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Low cost is not low risk: Realistic IP Protection in China, 21 September , 2006


Presentation given at GlobalAutoIndustry conference, "Key Strategies for Succeeding in China’s Booming Auto Industry," 21 September, 2006, Troy, Michigan, in PDF:

Low cost is not low risk: Realistic IP Protection in China,
21 Sept, 2006

Underpinning this presentation is ICG's Intellectual Property (IP) Protection Abstracts from April 2004 to July 2006. Click 'more' at the bottom of any abstract to jump to the full weblog article.

If you need IP support for either Greenfield or Brownfield installations, or supply chains combining your facilities and assets as well as your suppliers, please send feedback inquiry.

Gordon Housworth

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James Dobbins on correcting US missteps in vision and implementation in the Middle East


Following are my notes taken from James Dobbins speech at the New America Foundation’s panel discussion on Moral Clarity & the Middle East: Long War, Wider War, or the Return to a Peace Process?, 24 August, 2006. Dobbins served as US special envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. and now directs RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center.

In the wake of Sept 11, 2001, he was designated as the Bush Administration's representative to the Afghan opposition. He helped organize and then represented the United States at the Bonn Conference where a new Afghan government was formed. On Dec. 16, 2001, he raised the flag over the newly reopened US Embassy. Earlier in his State Department career Dobbins served twice as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, as Deputy Chief of Mission in Germany, and as Acting Assistant Secretary for Europe.

This is NOT A TRANSCRIPTION per se but I submit that it substantially presents Dobbins’ encapsulation of his themes (which are well known - see citations at end) regarding the failure of vision and implementation by the Bush43 administration in Iraq in particular and the Middle East in general. This content will be cited in subsequent notes that call for a reassessment of US and Israeli actions in engaging frontline states in both the Levant and Iraq.

Introduced by Steve Clemons, American Strategy Program/New America Foundation. Clemons cites Dobbins’s IHT article, Moral clarity in the Mideast, that ‘brought clarity and sensibility to a muddled issue’ and that he welcomed Dobbins’ comments that were ‘free from constraints that bar clear and open discussion.’ Clemons also cited Daniel Levy’s article in the Forward, Quit the Canard That American Policy Advances Israeli Security, and Flynt Leverett’s article in American Prospect, Illusion and Reality. Those items will be also addressed in subsequent notes.

James Dobbins: In the aftermath of 9/11, Bush43 said you’re either with us or against us, and that made sense at the time as many were with us in a broad coalition not unlike that in 1989 against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait. US diplomacy abroad had been generally successful and welcomed through the 1990s such that Bush41 and Clinton were more popular abroad than in the US. At 9/11 us leadership was welcomed yet five years later the US is probably at a nadir, probably more isolated that at any time in its history. Iraq, in part, has spent 60 years of accumulated US goodwill.

What went wrong? The easy answer is Iraq, but the problems commenced much earlier. I will divide those five years into three chapters: Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon:

Chapter 1: Afghanistan

Victory was not unique as almost all conventional wars conclude successfully and quickly. What was unique was the smoothness of the post-conflict period that owed its success to a broad based effort based derived from broad international support, modest objectives, and the support of all of Afghanistan’s neighbors.

It is a mistake to believe that the US formed a coalition to insure that Afghanistan was stable and was not a source of international terrorism; post 9/11, the US joined an existing coalition of India, Russia, Iran and the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. The US was not the leader in many of the goals that rose from the Bonn Conference; it was Iran that included democracy in governance (my brief did not include that) and cooperation against international terrorism.

The US, Iran, Russia and Germany worked over the Northern Alliance to secure the Bonn Declaration. Iran was a very cooperative member throughout the period. The Northern Alliance wanted 18 of 24 ministries which was insufficiently representative. It was the US, Iranian, Russian and German delegations that bent the NA to accept 16 of 24. Iran had the most senior delegation to Karzai’s inauguration. At the Tokyo donor’s conference, Iran pledged (and proceeded to deliver) $500 Million dollars, by far the largest donation of non-OECD members. Iran offered Dobbins a proposal to rebuild Afghan forces under US leadership, to house, pay, clothe and arm a 20K man force. Dobbins relayed the idea to Washington but it was never taken up by Washington.

Chapter 2: the Axis of Evil speech

The Axis of Evil speech linked together two declared enemies (Iran and Iraq) as cooperating states. That all three states were evil was defensible but that an axis of evil existed was indefensible.

A month later came the National Intelligence Estimate that enshrined two doctrines: never permit the emergence of a peer competitor and preemption. While both are intellectually defensive, they were unnecessarily provocative. Making it a central element of policy was only designed to piss everyone off.

Iraq was "one unanticipated challenge after another"

You could be forgiven for believing that we’d never done any nation building before Iraq, yet it was "one unanticipated challenge after another." You’d think that it was the first time that we had made an effort to liberate then reconstruct, even though there had been seven previous efforts, six of which were in Muslim states (Haiti was the non-Muslim state).

"Calculated indifference"

There was a "calculated indifference" on the part of the US that excluded a body of knowledge that would have helped. Germany and Japan were politically safe models as they had unambiguous outcomes (as opposed to the ambiguous outcomes of Bosnia and Kosovo) and had nothing to do with Clinton. It was politically unacceptable to say that, ‘we’re going to do Clinton but a little bit better.’

The explicit use of "occupation" in a model based on Germany and Japan was an error as the only "occupation" familiar to Muslims in the Middle East was Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Another issue was the midstream taking away of all aspects of non-military nation building from other units that had handled it for 50 years with varying degrees of success and giving them to DoD which had not done them since 1952. It is a surprise that this exercise in "heroic amateurism" did not fail worse than it did.

Chapter 3: The Second Inaugural Address

The Second Inaugural Address flagged a shift to transformational diplomacy (peacemaking was out) and democratization (which was by then the only rationale left for war). We suffered a growing enemies list. Al Qaeda became Islamic fascists; the GWOT became the Long War and now the Wide War.

US diplomacy isolated the US, not the terrorists, as it:

  • Employed highly polarizing rhetoric and martial terminology
  • Treated Mideast diplomacy as a zero-sum game, a practice which demanded that the US lose every time if we forced locals to choose between the US/Israel and Hamas/Hezbollah/Syria/Iran
  • Used excessive democratization speech, whereas locals wanted other things more than democracy; locals saw their religion and their nationalism, their sectarian culture as higher priorities than democracy
  • Gave democracy a bad name by associating with it with dodgy enterprises such as Iraq

The US positioned itself on the wrong side of issues that locals cared most about, issues that primarily involved:

  • Muslims and non-Muslims
  • Occupiers and non-occupiers

Most of the terrorists are in states that we don’t intend to invade: Pakistan, UK, Germany and Saudi Arabia. As it is not a war in those terms we need to replace inexact terminology:

  • Find new narrative with more precise terminology and analysis
  • Greater discretion in choosing our enemies
  • Craft message for both an internal and external constituency
  • Return to traditional diplomacy as opposed to transformational diplomacy

The central front of the GWOT is Pakistan, not Iraq. As this front is not bombable, we should stop thinking of it as a war. We don’t need to invade Pakistan but rather invest hundreds of millions of dollars in their educational system.

Muslim groups are mostly indigenous, mostly nationalistic. Al Qaeda is a parasite on these groups which couldn’t care less about a new Caliphate. In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo (notably the KLA), the US supported the proper group regardless of ideology. As a result, al Qaeda was marginalized in Bosnia and Kosovo. We need to choose our enemies and friends based on you national aims, instead of letting al Qaeda chose them by which ever side they’ve joined

Stabilization and security must precede democratization, and that requires dealing with one’s enemies. In Bosnia and Kosovo, we had to engage those who were most responsible for genocide, Milosevic and Tuchman, giving them a seat at the negotiating table, so that we could move towards stabilization. Iraq cannot be held together unless its neighbors cooperate no more than could Bosnia or Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the US helped broker an agreement between the four states, Russia, India, Iran and Pakistan, that had been tearing Afghanistan apart for twenty years.

We need to talk less about war and more about peace, talk to both our enemies and our friends, show more nuance and less certainty, more sophistication and less simplicity, and more co-option than coercion.

Part 2: Charting Israel's disengagement from the US: Daniel Levy’s commentary on Dobbins

U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East
New America Foundation, American Strategy Program
Washington, District of Columbia (United States)
ID: 193995 - 08/24/2006 - 1:31 - $29.95

Quit the Canard That American Policy Advances Israeli Security
Daniel Levy
The Forward
August 25, 2006
Mirror at NAF

Illusion and Reality
The violence in the Middle East shows the negative consequences of the administration’s contempt for engagement. But the tough talk has failed.
By Flynt Leverett
The American Prospect, Volume 17, Issue 9
Issue Date: 09.12.06

Moral Quagmire
By Stirling Newberry
TPM Café/Coffee House
Aug 19, 2006 -- 11:52:18 AM EST

Moral clarity in the Mideast
James Dobbins
International Herald Tribune
Published: August 13, 2006

In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities
Chairs: Samuel R. Berger, Brent Scowcroft
Directors: William L. Nash, General John W. Vessey, Mona K. Sutphen
Council on Foreign Relations Press
ISBN 0-87609-346-2
September 2005

What to Do in Iraq: A Roundtable
Larry Diamond, James Dobbins, Chaim Kaufmann, Leslie H. Gelb, and Stephen Biddle
Foreign Affairs
July/August 2006

Unfinished Country
Anchor Interview Transcript
Bill Moyers' interview of James Dobbins on Haiti
Wide Angle
August 23, 2005

The US and UN Ways of Nation-Building
By James Dobbins
UNA-USA Policy Brief, No. 8
1 June 2005
(UNA-USA - United Nations Association of the United States of America)

The U.S. and U.N. Roles in Nation-Building: A Comparative Analysis
Brookings Briefing
Moderator: James B. Steinberg; Panelists: James Dobbins, Francis Fukuyama, Major General Bill Nash (Ret.), Susan E. Rice
The Brookings Institution
February 18, 2005

Nation-Building: Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Kosovo
Lessons Learned
An excerpt from "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq" by James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina
Feb 2005

Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War
James Dobbins
Foreign Affairs
January/February 2005

Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement
Edward N. Luttwak
Foreign Affairs
January/February 2005

Iraq: One Year After
Thomas R. Pickering, James R. Schlesinger, James Dobbins
Council on Foreign Relations
March 9, 2004

Nation-Building 101
An Interview with James Dobbins
Wen Stephenson
Sept. 26, 2003

America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, by James Dobbins
Reviewed by Douglas Porch
Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 2 (February 2004)
Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey

America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, by James Dobbins, et al. Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2003. ISBN: 0-8330-3460-X. Pp. xxix, 244.

NATION-BUILDING: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower
By James Dobbins
RAND Review
Summer 2003

America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq
By: James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, Anga Timilsina
ISBN: 0-8330-3460-X
July 2003

Gordon Housworth

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Tools note: finding relevant maps and context for hot spots such as Lebanon


Having tracked the month-long Israeli-Hezbollah conflict through high street, ancillary and primary sources, I thought it time for a tools note on finding maps and contextual materials.

The shifting "
lens of the news" of the major trade and popular press deprives a concerted reader of contextual relevance in terms of event timelines, useful maps and a wider geopolitical context such that, "I have learned to look to the "committed," i.e., those who have a passion to search out and document what would be obscure or tedious work for the rest of us. Oxfam, ACLU, SPLC, FAS, and various UN relief agencies are good examples of what I call "committed" investigators." See:

Two map sources again proved useful, Perry-Castañeda and ReliefWeb (use of Google Earth was previously covered.):

Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection

The Map Collection at the Perry-Castañeda Library offers a useful series of maps on conditions in the Levant and Lebanon in particular. I regularly used the Lebanon Maps, Syria Maps and the Israel-Lebanon War Maps - 2006. Two especially useful in locating Israeli-Hezbollah conflict points were:

For those unfamiliar with Lebanon's religious/sectarian regions, Lebanon - Distribution of Religious Groups is useful.

I am not alone in using Perry-Castañeda as a topical resource. Its map center maintains a Online Maps of Current Interest that currently comprises:

ReliefWeb Map Centre

ReliefWeb, the UN's "global hub for time-critical humanitarian information on Complex Emergencies and Natural Disasters," is maintained by its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). ReliefWeb's MAP CENTRE has become its worldwide map locator from sources throughout the UN.

For each country displayed, Lebanon, for example, there are two boxes which allow you to select the broad categories (Complex emergency, Natural disaster, Reference and All) and the specific map themes of interest (wide spectrum that includes Affected Population, Child Soldiers, Damage Assessment, Development, Disaster Assessment, Economic Activities, Insect Infestation, Internally Displaced Persons, Landmines, Logistics, Refugees, Repatriation / Returnees, Satellite Imagery, Security, Shelter and Non-food Assistance, Transportation and Water and Sanitation among others). Relief Web then returns a list of maps that best match the selection.

Readers can prowl the world obtaining informative data and contextual relevance on areas that only merit short articles in the high street press. Excellent site, recommended.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has a Map Center of value, having taken over the content at Humanitarian Information Centre/Iraq (whose URL has been abandoned). There are, however a remaining group of Humanitarian Information Centres on distressed regions of value to the researcher.

Map Collection
Perry-Castañeda Library
University of Texas

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Humanitarian Information Centres

UNAMI Map Center
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)

Gordon Housworth

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What do you mean, "Israel lost"?


Part 2

Actually the condition in the Levant is worse that 'Israel lost.' The precise statement is 'Israel lost and will lose again in the future despite interim corrective actions.'

I'd not intended to write this note but so many lay readers have asked with some incredulity how I could state that 'Israel lost,' and that includes readers that scan NYT headlines, that I thought that I should let Israeli voices, for the most part, speak to the anger and distress fading to vulnerability and fear that Israelis now evince. I will call that part of the post 'Israel lost today' divided into four sections:
  • The loss of the war
  • Public complaints by both reservist and regular army personnel
  • Forthcoming investigative panel on the loss
  • Cost of the war
Each of the sections predominately cite Haaretz or other Israeli sources, with some Reuters, BBC and other citations, that I leave to the reader to explore.

The problem is that even if Israel corrects these immediate deficiencies, it will lose again in the future. I'll call that part of the post 'Israel loses tomorrow.'

'Israel loses tomorrow'

First looking forward, my forecast for the Jewish state is grim. One of the shortest and bluntest assessments that I think maps Israel's options has been released by William Lind. In the shortest of words, Lind
dissolves Israel's entire history of military success since its foundation, and it is only the few that understand the sea change.

In parallel to Lind's projection, my question is who will be Israel's fourth patron state after the USSR, France and the US when the US at some point, post-Bush43, will look to its own geopolitical needs instead of continuing its three-legged sack race with Tel Aviv?  Israel cannot survive without a patron state, nor can it win a Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) contest against Hezbollah. The Israeli finance ministry puts the cost of the Lebanon war at 23 billion NIS or about 5.3 billion USD - and that was around 13-14 August. It will ultimately be greater.  Damage to Lebanon is running at 3.6 billion USD plus.

I had once thought that China would plump for the patron role, if nothing else to tap Israel's weapons technology that the US has gone to great lengths to block, but things are going too swimmingly for China in almost every sphere to lure them to form an alliance with Israel. (As Israel becomes increasingly desperate, Tel Aviv will either find ways to transfer technology to China or will thumb its nose at the US.)

Proponents of Israel will not like Lind's ideas, and may even find them repellant, but I submit that this is Israel's future trajectory:

The magnitude of the defeat is considerable. Israel appears to have lost at every level—strategic, operational and tactical. Nothing she tried worked. Air power failed, as it always does against an enemy who doesn’t have to maneuver operationally, or even move tactically for the most part. The attempts to blockade Lebanon and thus cut off Hezbollah’s resupply failed; her caches proved ample. Most seriously, the ground assault into Lebanon failed. Israel took little ground and paid heavily in casualties for that. More, she cannot hold what she has taken; if she is not forced to withdraw by diplomacy, Hezbollah will push her out, as it did once before. The alternative is a bleeding ulcer that never heals.

But these failures only begin to measure the magnitude of Israel’s defeat. While Hezbollah’s leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, is now an Islamic hero, Olmert has become a boiled brisket in the piranha pool that is Israeli politics. The cease-fire in Lebanon will allow camera crews to broadcast the extent of the destruction to the world, with further damage to Israel’s image. Israel’s “wall” strategy for dealing with the Palestinians has been undone; Hamas rockets can fly over a wall as easily as Hezbollah rockets have flown over Israel’s northern border.

Most importantly, an Islamic Fourth Generation entity, Hezbollah, will now point the way throughout the Arab and larger Islamic world to a future in which Israel can be defeated. That will have vast ramifications, and not for Israel alone. Hundreds of millions of Moslems will believe that the same Fourth Generation war that defeated hated Israel can beat equally-hated America, its “coalitions” and its allied Arab and Moslem regimes. Future events seem more likely to confirm that belief than to undermine it.

Intelligent Lebanese have now seen the handwriting on the wall - and it is written in Arabic, not Hebrew. Lebanese forces now moving into the south below the Litani River will be more of a Hezbollah farm team, cooperating with Hezbollah in achieving its aims, moving goods and armaments to Hezbollah, such is the collective hatred of Israel. There will be no effort to disarm Hezbollah, either by the Lebanese or a subsequent UN buffer force. Israel is already faced with prospective UNIFIL contributors that do not recognize Israel as a state, yet may have no choice but to accept it. As France ducks its 'impossible mission' lead role on-the-ground, preferring to retain the diplomatic high ground, Italy assumes lead of the new mission; Italy has built one of the better expeditionary forces in Europe due, in part, to its many UN deployments but has never led.

Expect this hobbled UN mission (also here) to fail and hostilities to recommence, further digging Israel and the US into a hole. As Israel continues to lose ground, it will likely extend its strike radius to the state that continues local transfer of arms to Hezbollah - Syria. Iran could then follow as Hezbollah's benefactor. If that happens while Bush43 is still in the White House, it is likely that Israel will be urged on rather than restrained. Shortly thereafter, expect oil production in Arabia to be interdicted and put off-line. Expect petrol shipments through the Straights of Hormuz to be halted. This will happen even if Israel goes nuclear as Iran has long prepared to employ mass suicide tactics to overwhelm the defenses of escorting vessels much as Paul Van Riper's Red Team did to the US blue team in the 2002 Millennium Challenge exercise.

Lind forecasts the dissolution of Lebanon, a "vast strengthening of Islamic 4GW elements everywhere," ascending Iran and Syria, descending US (Israel goes without question), a general refusal of current state militaries "to come to grips with Fourth Generation War," and a limited window for salvation:

Israel only has a long-term future if it can reach a mutually acceptable accommodation with its neighbors. So long as those neighbors are states, a policy of pursuing such an accommodation may have some chance of success. But as the rise of Fourth Generation elements such as Hezbollah and Hamas weaken and in time replace those states, the possibility will disappear.

Anthony Cordesman at CSIS does a nice job of summarizing the likely progress against goals in his 17 August version of Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War.

Syria is key but its ruling Alawite minority sitting atop a largely Sunni population cannot strike a peace treaty with Israel and survive without recovering the Golan Heights for itself and likely some or all other occupied area for its Arab and Palestinian neighbors. Israel will likely not understand that the Golan had merit in terms of 1960s artillery fire directed down from its heights - the military state of art of the region at the time. The past month has shown that Israel can be struck from hundreds of sites far deeper in Lebanon, even Syria. Israel's separation wall has been rendered moot. If Syria got what it wanted, and the House of Saud operated behind the scenes, the resources to Hezbollah could be drawn down while Syria took much of Hezbollah's new found mantle from it as Damascus recovered lands that had evaded previous Arab efforts.

I am not alone in expecting both Israel and the US to fail to grasp the nettle and adjust to the coming realities in the Levant. If the window passes, then it will fall to Hezbollah's gain, but by that time the House of Saud will have found its new partner in Beijing.

'Israel lost today' in four sections

(1) Cost of the war
Cost to Israel:

Israel agrees to put new offensive on hold until weekend
By Karin Laub, AP/Indepenndent (UK)
Published: 10 August 2006

Israeli cabinet OKs defence spending rise due to war
By Steven Scheer, Reuters
13 Aug 2006 13:51:25 GMT

Fog of war dissipates: Finance Ministry puts total damages at NIS 23 billion
By Moti Bassok and Avi Bar-Eli, Haaretz
Mon., August 14, 2006 Av 20, 5766

Treasury shocked by cost of war
By Moti Bassok and Irit Rosenblum, Haaretz
Tue., August 22, 2006 Av 28, 5766

Lahav: New small businesses in the North face danger
By Haim Bior, Hareetz
Tue., August 22, 2006 Av 28, 5766

Occupation has a price
Tue., August 22, 2006 Av 28, 5766

Cost to Lebanon:

INTERVIEW-War inflicted $3.6 billion damage on Lebanon
By Lin Noueihed, Reuters
18 Aug 2006 11:39:33 GMT

Hizbollah stumps up cash for Lebanese war victims
By Alistair Lyon, Reuters
18 Aug 2006 21:10:21 GMT
(Adds U.N. figures on refugees, arrival in Beirut of envoys)

Lebanon's devastation sightseers
By Martin Asser, BBC News, Beirut
Last Updated: Friday, 18 August 2006, 11:56 GMT 12:56 UK

Surveying the damage in the south
By Martin Asser, BBC News, Nabatiyeh, south Lebanon
Last Updated: Saturday, 19 August 2006, 14:06 GMT 15:06 UK

(2) Public complaints by both reservist and regular army personnel

TEXT: Protest petition by IDF reservists back from the war
By Haaretz Service
Last update - 17:58 21/08/2006

Reservists rally in Jerusalem as protests over war snowball
By Haaretz Staff and Agencies
Last update - 21:55 21/08/2006

Preliminary report finds failures in preparing home front for war
By Gideon Alon, Haaretz
Last update - 21:51 21/08/2006

Rose Garden turns into protest grounds
By Jonathan Lis, Haaretz
Tue., August 22, 2006 Av 28, 5766

Bereaved families join reservists in demand for probe
By Nir Hasson, Haaretz
Tue., August 22, 2006 Av 28, 5766

(3) Forthcoming investigative panel on the loss

Mounting criticism at Peretz's decision to name war probe panel
By Amos Harel, Aluf Benn and Yossi Verter, Haaretz
Last update - 15:54 17/08/2006

Lipkin-Shahak to head panel appointed to probe war in north
By Amos Harel, Haaretz
Last update - 21:05 16/08/2006

AG eyeing alternatives to probe
By Yuval Yoaz, Gideon Alon and Aluf Benn, Haaretz
Mon., August 21, 2006 Av 27, 5766

Peretz-appointed panel suspends investigation into conduct of war
By Amos Harel, Yuval Yoaz, Gideon Alon and Aluf Benn, Haaretz, and Haaretz Service
Last update - 21:22 21/08/2006              

Defense panel frozen as state probe looms
By Amos Harel, Gideon Alon and Moti Bassok, Haaretz
Tue., August 22, 2006 Av 28, 5766

A note to the inquiry commission
By Akiva Eldar, Haaretz
Tue., August 22, 2006 Av 28, 5766

(4) The loss of the war

Israel is losing World War III
By Bradley Burston, Haaretz
Last update - 14:30 07/08/2006              

Israel fights under shadow of Iraq
By Jonathan Marcus, BBC
Last Updated: Thursday, 10 August 2006, 16:01 GMT 17:01 UK

52 percent of Israelis: IDF failed
Ynet News
08.14.06, 19:42

Oldest IDF casualty felt second tour in Lebanon 'would end badly'
By Yuval Yoaz, Haaretz
Thu., August 17, 2006 Av 23, 5766

Class war in the IDF
By Staff Sgt. (res.) Ori Berzak, Haaretz
Sun., August 20, 2006 Av 26, 5766

Hezbollah is not a terrorist organization
By Bradley Burston, Haaretz
Last update - 15:19 21/08/2006
OVERLOOK the title. What Burston is talking about is that by making them a demonic cardboard character that Israel can neither engage nor overcome.

This is no way to make a deal
By Danny Rubinstein, Haaretz
Mon., August 21, 2006 Av 27, 5766

Olmert: No talks with Syria if it continues to back terror groups
By Haaretz Service and Agencies
Last update - 18:19 21/08/2006

No confidence in the commander
By Haaretz Editorial, Haaretz
Mon., August 21, 2006 Av 27, 5766

Outgoing infantry chief says military 'guilty of arrogance'
By Amos Harel, Haaretz
Last update - 10:50 21/08/2006

For IDF, depth of public fury is beginning to sink in
By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz
Mon., August 21, 2006 Av 27, 5766

'Why did these soldiers die?'
By Amos Harel and Yair Ettinger, Haaretz
Tue., August 22, 2006 Av 28, 5766

ANALYSIS: Policing in Gaza has blunted IDF fighting abilities
By Ze'ev Schiff, Haaretz
Last update - 02:56 22/08/2006

General sources:

MAP - UNIFIL Deployment as of July 2006
UNIFIL - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
Map No. 4144 Rev. 15E UNITED NATIONS
July 2006 (Colour)

By William S. Lind
On War #179
Defense and the National Interest
August 17, 2006

Washington’s interests in Israel’s war.


New Yorker
Issue of 2006-08-21
Posted 2006-08-14

Italians take lead role in UN force
Richard Owen and Richard Beeston
AP/The Australian
August 21, 2006

Trying to Avoid the Perils of Peacekeeping

New York Times
August 20, 2006

Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War

Anthony H. Cordesman
Working Draft for Outside Comment,
Revised: August 17, 2006

Israel alarm at UN force members
BBC News
Last Updated: Friday, 18 August 2006, 11:35 GMT 12:35 UK

Text: UN Lebanon resolution
BBC News
Last Updated: Saturday, 12 August 2006, 01:33 GMT 02:33 UK

Bush’s Embrace of Israel Shows Gap With Father
New York Times
August 2, 2006

Gordon Housworth

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Where imagery has the power of bullets


Part 1

Media minefields await the unwary in any contentious issue but the Arab-Israeli divide is especially treacherous. In general terms, readers are referred to the previous A note on sources which I tried to separate bias and venom masquerading as fact:

I like to say that "Truth, beauty and contact lenses are all in the eye of the beholder."... The pro-Israeli HonestReporting is often not, but it is only modestly apologetic in comparison to the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA), the velocity of whose text barely holds onto a claim of legitimacy in presenting an Israeli issue. In opposition, there is the Institute for Historical Review (IHR) and FrontPage which I place in orbit between HR and CAMERA. Moving right, Jew Watch claims it is "NOT a hate site" but while it is largely devoid of doggerel, its texts push too great a slant. Farther to the right are those who decry the Holohuggers and Holocaustomaniacs. There is much worse. That said, a bad or dubious site can post a solid item. Attention is required as one good paragraph does not guarantee that another will follow it.

One watched this tug of war played out over such events such as the Qana bombing and the accuracy of certain Reuters imagery. In trying to address the impact of genuine and doctored imagery in the Lebanese battle, a NYT item, In Wars, Quest for Media Balance Is Also a Battlefield, I believe, unwittingly opened with what I would call bias in its framing comments over "the role of images in fairly portraying the conflict incited nearly five weeks ago by Hezbollah’s raid into Israel and its kidnapping of two soldiers."  Neither Hezbollah or most any Sunni or Shia would say that they 'started' the affair and I am on record as criticizing the term 'kidnapping' for what was a peer-to-peer military POW capture effort as opposed to a criminal offense that kidnapping conotates. That aside, the NYT cites Max Boot:

"Hezbollah is winning the war of images because it’s not being pinned with immoral and unconscionable war tactics, not to mention the genocidal war aim to wipe Israel off the map." [Both Boot and Victor Davis Hanson] argue that civilian casualties, while regrettable, have never been a factor in determining the justice of a war. In their view, if the news media during World War II had displayed photo upon photo of the German and Japanese victims of Allied bombing raids, it would not have altered the morality of the cause.

Like it or not, asymmetrical opponents now have the tools to instantly rush emotional imagery to press in support of their cause. Arabs, and now increasingly Muslims of any stripe, are predisposed to believe Hezbollah's accounting and I think that Western media would face a Herculean task even if it wanted to redress the matter. All it can reasonably do is to present the issue to its readership without undue bias that does not pander to the predisposition of its readers. The pro-Israeli press, especially here in the US and UK, does not make it any easier as they tilt the opposite direction.

American Jewish friends sent me Tom Gross' Media Missiles. Working for the enemy even though their copy came via a conservative blog, Little Green Footballs, which, I think, that they would not otherwise read. Many of Gross' themes still caught my attention and are worthy of comment before delving into greater specifics:

  1. Controlled shepherding of journalists: This is not anti-Israeli propaganda - at least from the journalists' side - but miserable reporting, possibly fearful reporting. I could substitute parts of Russia, Central Asia, Africa and South America and get those paragraphs. Go into Tamil Tiger territory and write uncomplimentary material and your death can be arranged to appear as a government attack. Lebanon has attracted a stampede of unqualified video journalists seeking that 'special clip' most of whose work does not merit the word journalism. It is right for Gross to call it, but call it what it is.
  2. Bad, venomous cartoons: That sadness has not changed a bit. The venomous cartoons put out in the Arab, Patriot right and neofascist press are scathing towards Jews and were brought up as recently as the Danish Mohammed cartoons incident in which comparisons were made. The level of image assault on Israel is so high that I saw no significant up-tick over Lebanon.
  3. Image saturation: 24/7 coverage demands to be fed and in the absence of continuous new feeds will simply regurgitate the old, focusing on the most telegenic in a shock sense. Gross' words here could be Hurricane Katrina or the Indonesian 2004 tsunami.
  4. BBC: Here Gross is closest to what I would call legitimate slant. I have observed that the beeb is a bit left of center on Arab matters. There is a joke among both beeb and al Jazeera staffs that it is 'only a matter of time before you work for al Jazeera'. Depending on your point of view, that can make the BBC more or less dangerous. There is at least more journalism in the beeb than in much of the opinionated talking head dross that passes for journalism here in the US, i.e., I will get more critical reporting from the beeb and it is up to me to position their cant. I don't even get that opportunity to filter the US talking heads who, when they are not shouting or making ex cathedra statements, are interviewing each other - a pure waste of bandwidth.
  5. Hezbollah: I think that Gross is appropriate in his flagging the historic understatement of Hezbollah in relation to al Qaeda as he notes that "You wouldn’t really appreciate that Hezbollah, far from being some rag-tag militia, is in effect a division in the Iranian revolutionary guards." From my view, Hezbollah certainly presents an equal threat to the US as does al Qaeda - and you are beginning to see that from thoughtful analysts.
  6. Hezbollah has proved itself skilled at propaganda and news control. All modern Sunni and Shia insurgencies have adapted to the medium superbly. People, journalist included, that do not recognize it are, I submit, more incompetent than provocateur. I read much on their organization and its military and civilian aspects and an continuously surprised as how much does not get into the high street press.

I have two general comments on the blogosphere's identification of journalistic errors:

  1. Valid discovery is itself asymmetrical in its impact as while there is likely to be a retraction effect in the Western press, an error goes largely unreported in the Arab press, thus widening the gulf of 'understanding' between parties.
  2. Conservative blogs primarily attack what they perceive as liberal sources while liberal sources return the favor. Both sides should, as both a defensive and corrective mechanism, examine their own side as well. A corrected source builds credibility, otherwise it is a game of journalistic smash mouth.

Moving to the specifics of the Reuters photos, the Qana strike and the UNIFIL strike:

Reuters: A tip to a conservative blog,
Little Green Footballs, resulted in an article rightly questioning of authenticity of a photo by Reuters freelance photographer, Adnan Hajj, purporting to show excessive Israeli bombing damage in Beirut. A usually reasonable Israeli feed, Ynet, bent that to Reuters admits altering Beirut photo while HonestReporting took no prisoners with Bold Distortions and Outright Lies that made Reuters out to be the villain, the perp, instead of the early stages of a process of discovery and correction by Reuters. It is that perpetually shrill, over the top, 'Israel is unquestionably right' take on matters that has long had me dismissing their work as even when they cite things that I believe to be accurate, they do so in a slanted manner that shifts the net direction of the piece. Also as noted, in temperament and twist, CAMERA is HonestReporting's Rottweiler.

Once alerted, Reuters "dealt with the matter within 18 hours", pulling the offending image by Adnan Hajj with a
picture kill notice (now scrolled off but mirrored here - scroll down to find), then pulling all of Hajj's work. In a largely honor-based system, a doctored image from a photojournalist slipped through on a day that Reuters "published 2,000 photos [and at least part of the process] was handled by someone [at] a more junior level than we would wish for in ideal circumstances."

USA Today noted that it
looks "for more than digital manipulation, especially in war zones where many American outlets hire local photographers because they can travel more easily than Americans. "We wonder, is he behind enemy lines?" [speaking] of the kind of scrutiny that goes into examining pictures to make sure they have not been staged. "Is he getting access that isn’t normal? How did he get there?" Sad to say, this process is not as widely followed as it should be. (Of course, Hezbollah is not going to follow it as they 'manufactured' much of the post-strike Qana imagery, but those who consume its output should.)

Qana: If Hezbollah did stage the second Qana attack, if by nothing more than firing at the Israelis from positions that would produce counterbattery collateral damage, it was a masterstroke as it cemented the turning of Sunni street opinion initially hostile to Hezbollah's border raid and it was a location of an earlier 1996 artillery strike that would incriminate Israeli action in 2006:

Then, as now, Israel accused Hezbollah of using the civilian population as human shields when they launched their attacks. However, a UN investigation reported in May 1996 that the deaths at the Qana base were unlikely to have been the result of an accident, as claimed by the Israelis. The UN report, by Maj-Gen Franklin van Kappen of the Netherlands, cited a shift in the fire patterns and the repeated use of shells with so-called proximity fuses over the small UN compound as evidence of an intent to kill people there.

The report also noted the presence of two Israeli helicopters and a drone in the skies over Qana, "contrary to repeated [Israeli] denials", which must have witnessed the bloodbath. "The pattern of impacts is inconsistent with a normal overshooting of the declared target (the mortar site) by a few rounds, as suggested by the Israeli forces," Gen van Kappen's report said. "While the possibility cannot be ruled out completely, it is unlikely that the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result of gross technical and/or procedural errors," the report concluded.

With the ground of discovery now well plowed, I refer readers to EU Referendum's The Corruption of the Media (which now supersedes the earlier Milking it?). While I find the title to be unnecessarily aggressive, it does offer one of the more extensive deconstructions of the staged Qana imagery. Readers could also look at Photos of the Qana Massacre.
Still frame event staging appears to be rising if not rampant. There is a delicious sequence of images around what is being called the "
Pieta image" in which a 'body is being staged in various poses by a 'helper' then all participants are shown scampering away. If you can look at that sequence and not demand that your preferred press adopt the USA Today guidelines noted above, then you have no business having an opinion.

I would like to comment on related
Israeli bombings on ambulances and trucks carrying medical and food supplies. As Hezbollah has previously transported fighters and ordnance in ambulances, Israeli targeting instructions can be hit anything that moves or hit things big enough to carry missiles. If an ambulance or truck is hit, Israel may interdict a weapons delivery but Hezbollah gains a major propaganda victory with post-event imagery. (One image of a missile strike through the middle of the red cross on a collapsed vehicle roof will power more resentment than the human losses involved in the strike.)

UNIFIL strike: I have already spoken of my
initial suppositions surrounding the strike on the UNIFIL observation post near Khiam (photo of post prior to strike, immediately after strike (click on image) and debris cloud rising from the strike). The size of the explosion indicates something as large as a JDAM round which tells me that the Israelis were quite serious. In reviewing the traffic leading up to the strike, I got the feeling of rising insistence on the part of the Israelis, but then time ran out and the Israelis moved to act. My first impression was that it was difficult to escape the binary options of gross error or intentional targeting. (One such gross error occurred in Afghanistan when a US forward observer reset his PDA which then defaulted to his GPS location rather than that of a recently entered target. Not knowing that the target coordinates had been erased, he pickled the JDAM onto his unit's position.)

I was not alone in that opinion as Kofi Anan, and the UN for that matter, who is generally diplomatic and is constrained to speak in the lowest diplomatic common denominator, was unusually direct in his accusations against the Israelis, using the word, "deliberate."  That indicated to me that there could be more info that had yet to reach the unclass arena, but it is not enough for prediction. But for the Lebanese and most Arabs, the die is forever cast.

Some relatively good things have nearly escaped reporting. For example, the Israeli airport runway bombings (intersections, midway points and active taxiways) were done with precision but did not use the French Durandal runway-busters, which Israel has in inventory and has used previously, but with smaller general purpose surface detonation bombs that can be filled in with relative ease.  Aerial photos which we call BDA (bomb damage assessment) show a quality of targeting missing in Hezbollah attacks which, except for the rarer attack on the Saar-class frigate with the radar guided Iranian/Chinese C-802 (Ying Ji-802 or CSS-C-8), are largely unguided.

The future: Few are saying it but it is only a matter of time before the poor man's nuke, a chemical weapon at a minimum, is put into one of those warheads. It may not be the Hezbollah of 2006, but it will happen by some greater or lesser group sooner than most think. I wrote long ago that the current Israeli security fence is at best a stopgap measure "until the Palestinians can throw something larger over it." That time is now and in the future it will be more than simple explosives. The future is not rosy for the Levant.

The reader is referred to these items that touch on jihadist integration of imagery and psyops into doctrine:

Part 3: What do you mean, "Israel lost"?

The Corruption of the Media
Progress board
EU Referendum
15 August, 2006

Part 1 - Introduction - rewritten.
Part 2 - The "set" - under construction.
Part 3 - Act 1: The dead baby - revised and updated.
Part 4 - Act 2: The Red Cross workers - first draft complete.
Part 5 - Act 3: The camera runs - Scene 1 - new material.
Part 6 - Act 3: The camera runs - Scene 2 - complete.
Part 7 – Act 4: Caught in the act! - under construction.

Hat Tip NYT- Roll the Audio
Sticky Notes
Posted on Wednesday, August 16, 2006 at 07:37AM

Hezbollah Fighters Limp Out Into the Light, Yet Manage a Bit of a Swagger
New York Times
August 15, 2006

In Wars, Quest for Media Balance Is Also a Battlefield
Wars in the modern media age often come complete with their own journalistic difficulties.
New York Times
August 14, 2006

Photos of the Qana Massacre
12 August 2006

Bloggers Drive Inquiry on How Altered Images Saw Print
New York Times
August 9, 2006

Reuters withdraws all photos by Lebanese freelance
07 Aug 2006 14:38:33 GMT

Bold Distortions and Outright Lies
Media Critiques
6 August 2006

Reuters Doctoring Photos from Beirut?
Little Green Footballs
August 05, 2006

Adnan Hajj isn’t even trying anymore
Jeff Harrell
The Shape of Days
August 5, 2006, 4:05 PM

Qana Casualties Only Half of Original Estimates
Kenneth R. Timmerman
Aug. 4, 2006

Media Missiles. Working for the enemy.
By Tom Gross
National Post (Canada) / Jerusalem Post (Israel) / National Review (U.S.) / Ma'ariv (Israel)
August 2, 2006

Qana Death Toll Cut In Half
Posted by AJStrata on Tuesday, August 1st, 2006 at 12:36 pm
The Strata-Sphere

Qana In Context
HonestReporting calls on the media to examine the Qana tragedy in context.
Media Critiques
1 August 2006

Milking it?
posted by Richard @ 12:46 AM
EU Referendum
Monday, July 31, 2006

Qana makes grim history again
By Martin Asser
BBC News, Beirut
Last Updated: Monday, 31 July 2006, 06:54 GMT 07:54 UK

U.N. observers asked Israel to stop bombing 10 times before their post was hit, UN report says
Associated Press

LEBANON: IDF told not to fire on unarmed observers, says UN
Source: IRIN
27 Jul 2006 01:21:14 GMT

Israelis Kill UN Peacekeepers
Halutz Commits to War Crimes
Israeli Airstrikes Kill Nabatiyeh Family
$150 Million Damage to Factories
Juan Cole
Informed Comment
July 26, 2006

U.N. observers asked Israel to stop bombing 10 times before their post was hit, UN report says
Associated Press

UN peacekeepers killed in Israeli air strike
By Adam Entous
Tue Jul 25, 2006 6:32pm ET

Israeli Missiles Rip Into Medics' Esprit de Corps
by Megan K. Stack
Los Angeles Times
Published on Tuesday, July 25, 2006
Mirror with photo

Red Cross ambulances hit
Jewish Telegraphic Agency
July 25, 2006

Ambulances fired on by Israel, says Red Cross
Ed O'Loughlin Herald Correspondent in Tyre and agencies
The Sydney Morning Herald
July 25, 2006

Gordon Housworth

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Hezbollah commences Levantine Marshall Plan, eviscerates Lebanese government and cements its propaganda media victory over Israel

My respect for Hezbollah grows daily, much as it did for an earlier foe, the Viet Cong who, it should be remembered, never won a victory against US troops but won the war and absorbed South Vietnam. Hezbollah's mastery of the moment never ceases to amaze me, that, along with its cold-blooded realism, e.g., the 2006 Qana strike was a Hezbollah set-up after which their proxies paraded dead children through the streets for hours afterwards even as Hezbollah was distributing medicines that could not otherwise transit bridges and roads bombed by Israel. Without skipping a beat, Hezbollah transitioned from combat to truce by commencing a Marshall Plan for Lebanon without so much as notifying Beirut. It cannot be lost on the Arab street, Sunni and Shia alike, that Hezbollah can respond in ways that make nominally sovereign Arab states look feckless:

Nasrallah's order Monday to begin rebuilding -- without government coordination or approval -- poses one of the biggest tests for Lebanon's already weak government, which in the aftermath of the war has pledged to exercise its uncontested control all the way to the Israeli border…

Hundreds of activists fanned out across the country; in Khiam, at times, they outnumbered the residents. Acting on the orders of Hasan Nasrallah, the group's secretary general, they began clearing rubble, pulling bodies from collapsed homes, cataloguing damage house by house, securing truckloads of food and water, and preparing to provide tens of millions of dollars in compensation…

Nasrallah outlined Hezbollah's reconstruction. Activists would begin work immediately to repair damaged homes and clear the rubble from the hardest-hit villages like Bint Jbeil, Aitaroun and Khiam. For families whose houses were destroyed, a number he estimated at 15,000, Hezbollah would provide money to rent another house for a year as well as buy furniture. An informed source said the group planned to spend $150 million, already provided by Iran, in coming days.

"You will not have to ask for anyone's help, you will not have to stand in lines or go anywhere," Nasrallah said. "Of course, we can't wait for the order of the state and the tools that it uses, as it could consume some time." He said Hezbollah and the government would work in "two parallel lines."

While I am no friend of Hezbollah, I can clearly see its carefully built reputation as a "social organization [noted] by its lack of corruption, ability to mobilize its people and success in fulfilling its promises." Save for the magnitude of this rebuilding, the effort should come as no surprise as Hezbollah immediately assisted Lebanese after the 1996 Israeli campaign and the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. It is preposterous for anyone to assume that the US can cling to the singular vision of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization - which it is, and I think the equal or superior to al Qaeda - and make any points on the ground north of the Golan. See Bernard Haykel's A Hezbollah "Victory"? for an excellent appraisal of 'victory' in Arab terms:

Sayyid Nasrallah has defined victory in his typically low-key style, which contrasts sharply with the old-style and bombastic claims of Arab leaders such as Jamal Abdul-Nasser and Saddam Hussein. Sayyid Nasrallah is very clear and precise that Israel cannot be defeated militarily. Hezbollah, he says, "cannot shoot down Israel’s F-16 fighter jets," but what it can do is bleed Israel’s military forces, harm its economy and extract political concessions, any of which constitutes a victory. Victory, in other words, is a new psychological state for Arabs and Muslims, as well as for the "defeated" Israelis, and bears no relationship to the actual physical or material costs of war. This victory cannot be quantified or calculated and no amount of destruction and killing in Lebanon, or elsewhere in the Middle East, can outweigh its positive value and outcome. It is this psychological aspect to the present war that has so many Arabs and Muslims rallying to Hezbollah's side—they finally see Arabs who are putting up a real fight against a formidable adversary who had acquired supernatural power in their collective imagination.

While there are those among the military and the administration that understand fourth generation warfare (4GW), that awareness does not appear to reach into the White House. John Robb maps his Global Guerrillas concept closely upon William Gibson's idea of the paradigm shift from conventional to fourth generation warfare:

The bad news is that the policy-makers of the United States and Israel apparently (still) don't get the new paradigm [of fourth generation war that cannot be won via classic military action], and the bad news is that Hezbollah (et al, and by their very nature) do. Though that's only bad (or double-plus-ungood) if you accept, as I do, that the new paradigm allows for a more effective understanding of reality. So if you still like to pause to appreciate the action of phlogiston when you strike a match, you may well be okay with current events. So many, God help us, evidently are.

Hezbollah and Iran are already fighting a 4GW campaign while the White House remains tethered to a WWII or Korean War paradigm. We must recognize that Hezbollah has migrated from "the state within a state" to the state that controls another state. Nasrallah has continuously delivered, militarily, socially and politically to Arabs starved for the unfulfilled promises of Egypt's Nasser, Iraq's Saddam Hussein and the PLO's Arafat. Unlike the 1973 Egyptian and Syrian armies in 1973, Hezbollah, even Hamas, will not easily collapse and won't be defeated in a "Six Day" war. The Daily Star's Rami Khouri positioned Nasrallah nicely:

[After hostilities ended Monday] he seemed to take on the veneer of a national leader rather than that as head of a single group in Lebanon's rich mosaic of parties. In tone and content, his remarks seemed like those that a president or prime minister should be making while addressing the nation after a terrible month of destruction and human suffering. His prominence is one of the important political repercussions of this war.

Israel, in
contrast, and the US, by identification with Israel, have been sundered. Here is a doctor working at a Beirut hospital:

“We will kill every American for this!” Dr. Mansour shouted, his voice cracking with rage. “Every Shiite Muslim will kill Americans! We will grind them under our shoes!”

Even Israel perceived that it has lost while Hezbollah's "two pillars of support" - its resistance to Israel and its social services to both Shia and Sunni alike - have only grown in stature. It has to be a bit of domestic political theater for Bush43 to claim the ceasefire as "an affirmation of American foreign policy," that Hezbollah was "the loser" because the UN resolution "calls for [Hezbollah] ending its control of southern Lebanon" which, of course, it will not do (also here). Humor spoke more clearly than politicians when:

Lebanon’s most popular satire show, ‘‘Bas Mat Watan,’’ broadcast a sketch showing an ‘‘interview’’ with Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader and secretary general. ‘‘Nasrallah’’ was asked whether his party would surrender its weapons. He answered that it would, but first several conditions had to be met: there was that woman in Australia, whose land was being encroached upon by Jewish neighbors; then there was the baker in the United States, whose bakery the Jews wanted to take over. The joke was obvious: there were an infinite number of reasons why Hezbollah would never agree to lay down its weapons and become one political party among others.

The month long propaganda war that helped propel Nasrallah was quite remarkable; it does not appear that Israel was ready to combat it (as much for underestimating duration of hostilities as the skills of Hezbollah) and it should be a textbook case for future parties of an asymmetric exchange:

  1. Israel learned too late (but should have learned from watching Muslim video agitprop activities against US forces in Iraq) that it was fighting a first class media war in addition to one of asymmetrical combat.
  2. Israel had been too slow to analyze and respond, even if it is was with aerial camera clips, and so lost the 'news hole' as event layered upon event.
  3. Israel has now lost the propaganda war - certainly in the eyes of virtually all the Arab street, Sunni and Shia alike - as a dead baby in hand trumps a "video game"-like camera clips from an Israeli aircraft cockpit or missile nosecone.
While I'll address many of the participants in what was an interchangeable media and propaganda war in Part 2, I want to touch on the difficulty in trying to parse reality in the early days of an event using the strike on the UNIFIL observation post near Khiam as an example. With a memory of the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, and the fact that the comments by the Israeli foreign minister that were rather similar to those issued over the attack on the Liberty, my first thoughts to colleagues when the UNIFIL base was struck by Israeli fire after one AP report noted 21 strikes in the vicinity of the base on the day of the final strike were:
  • Someone, possibly Hezbollah, has surreptitiously dug near, adjacent or under the post under the assumption that the UN post would not be struck and so its operation would be secure and undisturbed
  • Post had line of sight on Israeli operations - it was after all a specifically placed observation post
  • UN forces could have been legitimately reporting their observations through channels but their transmissions were being monitored or intercepted by persons unknown
  • One of the nationalities involved could have been transmitting through separate channels with data being fed to Hezbollah
  • Someone or something (perhaps automated) not directly associated with the post was observing and transmitting from the post's environs, i.e., the UN observers may themselves have been collateral damage
  • An Israeli operation planned but not yet executed required that it not be observed.
We see data now that Hezbollah was firing from the vicinity of the UN outpost, but some of the other options are still possible. We now know that luring the Israelis to strike near Qana and the imagery that resulted was a propaganda tour de force for Hezbollah.

Part 2: Where imagery has the power of bullets

Armed With Iran's Millions, Fighters Turn To Rebuilding
By Anthony Shadid
Washington Post
August 16, 2006

Hezbollah Leads Work to Rebuild, Gaining Stature
New York Times
August 16, 2006

A foretaste of larger furies to come
By Rami G. Khouri
Daily Star
August 16, 2006

U.N. Peace Efforts Threatened

Countries Urgently Needed to Aid in Lebanon, World Body Says
By Colum Lynch
Washington Post
August 16, 2006

Returning Home to Ruins: Shock Is Mixed With Outrage

New York Times
August 15, 2006

Hezbollah Balks At Withdrawal From the South
Lebanese Officials Work on Compromise
By Edward Cody and Doug Struck
Washington Post
August 16, 2006

'The Street Is Not With Us'
An Arab envoy on the chasm between Israel and Hizbullah—and between Arab leaders and their people
By Lally Weymouth
Aug. 21-28, 2006 issue

Bloggers Drive Inquiry on How Altered Images Saw Print
New York Times
August 9, 2006

Arab World Finds Icon in Leader of Hezbollah
New York Times
August 7, 2006

A Hezbollah "Victory"?
Bernard Haykel
Asharq Alawsat

Hezbollah's Other War

New York Times
August 4, 2006

William Gibson
July 29, 2006
posted 1:35 PM

Christians Fleeing Lebanon Denounce Hezbollah

New York Times
July 28, 2006

Israel Takes a Stupid Pill
By Larry C. Johnson
Booman Tribune/
Posted July 17, 2006

Gordon Housworth

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The lunacy of bottle embargo: think more water bottle, think drug mule, think both


Paralyzing air travel, grossly inconveniencing travelers and creating chaos over the emptying of every conceivable bottle before a passenger can board an aircraft gains little and if continued will soon join the obsolescent but annoying tactics in place from 2001-2005. Merely substitute a zip-locked bag tapped to the body for the external bottle. And don't overlook the 'transporters' that every felon, male and female, learns to move goods into, around and out of confinement. Everything one needs could be cavity transported. Are we to cavity search every passenger? Cavities need not be limited to immediately external parts of the body. If drug mules can swallow well over 80 capsules of heroin, often more, a suicide bomber could swallow the primary charge and need only produce the detonator and booster charge from another cavity or another coconspirator. As microelectronic timers shrink in size, one of the capsules can house the timer and detonator such that the suicide bomber is self-sufficient. Sensors that can detect the outgassing from solid explosives such as C-4 and Semtex will be challenged to detect that mode of delivery.

We could easily slide back (also here) to the pre-2005 period before DHS adopted a Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence-based Risk Analysis in place of previous scenario-based analyses, and when largely superficial measures where invoked that did little to deter terrorists but greatly inconvenienced passengers. In 2005 the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reevaluated security measures put in place since September 2001 to ensure their validity for 2005 threats and available resources. Risk analysis concluded that the primary threat was now a suicide bomber boarding an aircraft, yet "security screeners spend too much time trying to find nail scissors and not enough time focused" on a suicide bomber, an already difficult problem as the TSA has a very limited capability to detect explosives under clothing. Struggling with budget and headcount reductions, air traveler complaints over flier unfriendly measures and new risk analysis to airliner safety, the TSA proposed removal of empty "feel good" security measures while focusing on "keeping explosives off the airplane."

The opportunities open to an asymmetric attacker are great as the exploitable vulnerabilities of a free society are enormous. In such an environment, the identification of atypical trends or asymmetric action is not easily observable. Successful interdiction requires:

  • Ongoing observation and data combing
  • Broadest permissible analysis and surveillance systems
  • Rapid feedback for investigative follow-up
  • Surveillance needs to focused and specific rather than broad and routine

In this porous environment, risk options largely devolve to three variants:

  • Do nothing, accepting risk by default – an exceedingly undesirable option
  • Perform a risk assessment, managing risk by installing reasonable mitigation measures
  • Harden the system against all threats, achieving least risk with possible business efficiency degradation

Narcotics drug mules, human smugglers carrying drugs in their stomachs, offer a means to carry more than a kilo of high explosives onto an aircraft:

The advent of the jet era and the proliferation of international air routes opened up an efficient new method of smuggling illicit narcotics from producer countries to consumer markets. One method of avoiding detection was swallowing pellets containing drugs, or inserting them into the body. The first reported case of "body packing" was in 1973 in Toronto, when a man was admitted to a hospital with a small-bowel obstruction developed 13 days after he had swallowed a condom filled with hashish. Officials at JFK International Airport first began to encounter and interdict drug swallowers and inserters in the early 1980s.

Given the illicit nature of drug trafficking, data regarding mules is necessarily incomplete. The statistics cited below are intended only to provide background context for the story told in [the film] Maria Full of Grace.

  • Average amount of heroin or cocaine contained in an individual pellet swallowed by a drug mule: 10 grams (approximately 0.4 ounces)
  • Number of pellets an average swallower can ingest: 80-125 (800 grams – 1.25 kilograms)
  • Number of internal drug mules (swallowed and inserted) intercepted at JFK for Fiscal year 2003 (10/1/2002-9/30/2003): 145 [38 female, 107 male,] Oldest: 65 years of age
  • Number of internal drug mules (swallowed and inserted) intercepted at JFK for fiscal year 2004 to date (10/1/2003 through 4/30/2004, not counting seizures currently in process: 57 [23 female, 34 male] Youngest: 16 years of age, Oldest: 72 years of age

One returning currency smuggler for the cartels "was found to have $197,000 worth of euros in his stomach" in the larger 500 euro denomination compared to the largest US denomination of $100 USD.

We need only blend suicide terrorists with felons to produce other means of transport:

Suspects and inmates can be highly creative in using their bodies to conceal contraband. For example, objects may be concealed by inserting them in the rectum. Illegal drugs can be placed in condoms and temporarily stored in the colon. Cylinders such as cigar tubes are used to hide money, intravenous syringes, and knives. Duplicate handcuff keys can be concealed in most body orifices. These goods are considered valuable inside a prison and can pose a security risk to staff and inmates at such facilities.

Further, not all contraband flows into the prison. Inmates affiliated with the Irish Republican Army were known to write assassination lists on cigarette papers and hide these lists beneath their foreskins.

In a thorough visual body cavity search, a flashlight is used to illuminate body orifices, including nostrils, ears, mouth, male penis (urethra and foreskin), female vagina, and rectum. Generally, the detainee is required to manipulate these body parts so that they can be examined.

On-body and cavity transport of contraband pose their own unique demands to a clothed (pat), strip or cavity search. Consider what is required for the middle search classification, the strip search (which contains many steps of the pat search) - and still contraband gets through:

1. Maintain safe distance.
2. Strip searches should be done away from other inmates to protect dignity of inmate.
3. Strip searches should be conducted by the same sex: female inmate by female officer and male inmate by male officer.
4. Instruct prisoner to empty pockets; remove coat, hat, tie, shoes, and belt.
5. Flex shoe, bend in several directions; hold shoe by toe, strike against floor to break open possible fake heel.
6. Inspect belt for contraband visually and by rolling it up.
7. Tug on belt buckle.
8. Inspect the belt seams by twisting the belt to see if it separates.
9. Check coat for contraband.
10. Remove trousers; inspect seams, pockets, waist bands, and cuffs.
11. Remove shirt; inspect collar, cuffs, pockets, and seams.
12. Remove socks; crush between hands.
13. Remove underclothing; check seams and inspect.
14. Remove and inspect wig.
15. Inspect hat or other headgear by running fingers around crown. NOTE: Watch for razor blades or pins.
16. Inspect sweat band of headgear for contraband by turning it down or out.
17. Have inmate turn away from you.
18. Check bottom of feet, one at a time.
19. Check anal area.
a. Have inmate bend over, and spread buttocks with hands.
b. Visually inspect the anus.
20. Have male inmate face you and instruct him to lift testicles; visually inspect. If individual is uncircumcised, have him pull foreskin of penis back.
21. Have inmate raise both arms, check armpits.
22. Have inmate extend arms in front; check palms and between fingers.
23. Tell prisoner to lower head and run a comb or fingers through hair. NOTE: Watch for razor blades concealed in hair.
24. Have inmate open mouth, lift tongue; visually inspect.
25. Check behind ears.
26. Use other applicable techniques.
a. Generally, the procedures for searching females is the same as males with the following exceptions:
b. Upper foundation garments, e.g. bra
c. Have inmate remove any tampons; visually inspect vaginal area.
d. Lower foundation garments.
(1) Girdles
(2) Panty hose
(3) Some girdles and bras contain METAL supports or underwires.
e. Have inmate lift breasts one at a time. Examples: Syringes, etc. can be taped under breast and hidden effectively.

A suicide terrorist could combine both 'mule' and 'cavity' transport, individually or severally. Bomb component miniaturization is only going to make the interdiction task more difficult. It is an axiom at our shop that "items at the edge of technology" are often unrecognizable or unidentifiable by inspectors unfamiliar with the technology. Two characteristics most contributed to a lack of recognition, robbing the viewer of visual cues as to function:

  • Miniaturization – a reduction of size and form
  • Integration (often a handmaiden of miniaturization) – the combination of functions of multiple items into a single item, itself often miniaturized

Recognition of miniaturization and integration are crucial components in risk evaluation of any class of item. The emergence of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) (also here) exhibiting both miniaturization and integration will affect the embargo/alert environment Current watch list items will be continuously affected. How will we uniformly shift screening focus as the function of the larger, more recognizable items are performed by a proliferating class of the smaller, cheaper items?

We expects the following fluid conditions:

  • Unexpected, innovative and non-traditional methods will proliferate, finding broad applicability
  • Targets will have changing vulnerabilities, technological abilities and associated risks
  • Terrorist tactics will evolve in methods and operational activities from internal technological "lift" and as a response to changes by the targets
  • Short of nation state confrontations, conventional operations will draw less interest as adversaries will look to escape retaliation and the cost of investments required to underwrite an overt effort
  • Unless we design around the asymmetrical adversary, such adversaries will continue to find ways to bypass our defenses and exploit our vulnerabilities. Such asymmetric operations will have common characteristics:
    • Small-scale high-impact operations
    • Operations performed with greater efficiency and effectiveness, both to minimize footprint and discovery and to conserve organizational resources, in order to achieve maximum results
    • Rise in operations taken to address ideological causes – and this applies equally to fringe Muslim fundamentalists and single-issue groups such as Earth Liberation Front (ELF)

Current events are tracking with my prediction in the aftermath of the strikes on New York City and Washington DC that the "war on terror" would be as intractable as the war on drugs. Combine that with the increasing sophistication and capacity open to an asymmetrical attack and it is clear that lethality will rise even as components shrink. Business as usual cannot continue indefinitely.

Focused on 9/11, U.S. Is Seen to Lag on New Threats
New York Times
August 12, 2006

Liquid Threat Is Hard to Detect
New York Times
August 11, 2006

Foiling the Would-Be Hijacker
Reuters 08:00 AM
Aug, 11, 2006

Agent infiltrated terror cell, U.S. says
Air travel in chaos after plot to bomb airliners exposed
Friday, August 11, 2006; Posted: 3:33 p.m. EDT (19:33 GMT)

New rules put laptops in checked baggage
After bomb scare, U.K. authorities ban all electronic items from carry on luggage
By Jeremy Kirk
IDG News Service
August 10, 2006

what a fucking crock (updated)
Pirate's Cove
Aug 10, 2006 @ 11:58

Register: Fliers stripped of hi-tech, remote detonation a possibility in terror plot
Posted by David Berlind @ 6:50 am
Between The Lines
August 10, 2006

Planes Remain Vulnerable Targets
Associated Press 13:15 PM
Aug, 10, 2006

Update on Foiled Airline Terror Plot
OSAC Hot Topic
Americas, Europe - United Kingdom, United States
10 Aug 2006

In This War, Technology Is Key
Who is more tech-savvy—drug traffickers or federal agents? The answer may determine who wins the war on drugs
By Alex Halperin
Business Week
AUGUST 10, 2006

The Drug War's Technology Tricks
Here are some of the techniques and tools that government officials and traffickers use - from special greenhouses to Predator drones
By Alex Halperin
Business Week
AUGUST 10, 2006

'Airlines terror plot' disrupted
Published: 2006/08/10 14:16:12 GMT

RFID passports with improper shielding triggers bomb in simulation
Posted by George Ou @ 12:17 am
August 9, 2006

In the fight against terrorism, the long war is the wrong war
Sooner or later, terrorists will get, and use, WMD
John Arquilla
San Francisco Chronicle
July 16, 2006

Airline Security Changes Planned
Threats Reassessed To Make Travel Easier for Public
By Sara Kehaulani Goo
Washington Post
August 13, 2005

Remarks for Secretary Michael Chertoff U.S. Department of Homeland Security George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute
George Washington University
Homeland Security Policy Institute
March 16, 2005
(Remarks as Prepared)

FM 100-14, Risk Management
Field Manual Headquarters
Department of the Army, Washington, DC
23 April 1998

Search of Inmates – 01-97
Instructors Guide
Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Education (TCLEOSE)
January 1997

Inmate Search
Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Education (TCLEOSE)

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Infrastructure Defense Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  Weapons & Technology Public  


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Snippets of IP theft close to home


Martial extended the word for slave theft, plagium, to cover literary theft and was in turn plagiarized by others:

Plagiarism was so common in the churches by the time of King James that he had to order that at least one sermon a month be original. When, eventually, the practice was officially condemned, the practitioners merely aggravated the sin with an alloy of hypocrisy

Plagiarism remains with us in all disciplines; what was once a collegially understood, if annoying, appropriation has now taken on a fully fledged autonomous claim of original ownership. Kierkegaard has taken the next step in proclaiming "an entirely new art form: 'Plagiography' (and, for those who cannot do but merely desire to preach, its sister-muse, the detective science of 'Plagiology')."

The commercial world is always on the edge of plagiarism in its quest for new product:

Intellectual property is sacrosanct, but only to a certain degree [as] most car manufacturers would likely argue that the unique appearance of their car, such as the shape of the grille, is significant, and so if someone copies it that can become an issue of "trade dress" infringement, because the appearance of the product is something protected by trademark. "Generally, you can’t win unless the consumer is confused by what they see, so if you recognize a car is a Lexus and think it looks like a Mercedes, generally that’s not enough."

Part of the purpose of this note is to document the outright plagiarism of an article on mine so that the party may be identified and hopefully mend its ways. It does not rise to the level of 10 Downing Street plagerizing the work of Ibrahim al-Marashi on Iraqi security services in its Iraq - Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation, but it annoys me that they made not the slightest effort to change the text block while going on to offer a workshop that would purport to implement my intent.

That the firm is UK based and my US article is aging in web terms, 1997, are typical in cases of plagiarism where the plagiarist presumes that time and distance will make none the wiser. While I take the opportunity to whack the miscreant, I would like to take the opportunity to bring forward an idea originally floated by Michael Schrage, now at the MIT Media Lab's E-Markets Initiative, that of making "a service-flavored product or a product-spiced service" which he called serducts and provices.

Schrage got quite a lot of press at the time on the useful idea that you were in trouble if you thought that you were solely in the product or the service business, and conversely, that you could make new and niche products at low cost and relatively rapid turnaround times. I used the process in adapting US goods and services to Asian markets. It seemed that serduct had longer legs than provice, but then both began to drop out of currency but they shouldn't. I recommend commercial readers to look to his original 1996 article.

I mentioned the serduct in a 1997 Competitive Advantage article, The fall and rise of service in the 20th Century in this section:

"Serduct" - the merger of service + product

Buyers view their purchase event through one of three lenses:

  • Purchase as best price
  • Purchase as service
  • Purchase as theater

Service plays an essential role in all three purchases.

In purchase as best price, the service component must be extremely efficient and nearly invisible. In purchase as service, the care and pampering of the buyer is the defining component of the "product" because the buyer could have purchased it elsewhere for less but opted for the intangibles of service. In purchase as theater, the service component expands to include the overall event and the environment of the sale. The story that the buyer will tell, and retell, to others about the purchase becomes an integral part of the product.

Transcending the transaction - moving beyond the individual purchase

Most traditional businesses require some 50 to 60% repeat buyers to sufficiently lower the cost of sale for new buyers. If the percentage of new buyers rises significantly above 40 to 50%, the firm will suffer for operating cash and generally will see sales revenue stretch unacceptably beyond forecast.

Most firms find themselves in a Catch-22 position as they've neither the money nor the processes to build sufficient new sales by traditional means. Winning firms are breaking the mold by forming a relationship with their customers - a relationship that costs more in the short term but delivers long-term buyers that influence other potential buyers in their circle of acquaintances.

The essential element is building an inalienable trust between the buyer and seller. This trust can be built with a variety of tools, but some essentials emerge:

  • Give the buyer a pleasant and trusting experience.
  • Institutionalize a personal "culture of passion" among employees.
  • Get far in front of the purchase and well after it. Develop birth to grave buyers.
  • Put aside the traditional, adversarial relationship for a win-win.
  • Minimize employee turnover (and consequential training).
  • Create measurement standards and reasonable accountability.

This trusting bond created between buyer and seller permits seller to extend his/her franchise to a family of services and products for their customers.

Here is Vision 3000 & Associates' "Serduct" - the merger of service + product:

Buyers view their purchase event through one of three lenses:

  • Purchase as best price
  • Purchase as service
  • Purchase as theater

Service plays an essential role in all three purchases.
In purchase as best price, the service component must be extremely efficient and nearly invisible. In purchase as service, the care and pampering of the buyer is the defining component of the "product" because the buyer could have purchased it elsewhere for less but opted for the intangibles of service. In purchase as theater, the service component expands to include the overall event and the environment of the sale. The story that the buyer will tell, and retell, to others about the purchase becomes an integral part of the product.

Transcending the transaction - moving beyond the individual purchase
Most traditional businesses require some 50 to 60% repeat buyers to sufficiently lower the cost of sale for new buyers. If the percentage of new buyers rises significantly above 40 to 50%, the firm will suffer for operating cash and generally will see sales revenue stretch unacceptably beyond forecast.
Most firms find themselves in a Catch-22 position, as they've neither the money nor the processes to build sufficient new sales by traditional means. Winning firms are breaking the mold by forming a relationship with their customers - a relationship that costs more in the short term but delivers long-term buyers that influence other potential buyers in their circle of acquaintances.

The essential element is building an inalienable trust between the buyer and seller. This trust can be built with a variety of tools, but some essentials emerge:

  • Give the buyer a pleasant and trusting experience.
  • Institutionalize a personal "culture of passion" among employees.
  •  Get far in front of the purchase and well after it. Develop birth to grave buyers.
  • Put aside the traditional, adversarial relationship for a win-win.
  • Minimize employee turnover (and consequential training).
  • Create measurement standards and reasonable accountability.

Short of a few bits of clumsy punctuation, there is not the slightest chance of accident, of denial of provenance. The buggers didn't even change the "+" sign. 10 Downing Street did better than that. Vision 3000's impact of me was much the same as that of the UK dossier on Iraq. Despite whatever skills that they might otherwise have, it called into question their honesty, veracity and intelligence overall.

Are copycat cars a sincere form of flattery?
Automakers ‘borrow’ successful vehicle styling, outflank their rivals
By Roland Jones
Updated: 5:14 p.m. ET May 23, 2006

The plagiarism plague
BBC News
Friday, 7 February, 2003, 13:18 GMT

Iraq dossier 'solid' - Downing Street
BBC News
Friday, 7 February, 2003, 13:14 GMT

A piece of plagiarism?
BBC News
7 February, 2003, 11:11 GMT
Here are some examples of similarities between the government dossier and the work of Ibrahim al-Marashi.

Iraq - Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
January 2003

By Ibrahim al-Marashi
MERIA Journal
Volume 6, No. 3 - September 2002

The fall and rise of service in the 20th Century
Gordon Housworth
Intellectual Capital Group LLC
Copyright 1997 Intellectual Capital Group
Published in Competitive Advantage
American Society for Quality Services journal, 1997

Provices and Serducts
If you think you're either in the product or the service business, you're probably in trouble. Learn to wrap a service around your product or to 'productize' your service.
By Michael Schrage
Fast Company
Issue 04, page 48, August 1996

The Honest Man's Guide to Plagiarism
DECEMBER 21, 1979

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Intellectual Property Theft Public  


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Hezbollah is something not seen for hundreds of years: a Muslim army that can fight


Hezbollah is something that the West has not seen in a few hundred years - a Muslim army, Persian trained, that can fight, that can acquire and employ sophisticated weaponry (albeit some systems are most likely under direct Iranian control) and employ combat operations appropriate to its condition and environment. (I would have said Arab army but Iranians, although mostly Muslim, are Persians.) I submit that Hezbollah presents a threat greater than al Qaeda if and when it elects to strike out beyond Palestine at the US and EU. In that, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's statements are not boast but fact. (The only benefit is that, unlike al Qaeda, there will be a nation state homeland to counterattack. Unfortunately, that is Iran.)

Israeli Armed Forces effectives returning from the Lebanon’s front, say they are facing an intelligent, well prepared and ruthless guerrilla. The soldiers describe Hezbollah guerrillas hide between civilians and in underground bunkers that are two or three stories deep, evidence that this has been prepared for years. They are hard to beat and show no fear of dying, expressed an Israeli soldier.

These Israeli soldiers [tell] stories of Hezbollah fighting from buildings with AK 47s and grenade launchers in an orderly fashion. The soldier’s commentaries make clear the enormous challenges Israel faces trying to neutralize Hezbollah. "They have good knowledge of who we are, where we are and what type armament we are using"…

[Israel is] not facing the militia of tobacco share croppers. They are facing a highly professional military force, perhaps the most professional in the region aside from Israel's own. The Israeli military is rapidly scaling back its military goals, since the ones initially announced with such confidence (pushing Hizbullah back 35 miles and completely destroying its missile arsenal) are obviously pie in the sky. The Israelis are stumbling around so badly that yesterday they lost a helicopter and killed 6 of their own men (it could have been much worse).

In point of fact, Israel is losing in its conflict with Hezbollah, yet it will not have a better chance given that Hezbollah miscalculated with its POW grab and was surprised by the level of Israeli response. If Hezbollah survives with its weapons reasonably intact, Israel loses and is shown to be vulnerable as never before in its history. It is now unlikely that Israel will be able to push Hezbollah far enough away to prevent it sending missiles into Israel at will.

Unlike the close of the 1967 Six Day War, El Al Airlines is not taking out ads in the New York Times inviting tourists to "Visit Israel and see the Pyramids," nor are there jokes about Arab (Egyptian) weapons for sale, "never fired, dropped only once" or Egyptian deserters who abandoned their units to stand and fight. While "Arab Unity" is a contradiction in terms, especially so across a Sunni-Shia divide, Arabs are so thirsty for selfesteem that they can rally around Hezbollah's accomplishments. This is all the more remarkable when Lebanese whose state is being sundered in the conflict support Hezbollah's state within a state resistance against Israel.

Combine Hezbollah's prowess with what I call the "glide slope to the desktop" of any technology to "get to anyone's desktop, anywhere and for any purpose" (where the angle of descent indicates the cost and complexity threshold of acquisition over time), and we are witnessing the emergence of near-state class paramilitaries that are able to fight against established nation states under asymmetrical conditions.

The implication here is that the West is seeing a shift of an uncontrolled dominance that has held sway throughout the European colonial conquest. And what is the "West" but the reassembled colonial empires drawn together to contest the Sino-Soviet empires. Writing in Putting bin Laden into the perspective of Islam, Part I, May 2004:

When living in the Middle East in the 1960s I would tell colleagues that, "The Arabs live in a past glory for which the West gives them no credit," that the Islamic world, Arabs included, have an extraordinarily rich tradition that rose parallel to Rome and saw Islam supporting knowledge, discovery, and learning while Europe plunged into the Dark Ages. Dismissing them as "rag heads," hijacking their nationalism, first on behalf of British Petroleum and then the Seven Sisters, and treating them as serfs in their own country, was not a path to popularity. It was not a popular opinion then, and besides I was told that we strong ally governments in Tehran and Riyadh…

It is hard to express the unhappiness of even centrist Islamists to what they perceive as the dominance, even hegemony, of the West over the Third World in which Western civilization -- based on a Judeo-Christian ethic -- is promoted as "the universal civilization." Pan-Arab hopes for a cultural and political revival upon the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and later upon the discovery of oil were each dashed in turn. It is doubly damning for Islamists to admit their dismal political and economic failure, a failure that fell so low in their view as to permit the establishment of a Jewish state in their midst and on sacred ground.

Steeped in far too much Kipling as a child, I will use the language of empire to catalog the shift. Hilaire Belloc "punctured imperial triumphalism in 1898 with a brilliant parody of jingoistic verse" in The Modern Traveller. (Orwell does a lovely job of positioning these English satirists.) Here Belloc satirizes colonial native denigration with this stanza "supposed to have been uttered by a fictitious U. S.-born, blackskinned Liberian Lord Chief Justice":

In dealing wid de native scum
Yo' cannot pick an' choose:
Yo' hab to promise um a sum
Ob wages paid in cloth and rum,
But Lordy! dat's a ruse!
Yo' get yo' well on de adventure,
And change de wages to Indenture.

Here Belloc's hero, Captain Blood, watches the mutinous natives, Hottentots (derogatory Dutch for the native Khoikhoi people, extended by the English as "one of inferior culture and intellect"), who vastly outnumber Anglo-Dutch troops in the Boer War:

Blood thought he knew the native mind;
He said you must be firm, but kind.
A mutiny resulted.
I shall never forget the way
That Blood stood upon this awful day
Preserved us all from death.
He stood upon a little mound
Cast his lethargic eyes around,
And said beneath his breath:
'Whatever happens, we have got
The Maxim Gun, and they have not.'

Hiram Maxim's recoil operated machine gun is the metaphor for Western superiority over colonial dominated regions from the 18th century forward, a subjugation that led to a European assumption of ideological and intellectual superiority that suffused into the Western view of less developed states and tribal regions. Heavy and bulky, the Maxim fired only 500 rounds per minute but that was 100 times better than the best bolt action rifles of the day; its "extreme lethality was employed to devastating effect against obsolete charging tactics."

Without substantial force multipliers, how could England have withstood and bested larger armies such as the Zulu attack that overran Isandlwana, killing 1200:

King Shaka inducted every Zulu into the army, from early manhood to old age. They served throughout their life in regiments identified by markings in their cowhide shields: black for the young unmarried men, white for the mature warriors. The regiments were based on age groups and owed no allegiance to families or clans. As a result, they afforded Shaka a powerful tool for centralising power in his hands and developing in his subjects a strong sense of national pride. He allowed no man to marry until he had washed his spear in the blood of enemies…

Before Shaka, war among the Zulus had been a light, inconsequential affair, where insults were shouted and spears were thrown… Shaka changed all that. He armed his men with strong stabbing assegais with a tapering blade some 18-inches long and one-and-a-half-inch wide. To use these weapons one had to get close to the enemy, thrust one's blade into his flesh and be soaked in his blood. The Zulus called these spears ikwla, from the sucking sound they made when withdrawn from a victim's body.

Shaka also devised a battle formation known as impondo zankomo - the horns of the buffalo. The stronger, seasoned warriors formed the main body of the army, the chest. As the chest hurled itself at the enemy, the younger, faster men comprising the horns ran to encircle them on each side and cut off their retreat. The reserve, the loins, waited behind the chest. Sometimes they sat with their backs to the battle, so that the sight of blood would not excite them…

The Zulus were tall, strong, fierce warriors, who knew neither fear nor mercy. They went into battle naked, except for loin coverings, and barefoot… Their weapons were stabbing assegais and shields, throwing spears, knobkerries and a few fire arms, ranging from muskets to modern rifles. They charged their British opponents at an effortless pace, half trot, half jog, banging their assegais against their shields, hissing between their teeth and shouting [King of the Zulu] Cetewayo's war cry: 'Usutu! Usutu! Usutu!'…

The Zulus did not fight to gain psychological advantage. Their war leaders, the izinduna, knew nothing about guerrilla warfare, attrition or retreat. Their only manoeuvre was the headlong charge, exhilarating and deadly; their only strategy, annihilation and the scorched earth. The Zulus fought to wipe out the enemy, to 'eat them up'. Those who opposed them were destroyed.

In a single engagement of the 1893 Matabele War, 50 soldiers with four Maxim guns stood off 5,000 Zulu warriors. Farther north in the Sudan at Omdurman, Kitchener's Maxims killed 11,000 in retribution for the Mahdi's massacre of Chinese Lord Gordon at Khartoum. Ellis wryly noted in The Social History of the Machine Gun that, "In Africa, automatic weapons were used to support the seizure of millions of square miles of land and to discipline those unfortunates who wished to eschew the benefits of European civilization." African and third world warriors, "no matter how brave, were unable to cope, so that at Omdurman [the] ratio of casualties was 28 British and 20 of their allies to 11,000 Dervish dead. In the Iraq invasion of 2003, the ratio of military personnel casualties was some 150 US-British dead to unknown thousands of Iraqi soldiers, probably somewhere between 10-20,000, so the ratio was somewhat lower than at Omdurman, but still staggeringly unbalanced" in favor of core industrialized nations.

Military advantage went far beyond machine guns. Borne of 18th century fear of European cavalry assault that could quickly press from any quadrant, the British Square was the apogee of infantry's ability to "draw up in a square with men on each side facing outwards [so that any cavalry attack] would be met by a hail of fire." The English infantry were so rigidly disciplined that they could quickly form and reform the square. Formed two tiers deep, armed with breech loading repeating rifles, the trained British Square often overcame far larger forces across Africa and Asia.

The 1885 Battle of Abu Klea saw a British camel corps with 1800 infantry fight off 10,000 dervishes even after the Mahdi's forces broke the square causing the British to reform while fighting the Sudanese inside and outside the square. Until Abu Klea, "a fully-formed British square had never been broken by assault." (See 19th century diagram of the sophisticated multiflank attack upon the square. The Fuzzy-Wuzzies had clearly gone to school of the resilience of the square.) William McGonagall's The Battle of Abu Klea enshrined the moment:

But General Stewart ordered his men forward in square,
All of them on foot, ready to die and to dare;
And he forced the enemy to engage in the fray,
But in a short time they were glad to run away.

But not before they penetrated through the British square,
Which was a critical Moment to the British, I declare,
Owing to the great number of the Arabs,
Who rushed against their bayonets and received fearful stabs…

By eight o'clock the enemy was of considerable strength,
With their banners waving beautifully and of great length,
And creeping steadily up the grassy road direct to the wells,
But the British soon checked their advance by shot and shells.

At ten o'clock brave General Stewart made a counter-attack,
Resolved to turn the enemy on a different track;
And he ordered his men to form a hollow square,
Placing the Guards in the front, and telling them to prepare…

Even the redoubtable square could not have held without light field artillery. Take Kipling's ode to the screw-guns ("tiny little cannon made in two pieces, that are screwed together when the time comes to use them. They are taken up mountains, anywhere that a mule can find a road, and they are very useful for fighting in rocky country"):

Smokin' my pipe on the mountings, sniffin' the mornin' cool,
I walks in my old brown gaiters along o' my old brown mule,
With seventy gunners be'ind me, an' never a beggar forgets
It's only the pick of the Army
that handles the dear little pets
'Tss! 'Tss!
For you all love the screw-guns
the screw-guns they all love you!
So when we call round with a few guns,
o' course you will know what to do
hoo! hoo!
Jest send in your Chief an' surrender

it's worse if you fights or you runs:
You can go where you please, you can skid up the trees,
but you don't get away from the guns!

Without the guns things could quickly turn disastrous for colonial troops as noted in Henry Newbolt's 1897 Vitai Lampada ("They Pass On The Torch of Life"). In a case of logistical or training failure, the Gatling guns likely jammed "due to the use of ordinary service rifle cartridges" instead of the "solid-drawn cartridge cases, recommended for Gatling Gun use":

The sand of the desert is sodden red, --
Red with the wreck of a square that broke; --
The Gatling's jammed and the Colonel dead,
And the regiment blind with dust and smoke.
The river of death has brimmed his banks,
And England's far, and Honour a name,
But the voice of a schoolboy rallies the ranks:
'Play up! play up! and play the game!'

By the time that Kipling wrote the first series of the Barrack-Room Ballads in 1892, the British no longer dismissed native tribesmen. One can only imagine combat outcomes if the Fuzzy-Wuzzy (from the butter-matted hair of the Hadendoa, one of the Beja tribes supporting the Mahdi in the Sudan) had access to modern weaponry and training at the Battle of Abu Klea:

We've fought with many men acrost the seas,
An' some of 'em was brave an' some was not:
The Paythan an' the Zulu an' Burmese;
But the Fuzzy was the finest o' the lot.
We never got a ha'porth's change of 'im:
'E squatted in the scrub an' 'ocked our 'orses,
'E cut our sentries up at Suakim,
An' 'e played the cat an' banjo with our forces.
So 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan;
You're a pore benighted 'eathen but a first-class fightin' man;
We gives you your certificate, an' if you want it signed
We'll come an' 'ave a romp with you whenever you're inclined...

'E rushes at the smoke when we let drive,
An', before we know, 'e's 'ackin' at our 'ead;
'E's all 'ot sand an' ginger when alive,
An' 'e's generally shammin' when 'e's dead.
'E's a daisy, 'e's a ducky, 'e's a lamb!
'E's a injia-rubber idiot on the spree,
'E's the on'y thing that doesn't give a damn
For a Regiment o' British Infantree!
So 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan;
You're a pore benighted 'eathen but a first-class fightin' man;
An' 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, with your 'ayrick 'ead of 'air

You big black boundin' beggar—for you broke a British square!

Tide of Arab Opinion Turns to Support for Hezbollah
New York Times
July 28, 2006

Israel Finding a Difficult Foe in Hezbollah
New York Times
July 26, 2006

A new Middle East, or Rice's fantasy ride?
By Rami G. Khouri
Daily Star
July 24, 2006

Saudi Arabia Asks U.S. to Intervene in Lebanon
Humanitarian Situation Is Among Ally's Concerns; Rice to Discuss Crisis With Israel Today
By Michael Abramowitz and Robin Wright
Washington Post
July 24, 2006

Damascus Moves Back into the Center as Lebanon is Turned into a Failed State
Joshua M. Landis
Syria Comment
July 24, 2006

Hezbollah’s tenacity surprises Israeli Soldiers
Dominican Today
July 24, 2006

Hezbollah's Apocalypse Now
By Amal Saad-Ghorayeb
Washington Post
July 23, 2006

Can Israel Win? Not the way it's fighting
Ralph Peters
New York Post
July 22, 2006

Across the Middle East, Sermons Critical of the U.S.
New York Times
July 22, 2006

Israel's Hezbollah Fight Bolsters Syria's Assad
Ties to Militants Increase President's Popularity, Cast Him as Wartime Leader
Wall Street Journal
July 21, 2006

Amid Ties to Iran, Hezbollah Builds Its Own Identity
Shiite Group's Leader Vows Defiance After Israeli Hit; A Gift for Propaganda
'Frighteningly Professional'
By JAY SOLOMON in Beirut, Lebanon, and KARBY LEGGETT in Jerusalem
Wall Street Journal
July 21, 2006

Hostage to Hezbollah
Wall Street Journal
July 21, 2006

How Far Will the War be Broadened? Will the Lebanese Side with HA
Joshua M. Landis
Syria Comment
July 21, 2006

Editorials Continue to Back Wide Air War Against Lebanon
By E&P Staff
Published: July 20, 2006 1:40 PM ET

An Embodiment of Iran’s Long Shadow: Missiles for Hezbollah
New York Times
July 19, 2006

With Israeli Use of Force, Debate Over Proportion
New York Times
July 19, 2006

Few Editorials Find Fault with the Bombing of Beirut
It's one thing to endorse Israel's right to defend itself and retaliate. It's another to remain silent on the crime of causing mass destruction and civilian deaths in neutral areas of Lebanon.
By Greg Mitchell
July 18, 2006

Tradegy of Errors
Ralph Peters
New York Post
July 16, 2006

When the Shiites Rise
By Vali Nasr
Foreign Affairs,
July/August 2006

Will Syria Get Respect?
Joshua M. Landis
Syria Comment
July 15, 2006

Syria and Hizbullah on the Attack
Joshua M. Landis
Syria Comment
July 13, 2006

Out of Africa
Eduardo Zinna

Hizbullah’s New Face
In search of a Muslim democracy
Helena Cobban
Boston Review April/May 2005

A quiet joke at your expense
The Economist print edition
Dec 16th 1999

The Social History of the Machine Gun
John Ellis
Johns Hopkins; Reprint edition (August 1, 1986)
ISBN: 0801833582

The Gatling Gun
Paul Wahl and Donald R. Toppel
New York: ARCO, 1965
Out of print, data extracted here

Funny, but not Vulgar
George Orwell
Leader, 28 July 1945

"Rudyard Kipling"
by George Orwell
first published February 1942 in 'Horizon'

"De Native Scum. . . "
Feb. 2, 1931

The Modern Traveller
by Hilaire Belloc
Kessinger Publishing (January 2005)
ISBN: 1417954787
Originally published by Edward Arnold, 1898, and illustrated by B.T.B. (Lord Basil Blackwood.)

Rudyard Kipling
Barrack-Room Ballads
First Series (1892)

Rudyard Kipling
Barrack-Room Ballads
First Series (1892)

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  


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The second industrialization model - powered by IP harvesting


"Piracy" has become a very imprecise term in describing the risks and impacts to Intellectual Property (IP) in what we call the second industrialization model. We track a four tiered model of IP violation that is marking the progression of newly industrializing states:

  1. Simple piracy (copy with no effort to hide piracy - the audio/video model that applies to anything replicable from CD and DVD)
  2. "Badged" substitute (pirated or stolen Intellectual Property used to create a product masquerading as a legitimate offering by a legitimate supplier)
  3. Substitute product (pirated or stolen Intellectual Property used to create a "no name" or "new name" product competing with a legitimate offering, usually on price)
  4. Supplier substitution (original legitimate supplier is forced from the market, replaced by the copier)

While all four are IP theft, we have bowed to convention in the popular press to describe the first as piracy while reserving the other three as IP theft, especially as the theft is masked such that the sellers have distanced themselves from the theft.

As a heretofore internal working term, we call this the second industrialization model, the first being textile manufacturing. Although the French perfected large textile looms, their output was craftwork for a limited clientele. It was left to the English to turn looming into a mass production affair. The US purchased old, discarded looms, copying them down to their eccentrically worn bobbins to commence the colonial industrialization. Nation after nation subsequently followed suit for well over one hundred and fifty years.

We see the codification of a new industrial model in the postwar period based upon "commercial on commercial" Intellectual Property (IP) attack. While the earlier "military on military" or state on state espionage remains vibrant, a significant focus has shifted to advancing dual use technologies which bring both military advantage and domestic commercial industrialization.

Within this model, nations in a position of strength, specifically in innovation - part of which is acquired without royally, normally do not want IP protection laws as they are either independently innovating, thereby able to sell at a premium; producing more efficiently, thereby driving down costs over competitors; or imbedding surreptitiously acquired IP and thereby terminating the revenue streams of competitors. Nations tend to seek or support IP protection laws when they are in decline by some combination of an ebbing of innovation, emergence of lower cost producers, or new producers harvesting their IP and ending expected revenue streams.

The postwar Japanese model tracked this progression and is only now promoting IP protection laws in the face of Korean and Chinese successes in former Japanese core industries. The Chinese are expected to accelerate the model significantly. The downside for firms and industries affected is that China (and I started my commercial visits in 1980) is unique among developing nations in having a "first world" mentality even as it had a "third world" industrial capacity, i.e., from its "reopening" in the 1970s, it closed off industrial penetration and investment that it did not like (which most other industrializing nations could not or would not do) as it turned a benign eye on virtually any domestic industrial effort that nurtured growth, revenue and industrialization. How it achieved the IP required to do that was never questioned.

As is widely known among skilled China watchers, edicts on IP infractions, or anything else, often rarely leave Beijing as provincial, city and enterprise zone mangers do largely as they wish and are tolerated so long as they bring growth and revenue without significant embarrassment to the Party (CCP).

Firms that do not understand this landscape and industrial progression are ripe for IP harvesting. Moreover, legal remedies are largely ineffectual and the rewards moot as the IP is already lost and all expected downstream revenue is attenuated. Readers may wish to examine Low cost is not low risk: realities of IP Loss for realities on the ground.

Next step in pirating: Faking a company
By David Lague
International Herald Tribune
APRIL 28, 2006

FBI Sees Big Threat from Chinese Spies; Businesses Wonder
Bureau adds manpower, builds technology-theft cases
Jay Solomon
Wall Street Journal
12 August 2005

New York Times
January 9, 2005
Fee archive
Html miror
PDF mirror

"The China Price"
DECEMBER 6, 2004

Why China Is Making The Valley Fret
U.S. chipmakers worry that a new Wi-Fi standard puts their businesses at risk
By Cliff Edwards, in San Mateo, Calif., with Jim Kerstetter in San Francisco, Bruce Einhorn in Hong Kong, and Paul Magnusson in Washington
Business Week
MARCH 29, 2004

Car-Parts Piracy Has Auto Makers Spinning Their Wheels
February 26, 2004

The grille looks familiar …
Western automakers are torn between the lure of the world's fast-growing market and the dismay of seeing their intellectual property 'borrowed' by the Chinese
By Tim Querengesser
The Ottawa Citizen
May 07, 2004
May have scrolled off
Mirror minus the images

Intellectual Property Rights in China: Face it or Face off
China High Tech PR ( monthly newsletter
The Hoffman Agency
December, 2003

Nissan ponders piracy suit vs China's Great Wall
Nov 28, 2003

Master of Innovation?
China aims to close its technology gap with Korea and Japan
By Bruce Einhorn in Shenzhen
Business Week
APRIL 14, 2003

When Spies Look Out For the Almighty Buck
New York Times
October 22, 1995

Gordon Housworth

InfoT Public  Intellectual Property Theft Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  


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