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Think of the Yuan as a reserve currency and the Dollar in the gentile senility of the Pound

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Barring disasters such as an Asian Flu pandemic or a tactical nuclear exchange on the Korean peninsula that would stampede millions of starving North Koreans into NE China, alongside the more mundane threats of internal economic disruption, the watershed signing at the 10th ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit in Laos of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between China and ASEAN nations to create an Asian free-trade market of 1.8 billion people by 2015, possibly as early as 2010, launched what I believe is a concrete start to the Yuan becoming a reserve currency in a greater and more successful version of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Multilateral regional formations are proliferating with China rather than the US as the hub, sometimes without America even in attendance.

Its significance or its comparison to US achievements in the FTA arena (largely nil) seems to have passed without notice in US highstreet press despite the fact that the pact will compete with the US and Europe as it "aims to drop most tariffs over the next five years, [includes] an agreement to liberalize tariff and non-tariff barriers on traded goods and one to set up a mechanism to resolve trade disputes, [will] form the first component of a comprehensive accord planned for completion by 2010 that will include the full liberalization of the services sector [and if] completed on time, the overall ASEAN-China deal will result in the creation of the world's biggest free-trade zone.

It's not like one couldn't see it coming:

In 2002, China and ASEAN began talks on a free trade accord, and China soon called for a "China-ASEAN" free trade area within 10 years. Beijing continues to prod, as in some "early harvest" tariff-reduction steps, and last month saw agreements for further gradual reductions. They included large exceptions for ASEAN's "sensitive sectors," but the process, under China's impetus, is underway. Indeed, Beijing recently proposed a step that a generation ago would have struck cold fear into Asia's other capitals: It exhorted representatives of Asia's 20 million "overseas Chinese" to "play a positive role in enhancing the good neighborly friendship and political trust between China and…ASEAN."

This year has seen other previously unthinkable cooperative steps, including talks among all 13 Asian Foreign and Finance Ministers to create an Asian Bond Market. No less important are growing calls to turn the "ASEAN plus Three" framework "into a regular summit of the East Asian Economic Community." 10 In July, ASEAN'S leaders met with China, Japan, and Korea ("the Three") and agreed to formally discuss that proposal later this month. 11 And most revealingly, Singapore – with close US ties and the region's best antennae – added its voice. Calling for an "historic reconciliation" between China and Japan, former ambassador to the US and UN Tommy Koh in August declared, "The vision is to create an East Asian Community."

Japan and India courted ASEAN leaders during the summit, while India and China commenced some very public, high level bilateral talks. India's "landmark partnership document" permits New Delhi to build economic relations with ASEAN as well as Japan, China and South Korea (ROK). Japan will shortly commence talks with ASEAN to reduce tariffs. China, India, South Korea and Japan seek to match the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) by 2020. These trade patterns have resuscitated earlier ideas of an Asian economic "Community" that had lacked an economic powerhouse (Japan was disinterested) and the region's interactions were primarily with the US.

Part 2

China and India steal the show
By Siddharth Srivastava
Asia Times
Dec 2, 2004

PART 4: China steady on the peg
By Henry C K Liu
Asia Times
Dec 1, 2004

China adds its might to ASEAN
By Alan Boyd
Asia Times
Dec 1, 2004

Time for America to Trade Up
By BERNARD K. GORDON
Wall Street Journal
November 30, 2004

Chinese Recruit Top Executives Trained Abroad
By ANDREW BROWNE
HE WALL STREET JOURNAL
November 30, 2004

Revaluing the Yuan
by Worth Civils
November 23, 2004
Wall Street Journal

US Trade Policy: Legacy of the Sorcerer's Apprentice
Bernard K. Gordon
YaleGlobal, 5 November 2004

PART 1: Follies of fiddling with the yuan
By Henry C K Liu
Asia Times
Oct 23, 2004

A Global Power Shift in the Making
By James F. Hoge, Jr.
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004

The US Turns Its Gaze From Asia at Its Own Peril
By Kurt Campbell
Financial Times
Jun 21, 2004

Gordon Housworth



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Domestic Digital Pearl Harbor driven by offshore criminal and terrorist agents

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While I had previously noted that, "Malware (malicious software), phishing, cracking, and social engineering, individually and in concert, increasingly point to the goal of criminal profit," it is increasingly apparent that while US residents remain the most attractive target (due I believe to our volume of ecommerce, the availability of broadband bot targets, and far too many dumb users unable to protect their PCs), the perps are Eastern European gangs. (US organized crime has been slow in comparison in its embrace of cybercrime.) While the US has the largest absolute number of fraudulent transactions:

countries such as the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, the African countries of Nigeria and Ghana, and Vietnam are homes of a higher percentage of fraud. [VeriSign] labels any credit card transaction from an IP address sourced in Macedonia as "risky," and more than 85 percent of such transactions from the other three countries are not be trusted.

It is worth remembering that while Dick Clarke was too "often dismissed as a Cassandra while cybersecurity czar," and thus the six trends he identified in October 2003 were received with what I would call polite inattention by IT and government (See Revisiting Clarke's six bleak IT trends from October 2003), all that he forecast has come to pass. Clarke said all six would increase, but the one that would go through the roof was 'Rising identity theft.' Not only has it gone through the roof but it is being used in combination with at least four others: Rising vulnerabilities, Rising patches, Falling "time to exploit," Rising rate of propagation, and Rising cost of cleanup.

Phishing (enticing users are to surrender financial data and passwords to fake Web sites) is being carried out "on a massive scale [such that the] price of a credit card number is dropping into the pennies now." Offshore perps are infecting US PCs with Trojans and worms, turning them into bots and bot nets, which then launch an interstate attack masking the attacker's origin.

One supposes better late than never, but it is still stunning to see the FBI just now publicly begin to say:

Tools and methods used by these increasingly skilled hackers could be employed to cripple our economy and attack our critical infrastructure as part of a terrorist plot. People had to assume that terrorists would seek to hire hackers to "raise money, aid command and control, spread terrorist propaganda and recruit more into their ranks and, lastly and most ominously, attack at little risk.

The Internet could allow attackers to remain anonymous, to strike at multiple targets from a distance and escape detection. Critical infrastructure such as water, power and transportation systems remained vulnerable. In the future, cyberterrorism may become a viable option to traditional physical acts of violence. Terrorists have figured out that we have a technological soft underbelly.

Back in Black hat meets white hat in the Idaho desert, I noted that:

Many "many once-isolated systems used to run railroads, pipelines and utilities are now also accessible via the Internet and thus susceptible to sabotage," as "More and more of these things are being connected to the Internet, so they can be monitored at corporate headquarters. It is generally accepted that the August blackout last year could have been caused by that kind of activity."

The Control Systems Center being built at DOE's INEEL by DHS and CERT is intent on addressing five areas: awareness, incident management, standards collaboration, strategic direction and testing. INEEL's head of national security programs is already on record as saying, "I am confident that there is no system connected to the Internet, either by modem or fixed connection, that can't be hacked into."

Given the disarray at DHS, one hopes that they talk to the bureau.

In Clarke's vision of securing the net, I said that at least a small "p" digital Pearl Harbor was possible, in part, due to the 2003 Federal Computer Security Report Card scored the critical 24 federal agencies into an overall D grade [and] that those still getting an F are the departments of Homeland Security, Energy, State, Justice, Health And Human Services, Interior, Agriculture, and Housing And Urban Development.  (Defense got itself into the D category along with Transportation, GSA, Treasury, OPM, and NASA.)

Many private industry sectors are no better even as they possess the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that are the C2 for critical infrastructure including electric, gas and oil distribution systems, water and sewer systems, and various manufacturing processes.

It is painful to think of phishing attacks merely being a money-spinning prelude to an infrastructure attack. We've passed the small 'p' and are now on the way to a medium 'p.'

FBI: Hidden threat inside cybercrime
Reuters
November 10, 2004, 3:54 PM PT

Report: Crooks behind more Net attacks
By Robert Lemos
CNET News.com November 16, 2004, 2:17 PM PT

Gordon Housworth



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China and Russia achieve in Iran what the US and NATO had in Turkey, part II

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Part 1, the money. Now the power:

In a stroke, the October 2004 agreement between Sinopec and National Iranian Oil Company reduced Iran's isolation, raised its international stature, and gave it a major political ally in the Security Council.

Given that Iran's largest foreign agreement prior to the gigantic Sino-Persian gas agreement was a $25 billion gas affair with Turkey that has been plagued with problems, Iran expects, rightfully I think, that this deal will make states that "may still consider Iran untrustworthy or too radical to enter into big projects on a long term basis" to reconsider their position. It is expected that India will now begin to move forward with its stalled 1993 "Peace Pipeline" connecting India and Iran, traversing Pakistan in the bargain. It remains to be seen how soon Russia's Gazprom is allowed to sidestep US displeasure and increase its business in the subcontinent.

I would expect Iran to move towards entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) comprising China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but I think that Tehran can still extract more favors for this diplomatic plum even though:

China, Russia and Iran share deep misgivings about the perception of the United States as a "benevolent hegemon" and tend to see a "rogue superpower" instead. Even short of joining forces formally, the main outlines of such an axis can be discerned from their convergence of threat perception due to, among other things, Russia's disquiet over the post-September 11, 2001, US incursions in its traditional Caucasus-Central Asian "turf", and China's continuing unease over the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan; this is not to mention China's fixed gaze at a "new Silk Road" allowing it unfettered access to the Middle East and Eurasia, this as part and parcel of what is often billed as "the new great game" in Eurasia. Indeed, what China's recent deals with both Kazakhstan (pertaining to Caspian energy) and Iran (pertaining to Persian Gulf resources) [supports the view that] the new great game is not limited to the Central Asia-Caspian Sea basin, but rather has a broader, more integrated, purview increasingly enveloping even the Persian Gulf. Increasingly, the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a sort of frontline state in a post-Cold War global lineup against US hegemony is becoming prevalent among Chinese and Russian foreign-policy thinkers.

I cannot imagine why an observer would think that China would halt at the Stans when the greater political and economic suzerain is one that extends across the Persian Gulf. (And while the SCO launched as a joint Sino-Russian condominium, I feel that China is now securing the stronger position. And while the substantial military assets in the region are Russian and American, I think China can extend its reach by its unique commercial and diplomatic means without an immediate entry of arms.

I do not agree with the comment that the "The SCO initially was established to deal with border disputes and is now well on its way to focusing on (Islamist) terrorism, drug trafficking and regional insecurity." On the contrary, as far as Beijing is concerned, it was designed to produce a quiescent political belt on China western and northern flanks. I think that the parallels of China and Iran as two proud ancient states now seeking to restore what they perceive as the historic spheres of influence has much merit. In the case of Iran, I agree with the opinion that its nuclear weapons program is aimed not at Israel but at its Arab and Muslim neighbors:

Iran's history does not support the view that the weapons it is amassing are for fighting Israel. [Al-Rashid] concluded that Iran's presumed nuclear capability was aimed at targeting neighbouring countries, basing his assumption on the fact that there has never been a single clash between Israel and Iran. Iran does not share borders with Israel and has had no direct conflict with it. It supports forces that are against Israel although its weaponry cannot be sent to these parties. "Then who is at the receiving end of these [Iranian] sophisticated weapons? There is only one logical answer: [Arab] neighbouring countries."

To that end, China, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, became a powerful Iranian ally in forestalling a breakdown with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over weapons grade uranium enrichment that would see the Europe support US calls to refer Iran to the Security Council for sanctions.

"There is no reason to send the issue to the Security Council," Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said at a press conference in Tehran with his Iranian counterpart, Kamal Kharazi. "It would only make the issue more complicated and difficult to work out," Li said. The Chinese foreign minister refused to speculate on whether China would use its veto in the Security Council in the event of Iran's case being sent there.

Russia will restore, perhaps strengthen is the better word, its relationship with Iran as it continues to recover dominance over the "near abroad" states lost upon the breakup of the USSR, and eject the US from the Stans. Iran will respond by pressuring Moscow to halt its foot-dragging over completion of the Bushehr reactor. The affected states realize this and are making security diversifications that spawn reinforcing commercial alliances across the Stans and the Persian Gulf. China again becomes counterweight.

Pressure on Iran could backfire
By Saloumeh Peyman
Asia Times
Nov 9, 2004

China rocks the geopolitical boat
Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Asia Times
Nov 6, 2004

So long US, hello China, India
By David Fullbrook
Asia Times
Nov 4, 2004

Gordon Housworth



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China and Russia achieve in Iran what the US and NATO had in Turkey

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To geopolitically position Iran in the mid-21st century, think Turkey in the later-20th century. Just as Turkey anchored a US and NATO flank while projecting US forces and forward basing into Russia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, so now will Iran anchor a Chinese, Russian, and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) flank while projecting Russian and Chinese interests into the Persian Gulf, SW Asia, and the Middle East. Think of Russian angst reversed, with the US on the receiving end this time unsupported by France and Germany as they seek to gain commercial and political capital as they too attempt to restrain the US "hyperpower."

Why we can't see this coming is utterly astonishing to me. One cannot grasp the flow of near-superpower political action without adding China and Russia to France's view that "Its sacred duty is to check American power by publicly and ostentatiously objecting to it from without. The French are so concerned by the dominance of American powermilitarily, economically, culturally, and technologicallythat a former French foreign minister felt the need to coin a new word to describe it: hyperpuissance, or "hyperpower." Think of it this way: France thinks the United States has so much power that the French language didn't have a word for it.

First, the money:

Middle East energy, and Saudi energy in particular, is no longer a US preserve. Sinopec (China Petrochemical Corp) signed a major gas exploration contract in Saudi Arabia's Rub Alkhali Basin in March 2004. (Russia's Lukoil and a consortium of Italy's ENI and Spain's Repsol YPF also gained exploration rights as the Saudis sought to diversify away from US oversight.)

Refinery-heavy Sinopec has always been keen to find oil and gas resources in foreign countries, as it imports more than 60 per cent of the crude it refines. Saudi Arabia is one of the most important countries where the company is considering to add to its upstream reserves.

While Exxon Mobil and other American companies remain active in Saudi Arabia's petrochemicals and refining industries, the demise of the earlier gas deal highlighted important differences between the Saudi government and American investors. Problems emerged over financial terms and Saudi requests for companies to operate power plants and desalinization projects as well as search for gas. The deal was also scrapped amid growing security concerns [as] Saudi Arabia's traditionally close ties to the [US] have come under increased scrutiny. "It is newsworthy that no U.S. companies have been successful in the tender and perhaps more significant that none of the successful bidders have a substantial current portfolio or recent track record in the Middle East."

China significantly extended its energy and political access into the Stans with the May 2004 agreement with Kazakhstan between China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and KazMunaiGaz to build an oil pipeline from Atasu, NW Kazakhstan, to China's NW Xinjiang province. Kazakhstan wants to both diversify away from Russia and become a major exporter, thus its continuing talks with China for a pipeline to connect Caspian Sea gas fields to the east.

That palled with the October 2004 agreement between Sinopec and Iran's National Iranian Oil Company to "buy 250 million tons of LNG over 30 years from Iran and develop the giant Yadavaran [oil] field" which may contain over three billion barrels of recoverable reserves with a total production capacity of 300,000 bpd.

Iran's effort to tie LNG purchases with oil field development is seen "as more beneficial for Sinopec than the traditional buyback contracts, which apply to most foreign development deals in Iran"… Iran's petroleum minister [has] urged Chinese oil firms to play a bigger role in developing the industry in his country… Collaboration with Beijing would bring Tehran a new source of skills and investment at a time when U.S. sanctions block U.S. oil companies from doing business with Iran. "We have invited Chinese companies ... to actively participate in our exploration and development projects [promising them] the greatest incentives," including tax exemptions.

China saw that it could step across a prior barrier, the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), without significant US reprisal of penalties the act permits. While European and Asian firms had avidly sought Iranian energy contracts, notably Japan's INPEX's $2 billion 2004 agreement to develop the Azadegan field, China had previously limited itself to modest investments in Iran, including Sinopec's construction of an oil terminal and refinery upgrades.

It is supreme understatement to say that:

It is perhaps too early to digest fully the various economic, political and even geostrategic implications of this stunning development, widely considered a major blow to the Bush administration's economic sanctions on Iran and particularly on Iran's energy sector, notwithstanding the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) penalizing foreign companies daring to invest more than $20 million in Iran's oil and gas industry.

To be continued

Pressure on Iran could backfire
By Saloumeh Peyman
Asia Times
Nov 9, 2004

China rocks the geopolitical boat
Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Asia Times
Nov 6, 2004

So long US, hello China, India
By David Fullbrook
Asia Times
Nov 4, 2004

Gordon Housworth



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Face to face with the chasm between elements of Islam and the West

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The chasm between Anglo-European nationals, Christian, Jewish, and secular, and what I would call Western educated Muslim fundamentalism, i.e., a Muslim that speaks English or another European language, holds employment in a commercial firm, be it in the West or within a Muslim state, while holding strong Islamic views, was brought directly to the fore by a thread in an unlikely place -- an industrial design forum.

Hosted by York University in Canada, the Industrial Design Forum, or IDFORUM, has some 800 + subscribers around the globe. The IDFORUM charter states that it "provides a global electronic meeting place for all involved in industrial design. Practicing designers, design educators and design students are invited to subscribe." Hardy a place that one expects to come face to face with fundamentalism.

In a thread devoted to "World Issues" (affecting design and consumers of design), a Muslim designer offered this comment, with no deletions or changes):

-----Original Message-----
From: Industrial Design Forum [
mailto:IDFORUM@YORKU.CA] On Behalf Of Habib Hussein [habib_hussein1@HOTMAIL.COM]
Sent: Friday, 05 November, 2004 13:23
To:
IDFORUM@YORKU.CA
Subject: Re: World issues

Dear Jan,

This may sound harsh to some of you but, in my humble opinion, The Quran (and only in Arabic) is the Word of Allah - the ultimate designer. All others are wrong or outdated. There is no other Holy Text - as are writings of the atheist! I believe that anything else comes from Satan. One day the world will realise this as we will all be one people. The Holy Cites in and around Jerusalem will be controlled by Muslims one day instead of those who kill my people. I believe this will be the only way we will have world peace not by america or bush. He is a man of conviction and blindness. He wants to spread democracy but democracy too is the work of Satan. Look at them, they are places of lying, cheating, porn, drugs, alcohol, smoking, caffiene, greed, Machiavellian, insabordination to the autorities...

The more the world is divided, and it is doing a nice job of this, the more people will realise that Islam is the only way. Just look at all the new converts the world over, especially in Africa and Asia. Europe is next.

That is what motivates me to design and develop technology, results for the Kingdom of Allah.

HH

It is effortless to imagine that a much more isolated Muslim fundamentalist would decide to kill the artist Theo Van Gogh on an Amsterdam bicycle path.

It is always useful to see the post that occasioned the above response lest the Muslim's reply be due to baiting. Not so. Following is what I felt was a thoughtful post from a forum member at the University of South Australia:

Dear Habib,

Perhaps some fundamentalists everywhere have a lot in common whether they are Christian, Jewish, Moslem, or Hindu, or anything else. If a person who believes deeply in God, in religious law, and in the truth of their Holy Text and still somehow manages to ignore where it says we should love each other, then they may not be very fundamental in their beliefs at all only in their dogma which may be based on the word of other men, not the Holy Text. All those Holy Texts direct us to treat others with respect, live dignified and honourable lives and help others to do so as well. If a person who claims to believe fundamentally in the Truth, chooses for what ever reason to kill, torture, force, steal from, destroy, demean, leave to starve, arm, or in any other way injure another human being, regardless of circumstance; they are probably behaving in a way contrary to the spirit and purpose of loving God. Loving man and those creatures less able than us is I think a path to internal coherence described in all the Holy Texts.

And there are by the way some of us who do not choose to speak for others or design for destruction. I think we should speak from our own hearts to other people's hearts. Not as a group to a group we do not know as individuals. I agree we need to see each other as friends and share our understanding. The world needs all of us.

Regards,

I was among the early few that called the threat from al Qaeda and prophesied a conflict that could achieve the magnitude of a Holy War. I fear that it will require prodigious efforts to retain it at that daunting level. I further submit that until we come to terms with this possibility, that interim decisions will be insufficient to deal with the issue. And if we have indeed "become Israelis" as Mark Levine's guest editorial on Juan Cole' weblog suggests, we will have a combative, unproductive, and costly path on way there.

We’re all Israelis Now
Mark Levine, University of California, Irvine
November 05, 2004

Gordon Housworth



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Watching the front door, the wrong door, while mayhem occurs at the back door

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It is unlikely that the State Institute of Organic Synthesis Technologies (GITOS), its two facilities, Shikhany-1 and Shikhany-2, and the regional storage facility at Gornyi, all in Russia's Saratov region would mean much to US nationals. They should, as so should their state of deterioration and neglect, of both staff and facilities. We are speaking of one of Russia's larger chemical weapons design and storage facilities. Shikhany-2 is "Russia's primary center for the development of chemical weapons as well as protective measures against chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons" and includes the "Defense Ministry's test range for chemical and radiological weapons and defense systems." Shikhany-1 is (was) one of the primary research centers on hazardous chemicals with civilian applications until almost half the staff left after being unpaid for a year.

It is also worthwhile to remember the "Willy Sutton" rule in relationship to WMD fissile packages, bomb-grade nuclear materials, chemical and biological agents, their precursor components, and, of course, the research and production staff able to assemble any of them. (When Sutton was asked by a reporter why he robbed banks, the bank robber replied "Because that’s where the money is.") Al Qaeda certainly has, and their agents and criminal intermediaries are constantly paying attention to weak links in order to buy what they cannot yet fabricate.

Scientists from a former chemical weapons factory in Russia's Saratov Region have written to Russian Emergencies Minister Sergey Shoygu warning him of an impending disaster at the facility. The State Organic Synthesis Technology Institute in the village of Shikhany faces bankruptcy after years of declining demand. The scientists say the facility owes millions of roubles in debts and the 500 personnel have not been paid for months. They warn that no provisions have been made by the state to safeguard the stockpiles of toxic agents at the institute when it goes into liquidation. The scientific associates of the federal state unitary enterprise State Organic Synthesis Technology Institute (GITOS) located in the settlement of Shikhany in Saratov Region, have written a letter to Russian Emergencies Minister Sergey Shoygu. They likened the current state of affairs at the enterprise to a natural disaster.

The institute, which specialized in the development of chemical weapons for 40 years and accumulated an impressive stockpile of toxic agents, owes R100m to energy companies and to its own personnel. All of the power has been shut off at the institute. The institute's wage arrears were accumulated over a period of 11 months and ultimately amounted to R17m. "This is not a current problem. We have lived with it for more than 10 years," the chemists wrote. During that time, the personnel staff was cut to one-seventh of its previous size, decreasing from 3,500 positions to 500. The remaining personnel have nowhere to go: They cannot afford to move (they do not even have money for food, and hunger strikes are no longer a rare occurrence here), and there is no demand for such highly specific specialities in the country today. The institute's conversion plans (entailing the production of scarce medicines) have been difficult to implement: Investors face almost insurmountable difficulties because the institute still has the status of a restricted facility.

Russia commenced the decline of GITOS when it signed the international Chemical Weapons Convention, reducing its demand for continued chemical and biological agent production, and most recently forcing GITOS into bankruptcy:

According to the letter's authors, the Federal Agency for Industry, which took control of the institute along with the rest of the Russian Munitions Agency's charges, feels no responsibility for the hazardous production facility. According to the chemists, the agency only cares about the profitable portion of the enterprise (the one that barely makes a living on pharmaceuticals). For most of GITOS, the reorganization will mean liquidation (some of the institute buildings are already being dismantled). No one knows how the toxic agents, whose containers have to be renewed regularly, will be stored in the absence of personnel. In addition, no one knows what will happen to the personnel. An official resettlement programme has been instituted for them, but it can only handle a few families a year. "People are losing their patience," the chemists informed Shoygu. "There have been demands for mass hunger strikes and highway traffic blockades. It has become exceptionally difficult to keep the work team within the law." The authors of the letter suggested that the failure of the Russian government to take action in this situation could lead to a man-made disaster.

This conditions sound tailor made for theft, diversion, and corruption from staff, guards, or external penetration. I find it frightening that there are so many WMD facilities in the former Soviet Union, now the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS), that are simply falling apart along with the security charged with their protection.

If the US can profess to be concerned about areas of Africa hollowed out by AIDS that can become new al Qaeda havens, why are they not concerned with the hollowing out of key portions of the former Soviet weapons enterprise. A fraction of what we spend in Iraq could sequester and/or destroy these WMD assets. Al Qaeda has demonstrated the ability to 'hit us where we ain't' and it would be a masterstroke on their part to hold our attention in Iraq while they obtain materials from Russia to create disaster here in the US.

Chemical weapons storage methods spark protests
Gateway to Russia/BBC Monitoring/Nezavisimaya Gazeta
25 October 2004 13:07

Shikany / Volsk-18
Global Security
last data 1997

Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology, Politics
[Khimicheskoye Oruzhiye V Rossii: Istoriya, Ekologiya, Politika]
by Doctor of Chemical Sciences Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov Moscow
Center of Ecological Policy of Russia
27 July 1994

Gordon Housworth



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When mere pessimism is an optimistic analysis

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As grim as last Friday's forecast was in Forecast for Iraq and Afghanistan: taking the pulse of the war on terror, it was the most optimistic, if such an adjective is possible under the circumstances, of a range of options. At its simplest, our present focus on Iraq has done double damage, i.e., for what it has set in motion by its missteps in the region, and for what it has allowed to drift or receive insufficient attention due to the focus on Iraq. Add to that the remarkable inefficiency and squandering of resources in the prosecution of what we have set out to do, and you have a challenge on your hands. If I can turn to it in time, I will elaborate, but for now here are citations I find pertinent to the threats at hand:

Hell to Pay
By Rod Nordland, Babak Dehghanpisheh and Michael Hirsh
Newsweek, Nov 8, 2004 issue

U.S. Hopes To Divide Insurgency
By Bradley Graham and Walter Pincus
Washington Post
October 31, 2004

Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did
By Martin van Creveld
Defense and the National Interest
2004

GIs Lack Armor, Radios, Bullets
60 Minutes, CBSNews
Oct. 31, 2004

Provincial Capital Near Falluja Is Rapidly Slipping Into Chaos
By EDWARD WONG
New York Times
October 28, 2004

Video Shows G.I.'s at Weapon Cache
By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER
New York Times
October 29, 2004

Rights Group Warned U.S. of Munitions Cache
By William J. Kole
Associated Press
October 31, 2004

Munitions Issue Dwarfs the Big Picture
By Bradley Graham and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post
October 29, 2004

Eyewitness to a failure in Iraq
By Peter W. Galbraith
Boston Globe
October 27, 2004

Quarterly Report of the Office of the Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG)
Stuart W. Bowen, Inspector General
Office of the Inspector General Coalition Provisional Authority
October 30, 2004
Go
here for the report, as well as acronyms, definitions, and all appendices

Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey
Les Roberts, Riyadh Lafta, Richard Garfield, Jamal Khudhairi, Gilbert Burnham
The Lancet
Published online October 29, 2004

Iraq's Prime Minister Faults U.S. Military in Massacre
By EDWARD WONG
New York Times
October 27, 2004

Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls
President Faces a Multi-Front Battle Against Threats Known, Unknown
By Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer
Washington Post
October 26, 2004

US Hoped for Bin Laden Breakthrough: Newsweek
Reuters
Oct 31, 2004 05:50 PM ET

New Video Shows Kidnapped U.N. Workers in Afghanistan
By Keith B. Richburg
Washington Post
October 31, 2004

"Misunderestimating" Terrorism
By ALAN B. KRUEGER AND DAVID D. LAITIN
September/October 2004 issue of Foreign Affairs
October 12, 2004

China Lays Into 'Bush Doctrine' Ahead of U.S. Poll
By REUTERS
October 31, 2004
Filed at 10:07 p.m. ET

Gordon Housworth



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Nyang'oma to Chicago: expectations of largesse span eight thousand miles, two cultures and two governments

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The dry rankings of Transparency International's 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index do not do justice to the palatial scale of individual graft by the Big Man, tolerated so long as the "haves" -- the tribe, clans and families of the big man -- shared the wealth in progressively smaller measure until the "have nots" lived in squalor under the eye of the police and security forces.

No "poll of polls, reflecting the perceptions of business people and country analysts, both resident and non-resident" can have operational meaning until one understands the sway of the likes of Kenya's Daniel arap Moi and Zaire's (now Democratic Republic of Congo) Mobutu Sese Seko and their patronage systems that were seen as a duty of the governor and a right due to the governed. Those that did not fulfill their duties were soon replaced by someone who would.

I was always amused that Mobutu, born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, would rename himself Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Wa Za Banga. If one is speaking of his perennial assaults on the Congolese treasury, the name would surely fit as the translation is "The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake", or Mobutu Sese Seko for short.

The difficulty in rooting out this behavior was delightfully illustrated by the expectations of Kenya's Nyang'oma district on their Big Man once he gains office, none other than Barack Obama, a Democratic senatorial candidate in Illinois whose campaign has "pledged to improve education, fight for more jobs and make health care more universally available." The people of Nyang'oma would like all of those as well in addition to having their "dirt roads paved and their houses equipped with electricity and running water."

"We know he's got his constituency there in America, the people who elect him," said Said Obama, 38, the uncle. "But we're another constituency. He won't want to see us suffering."

"He is Kenyan," Ms. Onyango [Barack Obama's stepgrandmother] insisted, prompting the other relatives to nod. She showed photographs of a young Mr. Obama climbing aboard a matatu, the crowded minibuses that local people use to get around. Another photograph in her stash featured Mr. Obama hugging Ms. Onyango, and she held up one that had the baby-faced politician beaming beside his other Kenyan relatives.

It is not a free-loading attitude that people here are expressing when they speak of largess coming their way after Mr. Obama takes office. It is a feeling of extended family: those who make it help those left behind. Mr. Obama may have never lived in Nyang'oma, or elsewhere in Kenya for that matter, but he is one of them in the popular imagination and surely, relatives say, he will want to share his great success with his kin.

If Obama makes good on his intent to visit Kenya a third time after the Nov election, he "can expect thousands of people to turn out to greet him" with as I like to say, "one hand up and one hand out."

At the Nyang'oma-Kogello Secondary School, near the Obama family home, students are fairly well versed on Mr. Obama's Senate race and full of pride that a man they consider a local appears on the verge of victory... "We hope that when he wins, we all win," said Lawrence Were, 17, a student at the nearby high school. "It's not all that easy for an African to go so far. We consider him our man."

The school's definition of victory is "refurbished classrooms and a new science lab at the school," a library with textbooks and, of course, more electricity and running water.

"People say there will be great development once he wins. They say the road will be fixed and that there will be an airport so he can land right here direct from the U.S."

Just like Daniel arap Moi did for his town, Eldoret, even as he was plundering Kenya with the Goldenberg export compensation scheme and other excesses which cost Kenya the equivalent of a third of its annual GDP.

One wonders if Barack Obama, raised so very far from Kenya, knew what expectations he innocently set when he came to explore his ancestry.

Illinois Democrat Wins Kenyan Hearts, in a Landslide
By MARC LACEY
New York Times
October 25, 2004

Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index 2004
20 October 2004

Gordon Housworth



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As the truth changes so must the deception if the lie is to remain believable

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Part 3

An especially interesting statistic in deception is that the number of deceptions rise at the moment of attack approaches. If one becomes sensitive to a pattern of deception, it becomes much easier to field a countering move. Some political readers might say "but we know the date of the election," presuming it to be the 'attack.' I submit that the answer is far more subtle than that. Knowing that an election is forthcoming (known event in time) allows one to be especially attentive to the growing number of deceptions and ruses that will arise. Further, a presidential election is merely the culmination of a campaign comprised of many dispersed 'skirmishes' each of which has its own unique constituency and psychological context and is thus sensitive to varying deception. A stupendously effective (leave aside whether you think it accurate or fair) disinformation effort was the Swift Boat affair that put the Democratic candidate off-message and on the defensive. I believe that I heard Rove remark, if memory serves, that, 'My job is not to be fair. My job is to re-elect the President.' An appropriate response, I might add. Fairness has little to do with war. Successfully countering the deception at hand is.

Knowing that the rules of motivating an electorate have fundamentally changed and that Denial and deception (D&D) has entered the mainstream is the first step, The second it to understand what D&D seeks to do:

  • Disrupt one's ability to "observe, orient, and decide" (Boyd's OODA Loop)
  • induce inaccurate impressions about capabilities or intentions, causing the target to apply intel assets inappropriately, and fail to employ all assets to best advantage

Countering deception is hard because "those being deceived do not systematically consider alternative explanations for the evidence they observe, and incorrectly weigh the evidence they do have." "People often dismiss important evidence, prematurely prune alternative hypotheses, and jump to conclusions. These make people and organizations easy to deceive." Since deception is relatively rare, it is not surprising that people are poor at countering deception:

  • Poor anomaly detection (missing contextual cues, or prematurely dismissing as irrelevant or inconsistent with other intel)
  • Misattribution (attributing deception event to collection gaps or processing errors)
  • Failure to link deception tactics to deception hypotheses (noticing anomalies fails to recognize them as indicators of deception)
  • Inadequate support for deception hypotheses (failing to link an assessment of an adversary's deception tactics and goals to the adversary's strategic goals; i.e., failing to test denial or deception course of actions (COAs) against the available evidence)

Start with Heuer's Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, one of the great masterpieces of understanding the analytic thought processes of intelligence, of overcoming cognitive biases, and of stepping away from preconceived mind-sets and mental models. Heuer presents a protocol called Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) that I have used for both signal and sprignal (deception) analysis:

  • Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered
  • List the significant observed evidence and assumptions for and against each hypothesis
  • Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side
  • Refine the matrix
  • Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis
  • Analyze sensitivity of the conclusion to a few critical items of evidence
  • Report conclusions
  • Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a different course than expected

In what I see as a parallel of Whaley applied to Wohlstetter, Stech and Elsasser have sought to extend Heuer's ACH so as to account for cognitive factors that make people poor at detecting deception.

Their concern was that ACH can "lead one to be more susceptible to deception." In particular, Heuer's 'Draw tentative conclusions' step recommends weighing hypotheses in light of evidence, a process that already promotes reasoning errors rising from "everyday irrationality." The problem with 'weighing hypotheses in light of evidence' is that in conventional analysis, it neglects the individual base rates of both evidence and hypothesis, and in counter-deception conditions, it fails to flag an evidentiary false positive rate. In order to adapt ACH for counter-deception, Stech et al has modified ACH so that "hypothesis generation includes appropriate denial and deception COAs, and the ACH is used to elicit or estimate both" 'weighing hypotheses in light of evidence' and weighing evidence as signal, noise, or sprignal.

Suffice it to say that any major political party will have to master these techniques in countering deception, but learning is not easy. I am reminded that David Kahn's 1992 analysis of Pearl Harbor's intel failures (where we did not merge diplomatic and military data and depended on Magic decryptions to the exclusion of warnings contained in non-Sigint intel) "has taught the United States to gather more information and evaluate it better." Subsequent responses to new adversaries have not borne that out.

Psychology of Intelligence Analysis
Richards J. Heuer, Jr.
CSI, CIA 1999

Midway Revisited: Detecting Deception by Analysis of Competing Hypothesis
Frank Stech and Christopher Elsasser
Mitre, June 2004

Gordon Housworth



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Deception at its best: the opponent is quite certain, very decisive, and wrong

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Part 2

The ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive, and wrong. -- Barton Waley

Rove's most effective efforts strike me as similar to Allied deception efforts in WW II that earned them such success: "controlled the key channels of information, had superior intelligence and received feedback on their deception operations, centralized controlled over their deception planning, effectively practiced proven deception tactics, ensured deception operations were subordinate to strategic objectives, maintained stringent secrecy, and provided enough time to execute deception plans shrewdly." Democrats have much to learn.

Careful analysis of patterns within sprignals had the potential to accelerate timely warning of surprise attack. Whaley's later analysis extended to 68 cases of surprise attack in 20th century warfare, in Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War. Harris noted:

"Whaley found a high positive correlation between the intensity of deception (counting types of channels utilized for intensity) and the likelihood of surprise attack, and a positive correlation between the intensity of deception and the intensity of surprise, using, for example, casualty ratios in war as a proxy for intensity of surprise."

Returning to Wack:

After concluding the nonaggression pact with Hitler in 1939, Stalin was so convinced the Germans would not attack as early as 1941 -- and certainly not without an ultimatum -- that he ignored 84 warnings to the contrary. According to Barton Whaley, the warnings about Operation Barbarossa included communications from Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy in the German embassy in Tokyo, and Winston Churchill; the withdrawal of German merchant shipping from Soviet ports; and evacuation of German dependents from Moscow.

Deception, be it military, diplomatic, or political, has four components:

  • Security
  • Plausibility
  • Adaptability (however elaborate, deception must adapt to the changing situation)
  • Integration (deception effort integrated at all levels and with all means)

Using these components, Every deception effort is comprised of only two basic parts: hiding the real and revealing the false. Hiding the real is called dissimulation. It is the covert part, that which is concealed from the enemy. Revealing the false is called simulation. It is the overt part, that which is falsely revealed to the enemy as truth. Dissimulation and simulation are always present together in any act of deception.

The US Army has extracted ten maxims from game theory, history, and deception writings that make a good basis for planning a deception:

  1. Reinforce his beliefs (Magruder's Principle)-It is generally easier to induce a target to maintain an existing belief than to entice him to change his beliefs.
  2. Target his mind--There are limitations to human information processing that are deceptively exploitable.
  3. Use multiple forms of surprise-- Surprise can be achieved in the following categories: size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment-(SALUTE) intent, and style.
  4. Feed all the enemy's sources (Jones' Dilemma)-- Deception becomes more difficult as the number of sources available to confirm the real increases.
  5. Create Noise only for a purpose--Too much erroneous information can obscure the deception effort.
  6. Use deception selectively--It may be wise to withhold the employment of deception capabilities until the stakes are high.
  7. Deception is continuous--Deception activities should be sequenced to portray the deception for as long as possible.
  8. Feedback is a must--An intelligence collection scheme should be employed to determined if the deception is being adopted, rejected, or countered.
  9. Focus on the enemy's action (The Monkey's Paw)- Deception efforts may produce unwanted actions from the enemy and friendly units.
  10. Don't make it easy for him--If the target's intelligence collection system has to work for the indicators, the greater the chance he'll believe them.

I have yet to make a systematic analysis of such politically manipulative actions in the current presidential election campaign, but they all seem to be present.

Part 4

Stratagem: Deception and surprise in war
Barton Whaley
MIT Center for International Studies
1969

Codeword BARBAROSSA
Barton Whaley
MIT Press, 1974

Gordon Housworth



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