General Peter J. Schoomaker
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army
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Washington, DC 20310-0200

RE: Assessing and enhancing the Army’s capabilities to conduct long-term stability/civil-military operations.

Sir:

I was recently advised, by colleagues at the U.S. Army War College, of your intent for the U.S. Army to make an all out effort to improve its capacity to conduct Stability/Civil-Military Operations, and to bring the Army into compliance with the wishes of the Secretary of Defense that “The CJCS, SOCOM and the Service Secretaries will adjust their doctrine, organizations, training, and exercise plans to ensure that U.S. forces develop a core competency in stability operations capabilities.”

Having worked in these functional areas for almost thirty years, as well as a Visiting (IPA) Professor of Civil-Military Relations at the U.S. Army War College and a Professor of Civil-Military Operations here at the Joint Readiness Training Center, I must respectfully tell you that there are a plethora of reasons why that goal, while laudable and truly necessary, is doomed to failure; at least in our lifetime.

The task that you have taken on, to improve the Army’s capability to conduct long-term stability operations, will ultimately fail; not because you aren’t an excellent leader, and not because you won’t put forth a gallant effort, but rather because the cards, and time, are stacked against you. Neither you, nor any other Chief of Staff will be in your office long enough to make it happen. The maneuver mind set in the Army will wait you out, and in the end very little change will be accomplished.

In 1994, Colonel Dennis J. Quinn, in his book “Peace Support Operations and the United States Military,” (NDU Press), pointed out that “as we look to the future peace, now “stability”, support operations, there are a number of areas where actions can be taken now, which will pay significant dividends in the mission area at the time of

1 In 2000, During the early days of the Administration of Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, the terms “Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, etc.” were stricken from the U.S. Military lexicon. They were replaced by “Stability Operations.”
execution. Some initiatives must be done within the U.S. defense establishment, while others will require the cooperation and participation of our likely allies in such operations, as well as representatives of the UN and NATO.”

“If the United States sees a larger role for American involvement in peace, now “stability,” support operations, then our force structure must be suited to the mission. I do not believe that any nation can afford to form a special organization within its armed forces exclusively for peacekeeping, now “stability operations,” tasks. General purpose forces, trained and equipped for conventional combat operations, should always provide the back bone of any peace, now “stability,” support operations. Earmarking of these units for these missions should not be necessary. What will be required is specialized training. Units should undergo training programs on peace, now “stability” support operations on a periodic basis. Officers and non-commissioned officers could receive instruction during their professional development courses. When a particular unit is alerted for such duty, then specific area-oriented training could be conducted.”

You might well say that such training is currently being conducted at our various national training centers, the NTC/JRTC, around the country. Unfortunately, setting aside the fact that neither the quality, nor quantity, of that type of training is really happening, there are three main reasons why the current initiative to ensure that U.S. Forces, in this case the U.S. Army, develop a core competency in stability operations capabilities will fail, as it has failed repeatedly through at least the last three administrations, i.e.: (1.) The inability, or unwillingness, of the maneuver leadership of the U.S. Army to truly embrace Stability/Civil-Military Operations as the major military mission of the 21st. Century. (2.) The fog of tons of conflicting doctrine which increasingly bogs the U.S. Army down. (3.) The fact that the training system of the U.S. Army is seriously divided, diverted, and just plain broken; especially at our national training centers (CTCs). For the last year at JRTC, at NTC, at Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, in Germany, and in Hawaii, I have been compiling data that shows an ugly pattern. Keep in mind that this is just for one year, but I believe this to be a consistent pattern and it has created a real need for major improvements in how the Army trains its soldiers for 21st Century Operations, in general, and for Stability/Civil-Military Operations in particular. Of course keeping in mind that the arena for today's maneuver commander is always a fluid target.

- The inability, or unwillingness, of the maneuver leadership of the U.S. Army to truly embrace Stability/Civil-Military Operations as the major military mission of the 21st. Century.

The need for the United States military to, more fully, embrace Stability/Civil-Military Operations is crystal clear; to everyone except seemingly the United States military. It is extremely unclear as to whether the U.S. Military, particularly the United States Army, because of its obvious claim to significance to peace operations, does actually learn from their past experiences in Stability/Civil-Military Operations, and if so how?
In 1996, Captain Chris Seiple, USMCR, wrote in “The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions,” that “For the near future our military is more likely to participate in humanitarian interventions and in peacekeeping than it is to participate in war or in peace enforcement. In humanitarian interventions the military must work with civilians who are only not under the same operational control, but whose field workers often claim substantial autonomy. Further, part of the military’s mission is to work its way out of a job, to transfer its temporarily assumed duties to NGOs and other civilian authorities.”

Further, the “The U.S. military/NGO relationship is a fundamental trait of our present and the era into which we are entering. It’s proclamation is two fold: (1.) Interagency /multinational coordination will only increase; (2.) The role of civilians in military operations, no matter how pure the “battlefield,” will also only increase. Whether it is humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, or nation assistance, the NGO’s and the military will interact. It is the responsibilities of both communities to understand and work at this relationship prior to its implementation in the field.”

Time has proven Captain Seiple, and other Civil-Military scholars, absolutely correct on both counts; ie: the U.S. Armed Forces have participated in more humanitarian interventions, than in war fighting missions, and the need for the military to interact with civilians in the “battlespace” has never been greater. Yet never has the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Army, dug its heels in more to resist its obvious leadership role in stability, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, or nation assistance operations. The attitude is one of “don’t bother us with the truth, we are too busy preparing to fight a conventional war on two fronts.”

That head and feet in the sand attitude, plus the almost paranoid need for the U.S. Military (Army) to cling to ultra enhanced “Force Protection” doctrines, has rendered it all but impotent in stability or transitional operations other than war (OOTW). The general feeling in the U.S. military is one of “let someone else do it. We don’t do meals on wheels deals. We’re Warfighters, not Social Workers”

Granted the primary mission of the U.S. Military, especially the U.S. Army is “to fight and win the nation’s wars.” The concept doesn’t seem to have caught hold with the U.S. Army that (1.) effective Stability/Civil-Military Operations can prevent future wars, and that (2.) effective Stability/Civil-Military Operations can be a force multiplier, serving to enhance post conflict stability operations, more peaceful transition to a civil government, and an early stabilized end

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2 Anecdotal - The Theater Force Protection policies rarely addressed the threat. In Bosnia, a four vehicle, up- armored HMMWV convoy was required in the Serb sectors. The Serbs never once attacked U.S. Troops, even during the Kosovo Air Campaign. In addition, the four vehicles were actually a detriment on the narrow Bosnian roads and only served to aggravate and anger the local population (damage & traffic jams). However, CA patrols were given a “special operations” status in the Balkans and Afghanistan. (This is primarily because no one really knows what CA is.) They were often allowed to move around in non-armored non-tactical vehicles (SUVs) with little or no communications, weapon systems or a good location of where they are in the AO.
state. It’s a “no brainer”—successful Stability/Civil-Military Operations means the troops come home sooner, and are less likely to have to go back.

The U.S. Army’s sense of itself does not include fond memories of peacekeeping (Stability/Civil-Military Observations) operations. There were such memorable low spots such as Cambodia, 1975, Honduras, 1983 & again in 1988, El Salvador, 1989, Somalia, 1991 and Rwanda, 1994. Perhaps when 9/11 happened, and especially during the ramp up for the Iraqi Punitive Expedition, that the Department of Defense didn’t want to be bothered with planning for Post Conflict Stability Operations. At the War College we were tasked with serving as support for the “Garner Group,” who basically ignored any/all guidance for Stability/Civil-Military Operations; as have all key decision makers since.

Combat operations require only that a military force confronts armed adversaries in order to defend or conquer territory. That is clean, simple, and for the most part involves no paradigm shift in out of the box thinking. Military success is easily obtained, and the troops go home. However the major problem is often how the military determines success.

Stability/Civil-Military operations, in which military personnel confront needy civilian populations and seemingly alien species of intergovernmental, non-governmental and various other players in order to advance a peace process seems quite different, far less straightforward, and completely over the heads of most military commanders. As a result the U.S. Armed Forces in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have continually reinvented the Civil-Military Relations wheel when planning, and training, for both Combat and Operations Other Than War. Almost no lesson from the past has escaped going unlearned. As a result military operations drag out, far longer than anticipated or advertised, transition to a civil authority is delayed, and long term stability never seems to come. All of this keeps troops deployed far longer than necessary, resulting in higher casualties for both military personnel and civilians. Yet all of these side effect events seem to generate severe shock, awe and surprise for both military commanders and the civilian leadership as well when they inevitably occur.

Unlearned lessons bring fear of the unknown which causes hesitation, and as Adlai Stevenson famous quote says “On the plains of hesitation lie the blackened bones of countless millions who at the dawn of victory lay down to rest, and in resting died.” For examples of lessons unlearned causing hesitation and un-necessary casualties we need look no farther back than Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and most recently Iraq. The problems currently being encountered in Iraq, are the direct result of not learning from the lessons of Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The U.S. Military has perfected lessons unlearned into almost a new art form, and until that trend is reversed all the combat skills perfected, and all the up to date weaponry made available,

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3 This is the whole fundamental reason for the EBO/non-lethal fires targeting.

4 In General Frank’s Book—“American Soldier,” he goes into great length talking about his concept for post conflict stability operations. He also goes into equal length discussing his frustration with the institutional stubbornness from the JCS about their willingness to conducting Joint Operations on all levels.
aren’t going to help snatch victory from the jaws of defeat; or peace from war. We are failing to secure peace and stability overseas because we are not training properly for it at home. At least the U.S. Army isn’t training properly for stability operations at home. The major parts of this new type of operation are either missing or seriously wounded in training. We have a great opportunity to change that for the better at JRTC/NTC, but there seems to be little movement in that direction.

Further complicating the Army’s successful transition to Stability/Civil-Military Operations is quite simply what I label “Maneuver Warfighter Arrogance,” as is often demonstrated by “Combat Arms” in working with other branches like Civil-Affairs, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, etc. Then as further demonstrated against the Reserve and National Guard by the Regular Army. Quite simply the U.S. Army has indeed become, as it advertises itself, an “Army of One;” one branch vs. another branch, the active component vs. the Reserves and National Guard. The U.S. Army, and all of its components have never been less of a team.

The historic high point of Warfighter arrogance came in the summer of 2002, when the United States Army, desperately needing expertise in peacekeeping and stability operations, moved to disband the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute; the only such organization in the U.S. Military at large that had the expertise to provide the Army staff, or an Army commander, or a combatant commander, with access to what he or she needs in terms of resources, information, context, contacts in the civilian side of stability operations, concepts and doctrine, to prepare the Army for successful stability operations.

The Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict had been similarly closed in 1995 and was not replaced. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, which focused on peace operations, was scheduled to close effective 1 October 2003. TRADOC and JFWC had very limited assets dedicated to stability operations: one officer at Leavenworth (TRADOC) and one officer supported by a contract (JFWC); all stability rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center, at Fort Polk, had been stopped as well by 2001.

Yet the Warfighters wanted the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute closed, simply because peacekeeping, in the minds of the national military command structure, had come to equate to nation building, nation building equated to long term intervention, and the U.S. military just wasn’t going to take on long term intervention, because it did not meet the military’s criteria for declaring early success and going home. The plan was to get in, whack the bad guys, turn the stability process over to international peacekeepers, and have U.S. forces "home by Christmas." It has never worked out that way because of an intrinsic failure, on the part of the U.S. military national command structure, to understand Civil-Military Operations and the direct impact those operations have on follow on stability operations.

Fortunately in the aftermath of the combat phase of the punitive expedition into Iraq, when it became obvious to the U.S.Congress, and the worldwide media, that the United States military had won the combat war but was in serious danger of losing the peace, was the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute saved. Unfortunately, most of the staff had
gone, the records and archives had been placed in suspended animation, and very valuable time had been lost, diverting PKI away from its areas of expertise, and more valuable time will be lost bringing it back up to its full operational capability. Did the U.S. military save the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute because it recognized that it truly needed its expertise, or was this just an attempt for the national military command structure to, as they say in theatre terms, “look good from the twenty-third row?” Only time will tell, but heads buried in the sand for decades do not clear overnight, and this has created a reluctance, on the part of the new U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, to engage with the Army at large. A year later it remains unfunded, and bypassed operationally, yet is still the Army’s best asset for improving the Army’s capacity to fully conduct Stability/Civil-Military Operations.

There are volumes of current high points in Warfighter arrogance, far too many to cover in the limited time and space here. However, I would be very willing to provide any or all of those examples any time you, or anyone else, might care to take a look at them.

2. The fog of tons of conflicting doctrine which increasingly bogs the U.S. Army down.

In all honesty there is so much Army, and Joint, Doctrine in print at this time, that needs to be de-conflicted, I hardly know where to start. I would highly recommend that the U.S. Army freeze all doctrine in place, and de-conflict what doctrine it has, before continuing to just crank it out; considering of course that anyone is really reading it.

If your intent is to truly improve the U.S. Army’s capability to conduct Stability/Civil-Military Operations then the first areas that need immediate de-confliction, are the four current species of “Information Operations (IO),” it’s illegitimate step child “Effects Based Operations (EBO),” its cousin “Tactical Human Intelligence Operations (TACHUMINT-OPS),” and how they are all to interact with the long established, and highly effective, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. Current conflicting doctrine is only perpetuating training and operational failures. Those failures, in turn, are directly causing failure in national policy, as well as injury and death for all sides in both OIF/OEF.

The immediate benefit that can be realized by de-conflicting doctrine, and better defining missions, is an end to the existing constant inter-branch turf wars, that divert time, manpower and money away from the primary mission---realizing successful Stability/Civil Operations. Such de-confliction would also prevent the phenomenal waste caused by duplication/triplication of efforts, in both training and in the areas of operation.

However the U.S. Military seems to be rushing head long in the opposite direction. Currently being written is the new “Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations,” which hardly devotes any space at all for Civil-Military Operations, while at the same time generates streams of additional text relating to Information Operations.
The Department of the Army, including yourself as the Chief of Staff, has long advocated that the Army should bring itself more in line with Joint Doctrine. The key Joint Doctrine most often quoted, regarding stability operations, being “Joint Publication 3-57: Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

That is the one publication that comes closest to clearly defining Civil-Military Operations (CMO) as “being a responsibility of the entire command.” In fact clearly stating that CMO “are an inherent responsibility of command.” (It does not say that the individual components are an inherent responsibility of command.) Joint force commanders (JFCs) are mandated to integrate civil affairs (CA) (i.e., those specialized units trained to plan and conduct CA activities) with other military forces (e.g., PSYOPS, IO, maneuver, health service, military police, engineering, transportation, and other special operations forces) and civilian organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental) to provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO. While CA are the “bedrock” facilitating application of these selected capabilities, this joint publication (JP) reflects the transition from a primarily CA approach to the broader and over-arching concept of CMO. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces.

The Joint Publication goes on to state:

- CMO occur in virtually every operation across the range of military operations. CMO may be conducted to support a counterinsurgency program, and serve as a catalyst to affect all foreign internal defense (FID) programs. The relative effort and resources devoted to CMO vary with the nature and type of the joint force’s primary mission.

- During war, CMO will be important for supporting combat operations where goals include winning quickly with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners.

- During the onset of combat operations, resources devoted to CMO will be small in comparison to those directed at warfighting. Additionally, nonmilitary players such as NGOs and international organizations that may have been present prior to the conflict will likely find their capacities exceeded by the increased need for relief. Military forces must therefore be prepared to assume responsibility in organizing the relief effort and achieving unity of effort among the myriad of nonmilitary players likely to be present. CA are specifically trained and organized to provide the coordination necessary to facilitate this mission. In such situations, CMO can make significant contributions.

- Conversely, when the joint force’s primary mission is CMO, resources devoted to support combat forces maybe minimal in comparison to that of forces and assets with specific capabilities to provide relief to the populace in the operational area. Many military operations other than war (MOOTW) will fall between these two extremes with a balanced effort to provide
stability using both combat forces to defeat hostile forces and CMO assets to strengthen the civilian infrastructure, (and it should say "provide stability, which the need of," may arise as a result of military operations.

The bottom line here is that Stability Operations have already been well defined within the definition of Civil-Military Operations, and the primary responsibility for conducting Civil-Military Operations has long been well established as being that of Civil-Affairs. Further that the creators of doctrine have been extremely successful at establishing that equation, i.e.: CMO = CA, and visa versa, within the United States Military. My question is why are Information Operations (IO), and Effects Based Operations (EBO) now being allowed to further fog up an, here-to-fore, fairly clear operational playing field?

The common belief in the ranks is that it is to give Field Artillery personnel, every increasingly threatened with career loss, a place to go and a job to do. However for whatever the reason the fog of confusion being generated by this conflict of purpose, and doctrine, is contributing to CMO failure in both training and in the conduct of deployment missions.

In any event, the voluminous amount of current doctrine, the conflicts within current doctrine, and the less than adequate training being provided to Civil-Affairs personnel, has clearly created a situation whereby Civil Affairs, the key element in conducting Stability/Civil-Military Operations has a 100% failure rate in the preparation of maneuver Brigade Combat Teams during pre-deployment training.

(3.) The fact that the training system of the U.S. Army is seriously divided, diverted, and just plain broken; especially at our national training centers.

The ARMY is a big component in the area of planning, training, and equipment, spending billions every year to train the troops to be the very best killing machines available, and how to use these machines in combat operations to overwhelm their enemies. The ARMY is also a big player in Warfighter Exercises to help simulate the conditions in a battlefield environment and to coordinate with other elements that might be used in such exercises. These are great tools to use for Combat Operations during the first phases of the war to get the job done.

From vast personal experience I can tell you that STX, FTX, and Warfighters total focus is on defeating the bad guy which takes up 95% of the play at these events. Of course, these elements are made for and controlled by Maneuver elements which are the backbone of today's Army. These are the best and fastest killing machines known to man at this time. Our Army has the best equipment, best technology, best combat training, and best personnel to defeat any enemy in the world. For the last 200 years, the Army Maneuver Commander has been there to carry out their missions to win over any foe that may be in their way.
Since the Army Maneuver Cmdr is the best at what he does, you would call on him to eliminate any enemy that posed a threat to the U.S. and feel comfortable that he would be able to do that job. He would be considered an expert in his field of combat operations since that has been his primary focus in his career. However, today's new brand of warfare has change the way the Army needs to do business. Unconventional Warfare (UW) is an ever-changing environment and unpredictable at best. The Maneuver Commander needs more skill sets.

My data shows me that Civil Affairs has a 100% failure rate when CA is TASKORG below the BDE element. In all cases of TASKORG at Direct Support to a Task Force or Company level, CA has failed to produce a product for the supporting unit in 3 to 6 days in 12 to 14 day rotations. In all cases of DS, at TF/Company level has not been able to produce dedicated security, provide communications, and provide support for CA missions, for vehicles, for personnel, or for CMO meeting sites.

In most cases, the supporting element have put CA in the wrong tactical environment due to a failure of the (SU) situational understanding of what CA's role is. In the new (UA)Units of Action, all the same problems have carried over to meet the same fate. Although only three UA rotations has been supported at JRTC, it is evident that the same problems have followed CA at JRTC and have not been corrected.

The bottom line is that, because of a lack of proactive training, either at NTC/JRTC, or by USACAPOC, supporting units do not have a grasp on how to employ and track the CA support, vital to their mission success in OEF/OIF, or any other "O". The OIF/OEF theater has posed serious problems that are not the case with Bosnia rotations. OEF/OIF are quite different than Bosnia, and those Bosnian Templates just will not work in Iraq or Afghanistan. The threat environment is far more harsh, and with BDE elements trying to get up to speed on all the new elements and personnel that they are responsible for training has been a challenge. The bottom line being that the bulk of the BDE missions are CMO weighted, but the training that they receive does not match that weighted responsibility.

Let’s look at some of the training shortfalls just at the JRTC:

1. CMO Scenario Weight

Current Scenarios are weighted to heavily toward the combat and tactical operations side. While understanding the need to test the tactical proficiency of a unit going down range, JRTC also has an obligation to accurately reflect what is occurring down range in order to prepare the RTU for deployment. Currently CMO is the primary mission of most units (even Combat Arms) down range and reflects approximately 75-80% of down range operations. This is even more important in an MRE, which is designed specifically to prepare the unit for going down range. We have to set the scenario and achieve a proper balance in which we can test the unit tactically and still reflect the current situation as it relates to CMO. This simply isn’t happening and it is having a direct negative impact on insurgency operations, both in training and in the real area of operations. Our combat maneuver mindset first is only serving to increase resistance. Bottom line is that our troops can do little to bring about stability and peace if they aren’t being trained for that job. Civil-Military Operations are
failing because of an inability, and in many cases an unwillingness, of
the Army leadership to transition from warfighting to post conflict
stability operations; from what they know, and understand, to what they
don’t want to know and understand.

I would also add that the perverse reaction of the Civilians on
the Battlefield (COBs) at the Combat Training Centers do nothing to re-
encode the maneuver commander’s appreciation of CMO. I can speak
personally for the new JRTC/MRE scenario, and for similar scenarios at
the NTC, as well. The CA teams would go into a town, win the people
over with some good works and it had little or no effect on their
behavior in follow-on operations. It was as though there was no prior
interaction with the CA teams. The COBs were only doing what they were
scripted to do, which was very unrealistic human behavior. This only
taught the maneuver commander that the interaction by the CA teams have
little or no effect on the events in his AOR and that he should simply
focus his war-fighting skills in all likelihood to be used on the
civilians.

2. FORSCOM Training Guidance

FORSCOM needs to provide specific Stability/CMO related training
guidance. Currently there is minimal, if any, guidance that can be
related to CMO even under the SOSO or IO related task. CMO task should
be specific and separate from IO task and it should start at the
FORSCOM level.

3. JRTC – CMO\CA and IO

JRTC needs to define CMO and the role of CA and how it relates to
IO and Vice Versa. Currently there is a push to lump many of the CMO
related task into IO, which comes from a misunderstanding of both
concepts. This misunderstanding seems to across much of Plans as well
as the Observer/Controllers (O/Cs). They should be synchronized,
compliment each other but be seen as separate. IO should always be
seen as an extension of the 3 and not as a separate BOS. Additionally
the 5 should always be seen as the primary Staff Officer responsible
for planning and implementing CMO.

4. CMO\CA Education

CA should take a more active role in educating RTUs on CMO and
the capabilities and integration of CA. To facilitate this we need to
fill several of the positions at both JRTC and NTC with competent CA
soldiers as O/Cs/trainers. We need to confirm the status of the 2 AGR
positions at SOT-D that were supposedly approved but have yet to be
filled. Additionally the 18 series slot at SOT-D that is the SNR CA
O/C E-8 slot should also be filled with an AGR soldier or when the
active MOS (38B) comes into being this year. This education needs to
start with JRTC Plans and O/Cs as well.

5. Additional Fund Training and Integration

JRTC needs to step up the FUND play and O/C coverage during
rotation. Funds continue to be an issue and will be down range. This
will send soldiers and Commanders to jail if not handled properly.
JRTC needs to have additional instruction on fund related issues, pay
agents and the like for the RTU. Additionally JRTC needs to make fund tracking a priority during rotations. Currently there is no total accountability at the end of a rotation or is it covered in the AAR. This is probably due to the close proximity of ENDEX to AAR times. Recommend forcing the unit to pull back all unused funds, account for spent funds and cover the shortcomings in the AAR. JRTC and the RTU will be surprised. The end result of a lack of knowledge on funding is that no commander wants to spend any money on his/her watch.

6. CMOC purpose and integration:

This important CMO component is totally misunderstood, under trained, and almost intentionally minimized in training. CMO is almost completely eliminated from the BDE AAR at the end of the exercise.

7. Project Process and knowledge:

This whole key issue to providing successful Stability/Civil-Military Operations is almost totally lacking U.S. Army wide. The mindset being if it can’t be outsourced it is to be avoided.

8. Integrate CAPOC JRTC training objectives:

Additionally USACAPOC should facilitate this and do at a minimum an annual review of the objectives. USACAPOC’ lack of attention to its personnel assignment issues adds greatly to the failure of Civil-Military Operations, both in training and in the Area of Operations.

9. The litany of BDE and CA problems in training, which carry over into the mission AO:

A. LTPs (Pre-rotation)

1. CA not invited to attend in planning scenarios of rotations.
2. Maneuver units have no prior use of CERP Funding or Comptrollers (which only exist to support CMO, as per Doctrine JP 3-57, Chap 3,p22)
3. Maneuver units do not have a Bde S5 and are not trained for that position (usually filled by a organic senior officer to represent CA/CMO effort) not recommended only a quick fix, Both AC and NG units function the same in this regard.)
4. No understanding of how to TASKORG or employ CA units.
5. Capability Briefs are disregarded.
6. No understanding of how CA needs to be supported for rotation or deployment
7. No pre-rotational details coordinated.
8. No sharing of Units TACSOPs.
9. No CPX play for CA units.
10. No CA specifics in creation in rotational base order
11. LTPs are trained along maneuver agenda only.
12. No special classes to reflect non-lethal slices prior to rotation.
B. Rotations on the ground

1. CA Units are not trained on radio communications and procedures, No SOIs.
2. Radios that units have, do not work with the supporting units radios.
3. CA has not been trained on their own battle-tracking systems or TOC Ops.
4. BDE maneuver staffs do not integrate well with CA.
5. CA units do not have their own CA TACSOPs.
6. CA has no training in COMBAT/CONVOY OPS until they get to a CTC CENTER.
7. CA members are not prepared to deliver CA Capabilities Briefs or even understand them.
8. CA TASKORG does not work well below BDE level.
9. Neither CA, nor BDEs understand the different funding sources and how they work for CA or BDE. For instance, there’s a good reason why the Bde S5 doesn’t track the Bde’s CERP, IT’S NOT THE S5’s JOB! However the JRTC seems to think it is. It belongs to the S4/S8.
10. CA rarely trains with a maneuver element before JRTC/NTC, and the CA unit a BDE trains with is rarely the unit the BDE will deploy with.
11. No one has trained Maneuver Cmdrs/Staffs how to use and employ CA Units.
12. CA are rarely trained on combat driving skills until they get to theater.
13. CA has not been trained on Project Nominations or how to submit them for approval.
14. Neither BDE nor CA have even very little, if any, knowledge on working with outside agencies (USAID, IOs, NGOs.)
15. CA negotiations skills are very poor, need to be creative and adopt cultural awareness, yet at JRTC/NTC they are not part of the main "Engagements" training. I’ve been able to give only very short one to two hour classes on a hit or miss basis to both CA & PSYOPS.
16. CA does not have adequate CLS personnel/training.
17. The Fog of IO/EBO seems to be creating a great deal of confusion within the rotational BDEs, and how the BDEs utilize CA, and even PSYOPS to some extent.
18. The mis-use of what IO/EBO tasks the BDEs execute seem to be rewarded, rather than punished. This simply re-enforces bad behavior overseas.
19. SOTD CA At JRTC, and their counterparts at NTC, have been operating with almost no real personnel depth for far too long.

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5 Many of the maneuver units, particularly ARNG, poorly select or do not understand what type of person should be the S5. Since these units don’t really do CMO back at their home units, the S5 kind of becomes a morphed PAO/Protocol Officer/Party & Parade Planner. It becomes an excess slot for someone who wants to become a Major and these ARNG units only authorize an MTOE of two personnel in the S5 section (the S5 and the driver/clerk). I have also heard from many of these maneuver folks in the S5 sections at BDE and BN that they refer to themselves as the Civil Affairs team. I usually, politely as I can through clenched teeth, have to tell them that Civil Affairs is a branch/functional area (38A). There is a school and other training involved. Just because I know how to put on a band-aid, doesn’t mean I can represent myself as a doctor.
This only further serves to decrease those very few opportunities to train rotational BDES in Stability/Civil-Military Operations.

20. The JRTC/NTC is attempting to replicate, in a very unrealistically short time frame, what these BDES will face in OIF/OEF in a year’s time. It is unrealistic, a truly re-enforces the old adage that “haste makes waste.” In this particular case haste perpetuates failures, and costs lives.

Conclusion:

In my view we are failing to secure peace and stability overseas because we are not training properly for it in here in the United States. The JRTC, NTC and CTCs, are training ground for maneuver commanders. The ground truth is that none of them do a very good job of training those maneuver commanders in the skills necessary to conduct successful Civil-Military Operations (CMO), and CMO IS THE MANEUVER COMMANDER’S MISSION, NOT THE CA COMMANDER’S MISSION. It’s a systemic issue that is larger than just a Civil-Affairs issue.

This failure isn’t new, nor are the attempts to correct it. Turning again Colonel Dennis J. Quinn, in his book entitled “Peace Support Operations and The U.S. Military,” he highlights our failure to work effectively with the United Nations, as a mission enhancement partner in Stability and Civil-Military Operations. We are now, in the wake of OIF/OEF turning to the United Nations for just that kind of support, but our military has almost no in-depth experience at working with either the United Nations organization in New York, Geneva, or United Nations Troops in the Field. I am probably one of the very few Americans to hold the United Nations Post Graduate Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations, or to have attended the United Nations Military Observer Course.

Colonel Quinn points out that “the United States initially signaled its backing for United Nations involvement in peace operations in 1992. President Bush, in his September 21, 1992, address to the General Assembly, offered measured support and directed the Secretary of Defense to initiate several actions which would enhance the capability of the U.S. Military to work with the United Nations. In addition he called on the Secretary of Defense to establish a “permanent peacekeeping curriculum” in U.S. military schools.

In turn President Clinton called for pretty much the same sort of training to enable our troops to function positively with United Nations forces in joint operations. The training never really took place, and failures in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia led the United States to realign its position where the UN is concerned, and from 1993 until just recently we have drifted away from the wholehearted support of United Nations peace (stability) operations. Our troops will, no doubt, be asked to work in the future with United Nations troops, with still no training being provided on how to work with them. This lack of training, piled on top of the Stability/CMO training they aren’t receiving, will only serve to perpetuate mission failures and further loss of life.
I believe that an additional reason that we (the US Military) will have a difficult time building a post-conflict stability operations international coalition is not because of what Presidential-Hopeful Kerry calls "the arrogance of George Bush". I think that in many ways it is more of a practical decision on the part of our sometimes allies to join or not. They know that if we did most of the bludgeoning during the fight, we will want to call the shots after the fight. Seems fair to me. However, since our military has limited to no knowledge on NATO peacekeeping ops, UN peacekeeping ops, CIMIC ops, etc. our allies are probably reluctant to get battered about by us during these clean-up ops. Now while the US definitely produces the best "natural born killers" on the block. Our allies are already light years ahead of the U.S. Army, although possibly not of the U.S. Marine Corps, in conducting stability operations. As a result, it would be like their taking several steps back in time, on the CMO side, for them to join us on these operations. We also have many more legal funding barriers than they do on humanitarian assistance, and dare I say it "nation building ops," which makes it even more difficult for us to work seamlessly within joint stability/civil-military operations.

However, someday soon the Neanderthal approach to training troops has to replaced by more mission specific training. The troops expect to be trained for their "CMO" missions when they arrive at the JRTC/NTC, and what they get is maneuver, combat specific training. Perhaps these NG troops that are being labeled "Lazy," and "Unfit," are just tired of exercise, after exercise to improve only their combat maneuver skills. To use the popular quote around here "They got it!" "They got JRTC'd"--they get the combat skills message load and clear. What they aren't getting is the Stability/Civil-Military Operations message that they need to perform the rest of the 80% of their current mission in OIF/OEF.

What will replace the Neanderthal approach to training? In a recent article in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, entitled "Culture-Centric Warfare," by Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (Retired), General Scales comments on the needed reforms of the military learning systems, i.e., "This new era requires soldiers equipped with exceptional cultural awareness and an intuitive sense of the nature and character of war, but where will this culture-centric learning take place? Unfortunately, higher level military colleges and schools fail to meet this need. Very few military leaders are fortunate enough to be selected to attend institutions that teach war, and those who are, are chosen based on job performance rather than excellence of intellect. Personnel policies affecting the purpose of senior military education have transformed these institutions partly into meeting places to achieve inter-service, interagency, and international comity, at the expense of the depth and rigor of war studies. Thus the central elements necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and character of war—military history, along with war games, military psychology and leadership—(and I would add exposure to the humanitarian needs of war)—often are slighted in an effort to teach every subject to every conceivable constituency to the lowest common denominator." In the case of the Army this is one reason why the Army education and training system is so broken.
The difficulties in Iraq today reflect, at a basic level, a gap in our thinking about conflict termination. There is, first, a continued tendency to see war and peace as distinct—we fight, then, having won the fight, we negotiate and think about peace. In Iraq, our thinking about the relationship between conflict termination and conflict resolution extend little further than how we would fight and win the conventional war. Subsequently, little thought has been given to the different international and internal dimensions of the conflict.

Second, we continue to “stove-pipe” military and political roles. The military focus on achieving military victory with peace being the realm of the politicians. Both of these problems encourage a decoupling of military means from the political objectives they are designed to serve. The third problem is a lack of de-conflicted doctrinal guidance, as I touched on earlier in this letter. Western militaries have developed a lot of doctrine on campaigns, some on post conflict activities, but very little on the complexities of conflict termination. Unfortunately, also suffering from neglect is the fact that it is the relationship between conflict termination and conflict resolution that determines the ultimate value of the fighting in which we engage, and the peace we hope to secure.

In closing, I would respectfully point out that the U.S. Marine Corps, even if on a smaller scale, has done, and is doing, a much better job at Stability/Civil Military Operations. I credit this directly to the Marine Corp’s original concept of their slice of “Joint Vision 2010,” now rapidly upon us.

In the late 1990’s, when 2010 seemed a very long time away, each service espoused a theme. The Army’s theme was “Speed of Maneuver,” The Air Force’s theme was “Global Engagement,” and the Navy-Marine Corps theme, was “Operational Maneuver From The Sea.” The Navy-Marine Corps slice of “Joint Vision 2010” took into account the need to interact better with the civilians that they would encounter living in the littorals that the Navy-Marine Corps would be operating in, and through. They started training their troops, within their view of “Joint Vision 2010,” from day one, taking full advantage of their lessons learned, corrected shortfalls as they occurred, and today have produced, man for man, pound for pound, quite excellent Civil-Affairs personnel.

The other thing that needs to happen at the JRTC, if we really are to coach, teach and mentor to operate in a “Joint” environment, is to bring in Civil-Affairs personnel from other services, in general, and the United States Marine Corps, in particular, to serve in command, as well Observer/Controller, positions. It would not only enhance future Joint Operations, but the quality of present training. Right now the Joint Readiness Training Center is “Joint” in name only, and that also prevents the United States Army from providing quality “Joint” training.

Sir, the majority of Brigades that have passed through the JRTC have been National Guard Brigades. I have a serious concern that not only are we not training them to win the Peace, but we are diverting, and weakening, their disaster management and humanitarian assistance skills; to the point that should we ever suffer a major disaster within
the United States that what skills they retain might not be effective. My basic point being that if we continued to divert all military skills, including the ability to do disaster and humanitarian operations, totally down the point and shoot path, than those skills might well be missing in this country when we need them the most.

To end, as with my original point, I can only respectfully say that Once again, the task that you have taken on, to improve the Army’s capability to conduct long-term stability operations, will ultimately fail; not because you aren’t an excellent leader, and because you won’t put forth a gallant effort, but rather because the cards, and time, are stacked against you. Neither you, nor any other Chief of Staff will be in your office long enough to make it happen. The maneuver mind set in the Army will wait you out, and in the end very little change will be accomplished.

Sir, in all candor, the one real hope you have for setting the stage for an Army success in Post Conflict Stability Operations is to fully fund, staff, and use the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, at the U.S. Army War College, not as the figure head it has become, but as the force enhancement tool it was always meant to be. In fact, it may even prove necessary to convert that organization into the “Joint Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.”

The question of the day is not can the Army fight and win our nation’s wars? Darn straight they can! They are the best in the world at it! However, the bigger question is can the Army win the peace? The answer, at this point in the 21st Century, is an even bigger no. They don’t have a clue how to do it, and far worse the majority of the Army leadership just really doesn’t want to learn how to do it.

Thank you very much for your consideration in this matter. If I can answer any questions for you please don’t hesitate to contact me at any time.

Respectfully submitted,

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