier was most likely to be given new business -- either at my expense if I am leader, or to gain a larger share if I am a new entrant or minority provider.

Also, I would be sensitive to my quarterly/annual profit announcements which, on one hand, are necessary to attract equity funding, but, on the other hand, draw the quiet rage of OEM personnel who feel that certain suppliers are making more money pro rata than they are. There is always a latent, "I am larger, I am the buyer, and due more deference" attitude on the part of the OEMs, but it is never more virulent than at the times of high profit announcements by suppliers or a supplier's refusal to lower prices. This reaction is especially apparent when the OEMs are under severe market pressure.

a company is setting a low bar for itself if it is measured only by customer satisfaction. "If you ask people if they're satisfied [with their provider], most would say, 'Yeah, sure, I'm satisfied.' But if you ask them would they buy again, increase their purchases [from that provider] or recommend them, that's a different story."

Any automotive supplier that is unaware that his major OEM customers are watching his firm's ability to prejudice or restrain an OEM's flexibility and profitability, or is not showing due deference to the OEM, or in some way placating the OEM with accelerated R&D, service, et al, is naive and can suffer in future bidding.

If this tenuous level of loyalty extends beyond the automotive industry into other equally cost sensitive markets able to make vendor selections from among a group of similarly able suppliers, it could be a contributor to OEM-supplier strife, outsourcing (to low cost but not low risk locations), or other supply chain dysfunctions.

Who do you love?
September 20, 2004: 1:34 PM EDT
By Paul R. La Monica

IBM Tops IT Loyalty Survey
Lisa DiCarlo, 09.20.04, 12:01 AM ET

Loyalty study zeroes in on tech stalwarts
By Matt Hines
September 19, 2004, 12:01 AM PT

Gordon Housworth

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Putin, Montesquieu, and Catherine


In a post-Beslan emergency session in Moscow, Putin met with cabinet ministers and regional governors to overhaul the political system, greatly centralizing authority, all in the name of national security. It's hard to imagine any Russian or post-Soviet state as suffering a "weakness of state executive powers," but so it is.

Within 24-hours the White House said that Putin's centralization was a Russian internal matter and SecState Powell said that it is "alarming" and that it "could take Russia off the path to democracy," an opinion I find bluntly unrealistic and has me favoring the White House over State. When readers hear Powell speak of a "proper balance," they should know how Russian democracy works, and for that I look to Dmitri Simes.

Let me set the stage with comments Simes made in 2001, a decade into the Soviet collapse when some were calling Russia "finished," as a starting point for Putin's consolidation:

[On 'consolidate political power' v. 'repression] Yeltsin, with an exception for a short period in 1996 and 1998, always relied very heavily on security forces. Most unsavory KGB generals were part of his entourage and were instruments of his power. This is not new. I think that the issue today is consolidation and stabilization of the Russian society. There is still a lot of repression. There are many undemocratic practices, but you have to heed the direction and the direction is not toward greater repression. The direction is to restoration of a certain degree of stability.

[On the State] People were raised to believe that the state was an enemy, but also the state was always the authority. You do not bargain with the state, either you fight against the state or obey the state… Or you cheat the state… There is no meaning of truth in the way you have in Western societies, because you have to believe that you will be treated with the minimal fairness by the state. [You] also have a situation of ingrained corruption, generation after generation. I don’t think it’s something that will stay there forever, but I think it will have to be addressed for several generations before you will see any European-style democracy in Russia.

[Value to US foreign policyUS foreign policy agenda [depends] upon Russian cooperation. [The] Russian position is very important [on] America’s most important strategic relationship [China]. What kind of weapons Russia will agree to supply [China]? Would Russia agree to have some kind of tactical alliance with China?... Russian cooperation with Iran. Russian position on proliferation. Russia has a role [in every] major foreign policy. It is not the same role as in the case of the Soviet Union...,but Russia causes a considerable impact primarily on nuclear weapons.

[That Russia is not looking for either an American or a European model] I think that’s exactly right. The Russians are not only not ready for western-style democracy; they are not interested in western-style democracy. They believe that they have to find their own way, which in many respects will be European, but which will also be influenced by Russian culture, Russian tradition. They also believe that they have to define their own national interests, which they believe are not antagonistic to the United States, but also are not identical and I think that we will see a very complex relationship between Russia and the United States.

Back to Simes in 2004 for a realistic look at Putin's actions:

Putin was moving in the direction for quite some time. He clearly feels that in order to change things in Russia, and he's got a sense of mission he wants to change things, you need to have real power -- not a performer power granted by the Russian constitution, but real power. [G]overnors today - they are heavily influenced by the Kremlin -- but there is no line authority. The Kremlin cannot tell them what to do. [No one is] truly responsible. [Most of the] so-called independent legislators... are not democrats [but] people connected with provincial corrupt structures and their presence in legislature adds little to Russian democracy.

[There's nothing to 'take away" as] they don't have legitimate local government in Russia. [The] whole government of North Ossetia [is] run by a former Soviet party official, former Soviet diplomat who is part of the old power structure. [Elected yes, but] make no mistake, in fact he was appointed. But the situation was created when in fact they appoint the governors, that's why these people who were in the room with Putin who was talking about eliminating their elect status and yet they applauded him because they do not have the guts to challenge him.

The Kremlin has power without responsibility. Putin wants to concentrate the decision making in the Kremlin [which makes sense but] taken alone it's grossly insufficient. I think that under current Russian conditions where corruption is perverse, where local mayors and governors are frequently associated with criminal gangs [if] Putin wants to change something, he needs to put himself in charge first.

[You] have to have other reforms to start creating legitimate civil society. You should give local mayors, real mayors more power, and you also should have a struggle against corruption. Those reforms were promised by Putin, but he did not begin to implement them yet.

Catherine was fond of quoting the arch-democrat Montesquieu that "a wise ruler who favored reason over passion could best ensure the welfare of his or her subjects" and by extension that Russia could only be run by a firm central hand. Putin would approve.

Power Play
Sept 14, 2004

Putin Moves to Centralize Authority
By Peter Baker
Washington Post
Sept 14, 2004

Gordon Housworth

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List Introduction

This list commences the public side of an impromptu list that started immediately after 11 September when colleagues were asking ‘What is Islam?’ What started as a brief history of Islam, the schism between Sunni and Shia, moderate and conservative, and their respective views towards the West morphed into a list on terrorism and infrastructure defense.
Save for a minority, there was an ‘information hole’ on interpreting current events. While that hole is much smaller now, I have continued to comment on events that strike my interest. I enjoy making people think, question their assumptions, and gain a window to global issues that make them more effective world citizens.
In the spirit of full disclosure, you should know that I write as a US national, holding US interests paramount, and am comfortable with a Geopolitik outlook. I lean to the opinion that, “We have no permanent allies, only permanent interests.” It is immaterial to me if a foreign state is secular or religious, and if religious, whether it is Jewish, Muslim, Hindu or Christian. I only measure the effect of their actions on US interests.
If the reader has strong loyalties, be it religious, tribal, cultural or geographic, that work to the opposite, then a gap will exist that no datum or argument will resolve.
I agree with Sir Harold Nicholson’s description of diplomacy as “the understanding that for intractable problems there are only adjustments and not solutions.” Americans are resistant to that idea and too often paint a scenario into black and white, seeking a single, lasting, and implicitly moral solution. Other than by force-of-arms, it’s difficult to find such a solution that works for diverse stakeholders, overcomes a history of accumulated slights and resentments, and engenders a negotiation process that’s not resented by one or more stakeholders.
Gordon Housworth

Cybersecurity Public  InfoT Public  Infrastructure Defense Public  Intellectual Property Theft Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  Weapons & Technology Public  


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