return to ICG Spaces home    ICG Risk Blog    discussions    newsletters    login    

ICG Risk Blog - [ Risk Containment and Pricing Public ]

Using SARS to predict H5N1 Avian Flu impacts on regional & global supply chains


Suspected human-to-human Avian Flu H5N1 transmission has occurred in Vietnam, and is the kind of trigger news that could launch the epidemic/pandemic "event" noted in The flu season not yet underway and uncomfortable signs that 'when, not if' is shifting to 'soon, not when'. Worse, the lack of reliable or widely available tests may be masking other cases. H5N1 is vastly more fearsome than SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome).

In the case of SARS and now Avian Flu, governments are voting short term economic gains, reducing the flow of accurate infection information, impeding inspection by foreign epidemiological staff, and forestalling destruction of infected fowl, thereby blinding themselves - and us - to the tipping point of a pandemic.

Independent actions by local, regional, and national governmental entities effectively conspire to make the situation opaque. Vietnam, Thailand, and China are now repeating news suppression and denials in avian flu animal-to-human and human-to-human transmissions.

For all the interruption and destructive capacity of the SARS epidemic - the worst economic crisis in Southeast Asia since the bank failures and currency devaluations - one must remember that in comparison to Avian Flu, SARS was much more difficult to affect contagion. An Avian Flu pandemic will massively accelerate the SARS timeline. Containment is problematic.

During the SARS epidemic, we built a hierarchy of events in real-time so as to predict supply chain impacts before they occurred. If we have to dust it off for Avian Flu, the progression speed will be frightening in comparison.

Following is a sanitized event hierarchy for SARS that flags items that effectively worsen, impacting revenue and life. It does not include items that increase, or respond to the situation, such as the foreign (offshore) rise in teleconferencing (including audioconferencing, videoconferencing and Web conferencing), and host nation sales of autos and motorbikes (to avoid mass transit).

Two variables quickly emerged:

  • Primary variable: duration (as opposed to number of affected industries)
  • Secondary variable: continued/lingering fear

Hierarchy of Impact is divided into three sections:

  • "Pre-event" hierarchy: events leading up to the Asian (PRC and Hong Kong) breakout of major economic and health effects.
  • Host nation (PRC and HK) "Public" or core event hierarchy: events causing regional disruption, death, and economic loss
  • "Post-event" hierarchy: aftermath and mop-up events

"Pre-event" hierarchy:

  • Anecdotal communications among healthcare providers, CDC (Center for Disease Control), and WHO (World Health Organization)
  • Host nation suppression of news and entry of foreign disease control personnel
  • Unexplained disease reports of "acute respiratory syndrome" in neighborhoods, local hospitals, and health workers
  • WHO confirms disease as "worldwide health threat"
  • Air-transit leaps of disease (ex: Canada, Taiwan, Germany, US)
  • Foreign (offshore) travel warnings (ex: Canada) cause immediate travel, convention, tourism, service industry impacts, and airline revenue impacts to affected areas
  • WHO issues South East Asia travel guidelines
  • Foreign disease control personnel fall ill (insuppressible news event)
  • WHO recommends postponement of all non-essential travel to Host nations (PRC and HK)
  • Foreign (offshore) quarantine commences

Part 2

Suspected human-to-human bird flu transmission in Vietnam
Deborah MacKenzie
17:15 21 January 2005

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Infrastructure Defense Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  


  discuss this article

"Why are they doing this to us?"


Bolt this thought into your thinking of Iraq: US viewers have, in a month, been treated to more sustained disaster coverage of the Asian tsunami and its impact on human suffering, and have registered more empathy and action as witnessed by instantly offered donations and aid, than they have seen and acted upon in a year of Iraqi coverage. Think how differently that situation would be had we reacted to Iraq in the same manner of the tsunami.

What we have instead are widows screaming, "Why are they doing this to us?" Riverbend is a good reporter/blogger largely devoid of polemics so it all the more telling that a moderate, as yet unradicalized Iraqi can accept the possibility of US use of CW:

The situation in Falloojeh is worse than anyone can possibly describe. It has turned into one of those cities you see in your darkest nightmares- broken streets strewn with corpses, crumbling houses and fallen mosques... The worst part is that for the last couple of weeks we've been hearing about the use of chemical weapons inside Falloojeh by the Americans. Today we heard that the delegation from the Iraqi Ministry of Health isn't being allowed into the city, for some reason.

I don't know about the chemical weapons. It's not that I think the American military is above the use of chemical weapons, it's just that I keep wondering if they'd be crazy enough to do it. I keep having flashbacks of that video they showed on tv, the mosque and all the corpses. There was one brief video that showed the same mosque a day before, strewn with many of the same bodies- but some of them were alive. In that video, there's this old man leaning against the wall and there was blood running out of his eyes- almost like he was crying tears of blood. What 'conventional' weaponry makes the eyes bleed? They say that a morgue in Baghdad has received the corpses of citizens in Falloojeh who have died under seemingly mysterious conditions.

The situation in Baghdad isn't a lot better. Electricity has been particularly bad. Our telephone has been cut off for the last week which has made communication (and blogging) particularly difficult. The phone difficulties are quite common all over Baghdad. It usually happens in an area after a fresh bombing… We spent the last week fixing up the house. [explosions] took out three of the windows on one side of the house [spent] spent two days gathering shattered glass and sticking sheets of plastic over the gaping squares that were once windows.

Driven by the convergence of NIC's Jihadist Islam implications with my own, I'd reimmersed myself in Iraqi blogs to orient myself around the sense of loss and powerlessness that ordinary Iraqis feel (not that they are all princes, mind you, but their middle is not a monster either) and a worldview singularly at odds with many US nationals who will reproach them for their 'ungratefulness.' Remembering that Arabs place an entirely different lens against US actions as opposed to their own despots (unless they are supported by the US), too many Iraqis feel that the US invasion and occupation 'liberated' them from - or the expectations of - human rights, functioning infrastructure, and entire cities in which to live.

The destruction on the ground is phenomenal, the collapse of the infrastructure nearly complete, and about 50% of Iraqis out of work. Black humor abounds. An Abu Ghraib detainee said, "The Americans brought electricity to my ass before they brought it to my house." Stories of "dogs eating bodies in the streets of [Fallujah] and of destroyed mosques have spread across Iraq like wildfire," thereby deepening Iraqi antipathy to the US and lifting support to the insurgents. Whatever US prison sentences and accountability meted out for Abu Ghraib have been sneered at by Iraqis. It does not matter what we think but what they think and thus how they will support what Watts Wacker calls What Comes After What Comes Next.

The failed infrastructure is seen in riverbend's "typical Iraqi Christmas wishlist":

  1. 20 liters of gasoline
  2. A cylinder of gas for cooking
  3. Kerosene for the heaters
  4. Those expensive blast-proof windows
  5. Landmine detectors
  6. Running water
  7. Thuraya satellite phones
  8. Portable diesel generators
  9. Coleman rechargeable flashlight with extra batteries
  10. Scented candles

Oh don't get me wrong- the governmental people have gasoline (they have special gas stations where there aren't all these annoying people, rubbing their hands with cold and cursing the Americans to the skies)... The Americans have gasoline. The militias get gasoline. It's the people who don't have it. We can sometimes get black-market gasoline but the liter costs around 1250 Iraqi Dinars which is almost $1- compare this to the old price of around 5 cents.

Patience is gone:

There was a time when pro-occupation Iraqis were able to say, "Let's give them a chance..." That time is over. Whenever someone says that lately, at best, they get a lot of nasty looks... often it's worse. A fight breaks out and a lot of yelling ensues... how can one condone occupation? How can one condone genocide? What about the mass graves of Falloojeh? Leaving Islam aside, how does one agree to allow the murder of fellow-Iraqis by the strongest military in the world?

To Allawi's "State of Emergency":

A state of emergency *now* - because previous to this week, we Iraqis were living in an American made Utopia

To Rumsfled's "Rule of Iraq assassins must end":

I couldn't agree more: Get out Americans.

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

This resistance is acceptable to us


As we were eating, [an older professor and friend] Abdulla expressed a sentiment now widely heard. "The mujahideen are fighting for their country against the Americans. This resistance is acceptable to us"... among Iraqis the growing resistance was predicted long ago… While footage of cars with broken glass and bullet holes in their frames flashed across a television screen, my translator Hamid, an older man who had already grown weary of the violence, said softly, "It has begun. These are only the start, and they will not stop. Even after June 30."

Indeed it has, and indeed, it will rise, predicted by none other that the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, Mapping the Global Future. At least read the Executive Summary, starting with its Relative Certainties and Key Uncertainties, one of which is an "Arc of instability spanning Middle East, Asia, Africa":

The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating over the next 15 years… We expect that by 2020 al-Qa’ida will be superceded by similarly inspired Islamic extremist groups, and there is a substantial risk that broad Islamic movements akin to al-Qa’ida will merge with local separatist movements. Information technology, allowing for instant connectivity, communication, and learning, will enable the terrorist threat to become increasingly decentralized, evolving into an eclectic array of groups, cells, and individuals that do not need a stationary headquarters to plan and carry out operations. Training materials, targeting guidance, weapons know-how, and fund-raising will become virtual (i.e., online). Terrorist attacks will continue to primarily employ conventional weapons, incorporating new twists and constantly adapting to counterterrorist efforts. Terrorists probably will be most original not in the technologies or weapons they use but rather in their operational concepts—i.e., the scope, design, or support arrangements for attacks.

Keep in mind, Mamdani's jihadist Islam, an ideology now dominating Islamist politics, as you read on in 2020:

There are indications that the Islamic radicals’ professed desire to create a transnational insurgency, that is, a drive by Muslim extremists to overthrow a number of allegedly apostate secular governments with predominately Muslim subjects, will have an appeal to many Muslims… groups inspired by al-Qa’ida, regionally based groups, and individuals labeled simply as jihadistsunited by a common hatred of moderate regimes and the Westare likely to conduct terrorist attacks. The al-Qa’ida membership that was distinguished by having trained in Afghanistan will gradually dissipate, to be replaced in part by the dispersion of the experienced survivors of the conflict in Iraq.

the majority of international terrorist groups will continue to identify with radical Islam. The revival of Muslim identity will create a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology both inside and outside the Middle East, including Western Europe, Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

  • This revival has been accompanied by a deepening solidarity among Muslims caught up in national or regional separatist struggles, such as Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Mindanao, or southern Thailand and has emerged in response to government repression, corruption, and ineffectiveness.
  • A radical takeover in a Muslim country in the Middle East could spur the spread of terrorism in the region and give confidence to others that a new Caliphate is not just a dream.
  • Informal networks of charitable foundations, madrasas, hawalas, and other mechanisms will continue to proliferate and be exploited by radical elements.
  • Alienation among unemployed youths will swell the ranks of those vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.

Re Mamdani's "Every Middle Eastern movement that opposes the American empire--secular or religious, state or nonstate--is being drawn to Iraq, as if to a magnet, to test out its convictions":

  • Iraq and other possible conflicts in the future could provide recruitment, training grounds, technical skills and language proficiency for a new class of terrorists who are "professionalized" and for whom political violence becomes an end in itself.
  • Foreign jihadistsindividuals ready to fight anywhere they believe Muslim lands are under attack by what they see as "infidel invaders" enjoy a growing sense of support from Muslims who are not necessarily supporters of terrorism.

In titanic understatement, NIC Chairman Robert Hutchings said that 2020 "tried to avoid analyzing the effect of U.S. policy on global trends to avoid being drawn into partisan politics," but I cannot see how it can be kept out of political calculus given the implications of policy roads taken and those not. As a geopolitical analyst, it is grim satisfaction to see the report echo the concerns raised in this weblog. Iraq as we know it, or thought we knew it, is lost; now it is the Islamist Jihad test-tube, and most likely my neo-Taliban exclusion zone that permits insurgents and jihadists to operate unhindered.

Part 2 of Resistance is acceptable

Mapping the Global Future
Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project
National Intelligence Council
NIC 2004-13, December 2004
Executive Summary

The devastation of Iraq
By Dahr Jamail
Asia Times
Jan 11, 2005

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

Parsing political from traditional Islam


Those seeking superficial "culture talk" to pigeonhole Islam as a theology and a political force should skip this note as I conclude this trio with a tour of Mahmood Mamdani's dissection of the idea that "religion drives both Islamic culture and politics and that the motivation for Islamist violence is religious fundamentalism." Were it only so easy. No more monolithic a block than 'Christianity,' Islam is a sea of interpretations, large and small. Olivier Roy notes that Muslims "disagree, while all stressing that the Koran is unambiguous and clear-cut."

Remember that the magic of bin Laden is his marriage of two heretofore distinct arms of Islamic thinking, the ultra-strict, quietist Wahhabi (Salafist) school and the more autonomous and activist strand of political Islam of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (which was itself injected with the thinking of Sayad Maududi's Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) from Pakistan where it still holds sway today).

Conceptualizing Islam interlinked with socio-economic and political systems, Islam became a "movement which struggles (jihad) to enforce "the way of life," and in the hands of the Brotherhood fleeing to Saudi Arabia to avoid persecution, it "took control of Saudi intellectual life, [shaping] the country's religious and political awakening after the Iranian revolution of 1979. A new generation of radicals carried this new activist Wahhabism into the Middle East and Asia. (This is not the only time that Wahhabism has been "elevated to the status of a liberation theology," as Kepel notes, Ronald Reagan used Saudi money and religion to "free the region of communism." Isn't blowback wonderful?)

Soon came al-Zawahiri's brilliance in the tactical shift from the "nearby enemy" to the "faraway enemy," the strategic adoption of Palestine as a rallying point (which bin Laden had only paid token service), the advancement of political terrorism as a legitimate and cost-effective means of attack, the need for a new infrastructure to manage, operate, and recruit in pursuit of jihad, and the creation of a stateless and thus largely untargetable entity. (I still find al-Zawahiri the more essential thinker than bin Laden.)

I was more than intrigued by Mamdani's parallels between neoconservatives and jihadists:

In addition to the mix of interest and ideology, the two groups share global ambitions and a deep faith in the efficacy of politically motivated violence, and both count among their ranks cadres whose biographies are often tainted by early stints in the Trotskyist or the Maoist left. Both jihadists and neoconservatives are products of the Cold War, when ideologically driven violence was embraced by all sides, secular and religious.

Jihadist politics are "heir not only to the traditions of the quietist Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood, but perhaps even more so to recent secular traditions, such as Third World anti-imperialism and the Reaganite determination to win "by any means necessary." It is most certainly not a simple cultural extension of Islam.

Mamdani sees Europe's Muslims as "active subjects struggling to establish a new citizenship in adverse circumstances--some of which, such as racism and unemployment, were familiar to earlier immigrants; others, such as the stigma of a terrorist culture, are new." In a discussion too long to report here, he summarizes ideas which would indicate that traditional Islam could coexist. The problem is that political Islam whose ideologues are former leftists not clerics or ulema (teachers) likely cannot.

Mamdani believes that the Afghan jihad's influence cannot be overstated in understanding "why jihadist Islam, an ideology of marginal political significance in the late 1970s, has come to dominate Islamist politics":

the birth of jihadist Islam, which embraces violence as central to political action, cannot be fully explained without reference to the Afghan jihad and the Western influences that shaped it. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration declared the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and set aside the then-common secular model of national liberation in favor of an international Islamic jihad... Afghan rebels used charities to recruit tens of thousands of volunteers and created the militarized madrassas (Islamic schools) that turned these volunteers into cadres. Without the rallying cause of the jihad, the Afghan mujahideen would have had neither the numbers, the training, the organization, nor the coherence or sense of mission that has since turned jihadist Islam into a global political force.

Mamdani drives home the fact that that political Islam's growth has been nonlinear and hybridized by specific political projects. Political Islam may bifurcate between indigenous and immigrant arms, with one taking precedence over the other, but at least he is offering a far less simplistic means of analysis. He does not answer the question if political Islam will mimic the melding of Marxism and local nationalisms to create entities strong enough to pull down regimes, but he says to look to Iraq where:

Every Middle Eastern movement that opposes the American empire--secular or religious, state or nonstate--is being drawn to Iraq, as if to a magnet, to test out its convictions [in] a free-for-all [that] will influence the course of political Islam for years to come.

Part 12

Whither Political Islam?
Mahmood Mamdani
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

Putting aside militant ire, can Muslim moderates merely survive their conservatives?


Being shouted down amid chants of "Liars! Liars!... You are all Zionists! You are all infidels!" while being lunged at by conservative Muslims does not inspire confidence that moderate Islamist introspection can proceed safely, if at all.

For readers unfamiliar with Sunni sects, it is important to understand what has been called "fatwa chaos," i.e., that there is no central authority responsible for issuing penultimate rulings on doctrinal questions as there exists in Shias or, for that matter, Catholicism. Each Imam can preach and invoke within an enormously wide latitude, thus opening the possibility for contradictory "sweeping, ill-defined statements [that can be] interpreted as a mandate to undertake any violence, no matter how vicious."

Katzman believes that "Islamic reformers will always face an uphill battle [as] whenever they attempt to depart from Qur'anic literalism, they become vulnerable to charges from radicals of infidelity to Islam. This poses what is probably an insurmountable problem for those who would reform Islam."

Robert Spencer (of JihadWatch not for the faint but valuable material once one gets past the necessity of a PC mindset) doubts "whether Islam would or could develop interpretative traditions analogous to those in Judaism and Christianity that mitigated the force of bellicose passages of the Old Testament -- in other words, how this Islamic renaissance would manage to blunt the force of Qur'anic literalism (and literalism in Hadith [oral sayings of the Prophet] interpretation also) so that they would not continue to be inspirations for violence and fanaticism."

Spencer wryly observes that the [NYT] implicitly acknowledges [that] the extremists are not a "tiny minority," and are not as discredited as the Times would have had us believe on many other occasions, but are in control of the interpretation of Islam, such that the faith must be "wrestled back" from them [yet when he makes that observation he is] called an "Islamophobe."

Having long been of the opinion that Islam had its reformation and its Luther (many of whose brutal prescriptions have been softened for lay readers over time) in the person of al-Wahhab, I can agree with Spencer's position that "The primary point of similarity that that both Luther and Wahhab led movements that purported to strip away later accretions and get back to the core elements of their religions. That al-Wahhab's reformation was violent and virulent is a reflection on the core texts of his religion, to which he dedicated himself and his followers with all-encompassing zeal." Unfortunately, it is that Wahhabism that so frequently wends its way across the net today to waiting eyes.

When cast against Sheik Yousef Qaradawi whose "Islamic Law and Life" program on Al Jazeera (and thereby an extremely influential cleric among Sunnis) implied that all US nationals in Iraq could be targets and that "Resistance [in Iraq] is a legitimate matter - even more, it is a duty," and Abdel Sabour Shahin who states most foreigners in Iraq are legitimate targets, I can only hope that Abdul Rahman al-Rashed is correct in sensing that "there is a movement in the Arab world, if perhaps not yet a consensus, that understands that Muslims have to start reining in their own rather than constantly complaining about injustice and unfairness. The violence has not only reduced sympathy for just causes like ending the Israeli occupation but set off resentment against Muslims wherever they live."

It is worthwhile to read the 10 point statement from the Cairo Islam and Reform conference as it offers some insight into the overhead of "reviewing the roots of Islamic heritage [Hadith included], ending the monopoly that certain religious institutions hold over interpreting such texts and confronting all extremist religious currents." For a religion whose adherents have been imbued with immense pride for centuries that "Islam was spread by the sword, that all Arab countries and even Spain were captured by the sword" such that most of the Arab street believes that "the religion of Islam is the religion of the sword," the reformists have a challenge before them. Egypt's most senior religious scholar, Muhammad Sayed Tantawi, immediately labeled the attendees of Islam and Reform as a "group of outcasts."

Perhaps it is true that "even raising the topic [of reinterpretation of Islam] erodes the taboo that the religion and those schooled in it are somehow infallible," but the struggle will be long and I think dangerous as it is all too easy for a reformer to be ruled an apostate to the faith by a conservative cleric with a following and thus be open to summary execution for that 'lapse' of faith.

Part 3 of Islam's trajectory

The War Inside the Arab Newsroom
New York Times
January 2, 2005

Europe's Muslims May Be Headed Where the Marxists Went Before
New York Times
December 26, 2004

Muslim Scholars Increasingly Debate Unholy War
New York Times
December 10, 2004

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

If Islam follows a Marxist trajectory, what kind of Islam will it be?


I've long held that Marxism, despite its protestations, was a secular religion. Like any deity-based religion, it had a teleology and metaphysics, prophets and saints, a potent means of proselytization and assimilation, and to my mind operated very much like the Holy See at its zenith of power.

While Islam appears to have succeeded Marxism as Europe's "ideology of contestation" its practitioners hale from very different roots. As Marxism then and Islam now:

  • Working class political voice, immigrants included
  • Voice of idealism amid disillusionment (that "transnational ideology" leading to Utopia)
  • Similar working-class political districts (moving from Communist to Communist-led and Muslim-populated to Muslim administrations)
  • Pragmatic, law-abiding mainstream but with an extremist element

Initial Marxist outreach to Muslims replacing working-class populations withered as Communists failed to promote Muslims within their organization and disillusioned Muslims dropped political action as a means to improve their lot. Many, but not all, Muslims predictably turned to religion and the solace of self-reinforcing group increasingly isolated from European society. The danger of painting with too broad a brush is shown in Holland's aftermath of Theo van Gogh’s murder:

The Turkish immigrants live mainly quiet and increasingly prosperous lives. The most problematic minority in terms of [crime and maladjustment] are Moroccans. [In a recent conference to identify extremists while protecting innocent Muslims] The Turkish representative spoke perfect Dutch, wore a business suit, and agreed with the proposal. The Moroccan representative spoke broken Dutch, and still needed "to consult" with his mosque.

Those Muslims opposed to cooperation are only isolated physically within European society as they are vibrantly and instantly connected by satellite TV and internet to the most fundamental Imams and the most vitriolic cant.

It is not at all clear to me that the broader Muslim population of Europe will follow Communism's shedding its revolutionary extremism, shifting to assimilation within European democratic political life:

Disowned by the pragmatic left, Europe's militant Marxist fringe was isolated and repressed, while governments pursued social policies that to some measure addressed the grievances of the poor and dispossessed, which had animated the radicals.

It is also not obvious to me that "Islam's role as a beacon for the downtrodden may wane, in part because of its very success" when that success is described in Anglo-European terms as the "necessary compromises with the surrounding community that are inherent in economic and political participation could dull its edge and sap its momentum, as they did for Marxism." Given the open resentment and ostracism showered on Muslims even in formerly tolerant Netherlands (and excepting the remarkable strides made by Turks), I find it hard to accept Kepel's view that:

Once the more mainstream, upwardly mobile Arab or African young people move out of their working-class neighborhoods, "they aren't perceived as Muslim any more, and the vast majority aren't interested in using their religion as a social and political marker."

While I do agree with his comment that "Beyond the militant minority, the inward-looking fundamentalists are by definition politically insignificant," it is not their political insignificance that concerns me but rather their militancy, their willingness to unilaterally enforce a Borg-like assimilation on their terms, and without notice, put another Theo van Gogh in the street for affronting them.

Part 2 of Islam's trajectory

Europe's Muslims May Be Headed Where the Marxists Went Before
New York Times
December 26, 2004

Muslim Scholars Increasingly Debate Unholy War
New York Times
December 10, 2004

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

Does Arabic have a word for Desaparecido? French and Spanish does.


When you are familiar with the desaparecidos ("The Disappeared") populating the miniature killing fields of Guatemala and Salvador (often times a preexisting garbage dump), when you as a gringo in the bush fear arrest by the military as much as kidnapping by the guerillas, when the hapless, innocent Indios were killed by the military by day and by the guerillas by night...

Having been closer than most to fruits of a desaparecido effort, I can say that it is vicious, capricious, replete with collateral damage to innocents, instills fear while moderating behavior, creates blowback of some magnitude at a later date, but works in the short-term. Could be Plan B, and not just for Iraq. I've already forecast a return to such programs in Central America to deal with the Maras (gangs), Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Mara 18:

the law enforcement tools on offer mimic that of terrorism, covert and overt military force, without the programs that address the social and economic forces that create the draw to gangs. The problem is already so great in Central America that states are reviving conventional military strength and counterinsurgency strategies along with extralegal paramilitary and vigilante enforcement, while adopting zero-tolerance laws that bypass rules of due process. Mechanisms once directed at leftists and political dissidents are now directed at gang members.

Enter Iraq. With painful realism settling in among senior civilian and military ranks that recent actions against Fallujah's insurgents have merely dispersed the intended targets while continuing to enrage ordinary Iraqis, there is active debate on resuscitating "the Salvador option," the training and arming of paramilitaries operating in concert with US spec ops to liquidate insurgents, jihadists, their enablers and facilitators. One proposal sends "Special Forces teams to advise, support and possibly train Iraqi squads, most likely hand-picked Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and Shiite militiamen, to target Sunni insurgents and their sympathizers, even across the border into Syria, [although current thinking] is that while U.S. Special Forces would lead operations in [Syria while] activities inside Iraq itself would be carried out by Iraqi paramilitaries."

I find discussions of "whether this would be a policy of assassination or so-called "snatch" operations" for covert interrogation to be moot as if such a program mimics its predecessors, once gone, forever gone whether one is interrogated or not. Liquidation squads would be controversial only to outside observers. Were insurgents/Baathists to be candid, I submit that they would consider it a long overdue response even though they would be its targets. Welcome to symmetry in asymmetrical warfare.

Compared to some 100,000 gang members, Iraq is manageable only if one is sufficiently ruthless, can operate beyond public scrutiny, and employ surrogates so as to claim plausible denial. The Baathist-insurgent marriage of convenience is now so large, so well armed, that their backlash would be phenomenal:

[number of gunmen in Iraq that] carry out terrorist actions against the citizens and are outlaws. Their number in all parts of Iraq is between 20,000 and 30,000 and they are mostly in the Sunni areas where the population there, almost 200,000, is sympathetic to them. But they do not provide them with any material or logistical help. For example, they do not report their activities if they have the information. [gunmen are] Ba'thist remnants, hard-line extremists, and others. If 20 percent [of an estimated 2 million Ba'th Party members are presently involved in armed operations] then their number is large and all of them are members of organizations and have weapons. A large number of people are working with the Ba'thists to earn a livelihood after finding themselves without jobs, especially those who were in the former Iraqi army.

The majority of Iraqis are what I call insurgent-neutral, neither aiding or providing logistical support, nor alerting the authorities. A desaparecido program would instill fear of aiding the insurgency:

The Sunni population is paying no price for the support it is giving to the terrorists. From their point of view, it is cost-free. We have to change that equation.

Running it as a covert op under a US presidential finding sidesteps nettlesome oversight and insulates the military from legal peril. No surprise that Prime Minister Ayad Allawi "is said to be among the most forthright proponents of the Salvador option." I am more curious as to, say, Turkish interest in seeing Kurds so trained, the ramp-up time to force maturity and preemptive Insurgent/Ba'athist counterstrikes. There will be no rear area and no noncombatants.

Part 11

‘The Salvador Option’
By Michael Hirsh and John Barry
Jan 8,
Updated: 10 Jan, 2005

Iraqi Intelligence Service Chief Interviewed on Terrorism, Related Issues
Interview with Major General Muhammad Abdallah al-Shahwani, director of Iraq's National Intelligence Service, 4 January
(FBIS Translated Text) Wednesday, January 5, 2005

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

If it can't be realistically won - settle for Realpolitik


RAND's James Dobbins makes a related case for US withdrawal in the same Foreign Affairs, stating that as a "result of its initial miscalculations, misdirected planning, and inadequate preparation," the US has lost trust and consent of Iraqis, will not win them back, has abrogated its duties and responsibilities of an occupying power under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and that each passing day of US action insures that we "lose further ground on the central front of Iraqi opinion" - what could be called moderates in that area. In short, the US has "already lost the war":

Moderate Iraqis can still win it, but only if they wean themselves from Washington and get support from elsewhere. To help them, the United States should reduce and ultimately eliminate its military presence, train Iraqis to beat the insurgency on their own, and rally Iran and European allies to the cause.

Timing and diplomacy has much to do with US success as we must try to reduce growing resistance without leaving a vacuum that triggers a civil war while involving all frontline and local elements. Unpalatable perhaps but recognizing Realpolitik has merit:

In order to stabilize Bosnia in the mid-1990s, the United States had to work with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, the two individuals personally responsible for the genocide it was trying to stop. In 2001, Washington worked with Iran, Pakistan, India, and Russia to install a broadly representative successor to the Taliban, even though those states had been tearing Afghanistan apart for a generation.

Dobbins contrasts that to a US approach in Iraq that had no "underlying strategy designed to secure the support of neighboring states" and that, conversely, in framing its occupation as part of a regional democratic transformation, "actively diminished incentives for regional collaboration."

Extricating the United States from the costly conflict in Iraq, ending the insurgency, and leaving behind a representative Iraqi regime capable of securing its territory and protecting its population cannot be achieved without the support of the Iraqi people and the cooperation of their neighbors. [The US] will have to redefine its goals in Iraq in terms that the populations and governments of the region can identify with. The U.S.-led campaigns against terrorism and for democracy are tainted in local eyes by their association with the doctrine of pre-emption and their application in occupied Iraq and occupied Palestine. Whatever their considerable objective merits and potential long-term appeal to Arab audiences, the war on terrorism and regional democratization are not themes around which Iraqis and their neighbors will unite, as they must if the current insurgency is to be defeated.

I see echoes of Luttwak's comment that "All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the U.S. withdrawal is carried out, and this would give Washington a great deal of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests":

Wielding the promise of withdrawal, for example, could give Washington valuable leverage, compelling Iraqis, Iraq's neighbors, and much of the international community to look beyond their desire to see the United States chastened and toward their shared interest in Iraq's long-term stability. Thus the Bush administration should carefully modulate two simultaneous messages: a clear desire to leave Iraq and an equally clear willingness to stay until the Iraqi government, with the support of its neighbors and the international community, proves capable of securing its territory and protecting its citizens. Washington should establish that its ultimate goal is the complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces as soon as circumstances permit and that it has no intention of seeking a permanent military presence in the country.

The forthcoming elections are trouble. If elections occur, the new government will have modest legitimacy at best as Shiites and Kurds may be represented, but Sunnis will not. Larry Diamond says, "The fear is that it's too late to bring the Sunnis in by Jan. 30 and that the country is headed for a very serious train wreck. There'll be an escalation of violence, if you can believe that."

leaders of Sunni-dominated political parties have not been easy to bring on board… the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni political movement in post-war Iraq, recently pulled out of elections citing security concerns, while the Independent Democrats, led by well-known Sunni moderate Adnan Pachachi, are calling for a postponement of the Jan. 30 poll date… hardline groups such as the Muslim Scholars Board simply refuse to participate until all U.S. forces leave Iraq.

We need to do something positive as "Allowing for its population's smaller size, Iraq suffers every month--sometimes every week--losses comparable to those [of 11 September] Iraqis are as likely to attribute these losses to the U.S.-sponsored war on terrorism as to the terrorists themselves." The very hard part is Luttwak's process prescription:

A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than is the United States itself.

Part 10

Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War
By James Dobbins
From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005

Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement
Edward N. Luttwak
From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

If it can't be realistically won, then what must we settle for and be prepared to accept?


Disengage, now, while we still have a substantive chance to affect the principle players, before a flawed election 'winner' sends us packing, robbing us any shard of legitimacy or influence. Prepare for things to get very much worse in the short to medium term as Iraqi elements, Baathist, Sunni, Shia, insurgents, moderates and conservatives work out a messy restructuring of a post-Saddam government.

For liberal and conservative reader alike, before you descend with accolades or attacks, permit me this digression. Active in the 8th century, Pope Gregory III was said to apply three tests to every papal bull brought before him:

  1. What fairness suggests
  2. What the law allows
  3. What will work

Whenever I find that a negotiation has collapsed, I know that the third test has been breached (What will work) and that the parties are likely working hard on tests 1 and 2. As a corollary, when things don’t "work" as I believe that they should, then I’ve failed to identify one or more stakeholders or a substantive interest of at least one stakeholder. (Readers are recommended to try the tests as honest answers will point to workable options.)

Readers who have come this far in the series will know that I think things are not working despite prodigious efforts of US military units on the ground, are getting worse, the fix - if one can call it that - is as costly, damaging, and futile as Israel's handling of Palestine. When in a hole, stop digging, or at least tunnel out.

No less a grey eminence in defense circles than Edward Luttwak had made that blunt assessment in Foreign Affairs. For those readers unfamiliar with Luttwak, his is a towering, piercing, and unsentimental mind (see his comments on our intel capability here). While it's said that he doesn't 'write often' what he does write is trenchant. Strategy:The Logic of War and Peace and Coup d'etat remain classics that readers overlook at their peril. Luttwak is direct:

WITHDRAW NOW... The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead.

The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in order to obtain concessions from others, nor can it make transparently conflicting promises about the country's future to different parties. But once it has declared its firm commitment to withdraw--or perhaps, given the widespread conviction that the United States entered Iraq to exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an evacuation have begun--the calculus of other parties will change. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the U.S. hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq's neighbors are too shortsighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the withdrawal should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy.

Luttwak does not omit basics such as the need for "careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from much of the country--while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempt to harass the withdrawing forces," but he gets to the point that Iraq cannot "be transformed into a successful democracy by a more prolonged occupation," the parties have much to lose in an anarchical Iraq - perhaps more than the US, and need to work it out rather than have many of them shooting at us while we cannot shoot back in a creditable manner that does not fan Iraqi and Arab ire.

Part 2 of If it can't be realistically won

Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War
By James Dobbins
From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005

Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement
Edward N. Luttwak
From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

Winning the war without intelligence, Part 2


Edward Luttwak is no less piercing and unsparing today in his criticism of the CIA and our intel ability, humint collection, analysis, and policy formulation:

One reason why the CIA favours rendition [summary deportation of suspected Muslim extremists to Arab states for interrogation] is its lack of interrogators who know foreign languages -- and I mean not just difficult languages such as Korean, but also easy ones such as colloquial variants of Arabic, or indeed modern standard Arabic, in which fluency requires only a few months of moderate effort. Companies instruct their salesmen to pick up Arabic when assigned to Middle East spots, but the CIA is apparently a less demanding employer. The CIA's degeneration, however, is of far broader scope. The Mormons and cow-college graduates who have come to fill the ranks of the Directorate of Operations since the Ivy League's post-Vietnam desertion are simply too provincial for the basic craft of the espionage trade, the recruitment and handling of foreigners as agents. So long as the Cold War lasted, the solid products of satellite photography and all manner of electronic intelligence masked the erosion of espionage skills without which there is no going after terrorists. While competent case officers with languages and tact are few, deep-cover operatives are absent -- the US has been engaged with Iraq since 1990, but the CIA did not have one agent in its government when war started anew in 2003, nor any operative on the ground. Now, ordinary Army and Marine officers are doing a better job of recruiting Iraqi informants than the CIA.

Regarding yellowcake:

The moral of the [Niger] story is that when policy makers want bad intelligence to suit their policies, they get it. [Niger started] with French intelligence out to trip up the Americans and their allies [first offered to] to Italy's Panorama magazine, whose star reporter, Elisabetta Burba, soon uncovered the deception, and told the US Embassy at the behest of her Editor, Carlo Rossella. [The Italian] foreign intelligence service SISMI [passed] the forgery to the CIA station in Rome [as] highly suspect paper [and the] CIA station in Rome was entirely undeceived.

Regardling Ahmad Chalabi:

If Chalabi knew that far from being proto-democrats most Iraqis were entrapped by tribalism, fanatical religion and clericalism, he did not tell anyone: his aim after all was to overthrow Saddam, not to justify his despotism as mere necessity… His only sin actually was not to contradict those who greatly wanted to believe that Iraqis could lead the democratic transformation of the Middle East.

The moral I take to this an other stories is that our intel capacity beyond "national technical means of collection" has failed us against new adversaries and that it is little wonder that the military wanted a far greater hand in intelligence matters than the 9/11 commission was originally proffering.

Back to our dealing with the insurgents at hand: Isseroff disagrees with Van Creveld's premise that the weak always triumph, stating that if is "correct then changes in strategy are hopeless, political maneuvers are beside the point and improved intelligence will not help," yet isn't kind to the US:

Americans are fighting the Iraq war stupidly. The wholesale destruction of Fallujah is symptomatic. It illustrates the same problems that Dayan found in Vietnam 40 years ago. The Americans concentrated massive firepower against an elusive enemy. At the end of the battle, Fallujah was more or less destroyed. The Americans gave the Iraqis have more reason to hate them as well as their own government. However, Zarqawi and most of the other insurgents escaped unscathed. They will no doubt use the anger stirred up by Fallujah to recruit more insurgents.

While I'm not convinced of the inevitability of Van Creveld's 'small is victorious' argument, it is difficult to argue with his observation:

he who fights against the weak—and terrorists are weak by definition—and loses, loses. He who fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore stupid.

Part 9

Torture of the evidence
A Review by Edward N. Luttwak
The Times Literary Supplement
November 7, 2004

How Not To Fight Terrorism
Martin van Creveld
Center for Unconventional Security Affairs
CUSA Occasional Paper #1, September 2003
[originally presented April 5, 2002]

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


  discuss this article

Prev 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  [14]  15  16  17  18  Next

You are on page 14

Items 131-140 of 177.

<<  |  January 2020  |  >>
view our rss feed