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Stephen Henthorne FRUSI
Director, Defense Studies Foundation
P.O. Box 13485
Alexandria, Louisiana 71315
USA

Dear Steve,

RUSI JOURNAL – FEBRUARY EDITION

I have the pleasure of enclosing a copy of the February 2002 edition of the RUSI Journal, which features your letter to the editor. Should we receive any comments about your letter from our membership, we will be sure to pass them on.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank you for your contribution. I am sure we will be in touch again in the future.

All the Best,

Terry McNamee
Editor, RUSI Journal
LETTERS

General Wesley Clark

From: General Sir Mike Jackson KCB CBE DSO ADC Gen

SIR, You offered me the opportunity of replying to the interview with General Wesley Clark, published in the December edition of the RUSI Journal. I do not believe this is the right time or place to expound in any detail my own understanding of the extraordinary events of June 1999 in Macedonia and Kosovo – such an exposition must wait. That said, a few remarks at this juncture may be worthwhile.

I recognize much of what General Clark said, and indeed agree with a good proportion – not least that wars are punctuated by sharp differences of judgement. I would add, however, that subsequent analysis by those involved is often characterized by equally sharp differences of recollection and, more importantly, understanding of what was going on. That is certainly the case on this occasion; furthermore, the interview also includes factual errors. Indeed, General Clark’s interview does not always appear to be consistent with his account of events as given in his recently published book. It should not, therefore, be taken as any form of definitive record.

One thing does need to be said now: the important role being played by Russia in the post-11 September coalition can be seen as a continuing and welcome convergence of interest between the West and Russia after the Cold War – despite the temporary disruption caused by Russia’s objections to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. General Clark may have felt able to dismiss a potentially serious confrontation with the Russian contingent on the ground at Pristina airport as ‘it wasn’t ever going to be a crisis’ – many others, including myself, had a less cavalier view.

In closing, I would emphasize that what is important about the Kosovo campaign is that NATO, led by its member Governments and military commanders at all levels, succeeded. That is the proper justification for the judgements reached and the resulting actions taken – and for those not taken.

GENERAL SIR MIKE JACKSON KCB CBE DSO ADC GEN
Commander-in-Chief, Land Command

11 September & Waging Modern War

From: Elizabeth Young (Lady Kennet)

SIR, Michael Howard’s address to the Institute on 30 October [RUSI Journal, December 2001, Mistake to Declare This a ‘War’ pp. 1-4], is – as usual – cogent and salutary: indeed, let us not be so determined to ‘keep our nerve’ that we ‘lose our heads’ in the Global Civil War that Sir Michael Alexander perceptively describes in the same issue [pp. 12-5]. (For an example of both ‘nerve’ and ‘head’ apparently lost, see David J. Smith, President of Global Horizons, Inc., writing in the December 2001 issue of RUSI’s own World Defence Systems, pp. 42-4.)

At this particular crux in human existence – and crux it is – Sir Michael Howard is perhaps too polite to mention one thing over which we should retain our heads and steel our nerve. This is the United States’ by now reckless ambition, not only to fight the ‘war on terrorism’ to some improbably total conclusion, but to achieve Full Spectrum Military Dominance (see US Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Vision 2020).

The Reports of the Commissions chaired by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld when he was in the Senate - one to assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization and the other to evaluate the threats to the US from Proliferation - also recommended that the United States take full military control of everything in sight, including comprehensive military control of space.

It is to these unwise ends that the US Armed Forces are being ‘transformed’. Several of the principles embodied in the American Constitution itself are now being dispensed with in favour of new ‘anti-terrorism’ provisions, but the military plans were there long before 11 September.

How are we in the United Kingdom and our European allies affected by these plans? We have seen the military campaign within Afghanistan conducted by the US Military, to the effective exclusion of the US State Department as well as of the other members of the swiftly gathered political ‘coalition’.

The reasons for this kind of exclusion were made clear by General Wesley Clark in his revealing interview with the Director, Waging Modern War [p. 5-11], in which he discusses his experiences during the Kosovo conflict: we others got in the way, with our inconvenient political views and our inadequate military equipment, and in future we would be kept out. Our one achievement today seems to have been the postponement of an attack on Saddam Hussein.

The political ‘coalition’, which was to fight a long term ‘war against terrorism’, has now almost dissolved, with US military victory assumed, and the US Administration hoping others of us will clear up the physical and social mess left by the bombing. The UN, rather than the US, is apparently to find the fifteen or more billion dollars currently estimated.

The result of US military action in Afghanistan - the destruction of far more than the Taliban’s infrastructure - became inevitable once the politically uncontrolled
action began in October, but what happens next is not inevitable. Any kind of ‘victory’ in a global ‘war against terrorism’ will have to be political and co-operative, and aim at both some eventual kind of ‘justice’ and at historical plausibility. The rest of us know that any ‘sea’ in which ‘terrorists swim’ will not have been dried out by smart bombing, nor will it be by ‘peacekeeping’ when the ‘peacekeepers’ (and even the ‘government’) are identified with the warmakers. How much will three months’ worth of British - or other - troops be able to do?

And meanwhile, among the opportunities determined terrorists will eventually exploit are our own (neglected) vulnerabilities. However military the United States’ response, the horrors of 11 September were non-military: exclusively within the United States’ jurisdiction, using American civil means, against mostly American civilians; and at minuscule cost to the perpetrators. All the other possible ‘Civil Pearl Harbors’, mainly electronic, to which John Deutch and the US Defense Science Board have been drawing official attention, remain.

As for the big world, the recent poll by the International Herald Tribune, the PEW Research Center and the Princeton Survey Research Association, showed that American self-esteem and self-congratulation have already gone too far for safety. Sir Michael Boyce’s address to the Institute on 10 December suggested that he at least was losing neither his nerve nor his head.

Let us hope others in Whitehall don’t either.

ELIZABETH YOUNG

From: Stephen E. Hentorne FRUSI

SIR, Sir Michael Howard is absolutely correct in ‘Mistake To Declare This A “War” ’ [December 2001 RUSI Journal] that this is not, nor will ever be a ‘War’, in the traditional sense of the word. The constant analogies with Pearl Harbor go little farther than that both 7 December 1941 and 11 September 2001 were sneak attacks on a seriously unprepared United States. And attempts to use 11 September 2001 as a rallying cry (like ‘Remember Pearl Harbor’) to bind the country together and forge a common national focus, as in 1941, have failed miserably - aside from selling a lot of flags, buttons, pins and patriotic clothing.

When Sir Michael wrote ‘but in six months time for much of the world that atrocity will be, if not forgotten then remembered only as history’, he was far more accurate than even he may have realized. For the majority of the US population, it has indeed become more than an historical blip on the radar screen. That said, 11 September will be paraded out every year, politicians will thump their chests, and much speechmaking will be heard in the halls of Congress; but it will never be the compelling cause that Pearl Harbor remains today. The reason is that, unlike Pearl Harbor (despite what some historians may say), there is growing evidence that the tragic events of 11 September could have been heavily blunted, if not completely prevented. Our government just simply ignored warning after warning, and continually tempted fate.

There are a great many Americans who are complete-ly convinced that we are involved in this ‘War’ today for no other reason than for the United States Government to save face, to attempt to deflect attention away from our cavalier lack of preparedness, to cover up decades without a viable foreign policy, and our unmitigated arrogance in practically inviting an eventual terrorist attack. I hate to believe that all those people died on 11 September, and in the military actions afterwards, because of those very reasons, but that is exactly what I do believe.

In our arrogance, and that of our Western Allies as well, we have completely discounted the Islamic world with impunity for centuries, and now the worm is painfully turning. The irony is that we have trained their leaders, and given them the weaponry and wherewithal to bite the hand that has condescendingly fed them. In their naïveté, we created the very monsters that now attack us, believing that we could easily control them with, as Sir Michael wrote, the superior ‘secular and materialistic culture of the West’.

As Americans, we are constantly told by our media that ‘our lives changed forever on 11 September’. Well yes they’ve changed, in that perhaps our public transportation has gotten worse, our freedom of movement is more restricted, and we’ve been stampeded into a headlong rush to trade our civil liberties for more ‘security’.

I strongly agree with Sir Michael’s prophesy that even more disastrous than the prolongation of the war would be its extension, into ‘a Long March through other rogue states beginning with Iraq, in order to eradicate terrorism for good and all so that the world can live at peace’. The involvement of the United States in military conflicts simply to save face is nothing really new. That’s why I found Admiral Cobbold’s interview with General Wesley K. Clark, also in the December Journal, so interesting. The decision to take military action against Yugoslavia boiled down to being purely personal, and punitive, on the part of General Wesley Clark and Secretary of State Madeline Albright. In the end, the decision to bomb Yugoslavia served to cover up the fact that the United States had no effective foreign policy, nor an effective Secretary of State. The military intervention and the bombing campaign were unnecessary.

The strategic environment we face today is very different to that of the previous fifty years. But both the Europeans and Americans have failed in meeting the new challenges. Will NATO’s military actions in Yugoslavia ‘help Europe move from stability based on fear?’ My concern is that our refusal to learn from the past mistakes made in the Balkans might haunt us all for a very long time. Effective diplomacy should not be based on the tip of a missile, or on the sole, un-becoming, principles of the economics of saving face. Might has proven not to make right, especially in the hands of arrogant amateurs.

In truth, General Clark was relieved of his command because he was the ultimate arrogant amateur. The fact that Washington went around him to deal with General Mike Jackson directly suggests that his forthcoming relief should not have been either ‘stunning’ or ‘surprising’ to him, as he remarked in the interview. General Clark, in classic protective ‘pass-the-buck’ style, intimate-
Kosovo, which was 'a blow to the idea of an Allied chain of command'. 'The consequences', he added, 'are present today in Afghanistan in the US's disinclination to involve its Allies in the conflict', thus suggesting that unified command has proven less than successful for the United States. I would agree with General Clark that unified command has not proven successful for the United States: in two previous cases, the subordinate commanders, Generals Jackson and de la Billiere, clearly saw the command shortcomings of their appointed superiors. The major difference between those two British Generals was that General Jackson had Washington's support in doing something about it. The bottom line is that General Clark wasn't stabbed in the back by anyone. He shot himself in the foot.

Responding to Admiral Cobbold's concluding question about how he saw the future of the Alliance, General Clark replied, 'I'm troubled... the conflict seemed to wedge open the disagreement and fundamental divergent views of Allies on either side of the Atlantic... we still need to take full advantage of the lessons of the conflict and to strengthen those [Transatlantic] linkages'. I would submit that one of the best lessons learned was seemingly taught by General Mike Jackson: to quote Mrs. Ronald Reagan, sometimes 'just say no', even if it's to the Supreme Allied Commander.

STEPHEN E. HENTHORNE FRUSI
Director, Defense Studies Foundation, USA

RAB in the Ministry of Defence:
A Response

From: Professor Keith Hartley

SIR, There is much that I agree with and welcome in Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh’s letter [December 2001]. However, I would like to comment on three issues.

First, I recognize that in assessing defence choices and efficiency, a distinction needs to be made between information available to MoD and that available to Parliament and voters. In reviewing the development of MoD budgeting, the Functional Costing approach was an improvement over the traditional 'input' budgets. Functional Costings provided Parliament and voters (taxpayers) with some valuable information on 'trade-offs' and it is interesting to read Sir Nigel’s conclusion that ‘... they did not enable anyone, neither MoD nor Parliament, to make genuine choices...’. Presumably, similar problems arose with the replacement for PPBS, namely, the New Management Strategy. In the light of such an admission, voters are now entitled to ask how defence choices were made and how efficiently, over the years 1960 to 2001, before the new enlightenment of RAB?

Second, Sir Nigel states that defence-choices ‘...should be policy related rather than resource driven.’ To avoid any misunderstanding, I would wish to add that defence choices should be resource-constrained. There are limits to our ability and willingness to pay for defence.

Professor Keith Hartley
Director, Centre for Defence Economics
University of York

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The RUSI JOURNAL welcomes correspondence from readers on articles or reviews, topics they would like to see covered and other matters arising from discussions in the Journal.

The free exchange of views in the JOURNAL is an important part of the Institute’s role as an open forum for debate on all issues of defence, military science and security and we value contributions from readers at every level. We prefer letters to carry the correspondent’s name but please indicate if you wish your name to be withheld and supply a nom de plume if you wish to use one. Anonymous letters will not be considered.