return to ICG Spaces home    ICG Risk Blog    discussions    newsletters    login    

Submarine fiber optic cable breaks: a study in hysteria and ignorance against analysis


Undersea cable networks are an underappreciated but essential part of modern life. They now carry well over 95% of the world's international telecommunications traffic. As trade rises as a share of global GDP - it's now over 30% - reliable connectivity becomes a key ingredient to growth. Some drivers of economic growth - outsourcing, offshoring - would be nearly impossible without it. As such, the undersea cable networks that support this connectivity are clearly vital to global commerce...

Submarine fiber optic networks mimic electricity grid vulnerability

The global submarine fiber optic network almost perfectly mimics the global electricity grid in its inability to mount any reasonable defense against attack. (I say 'almost' as the fiber optic industry is far less aware of its being a target than is the electricity grid.)

Here is Richard Clarke in 2000 speaking of cyberwar as "a threat that US government cannot defend solely by federal means":

The owners and operators of electric power grids, banks and railroads; they're the ones who have to defend our infrastructure. The government doesn't own it, the government doesn't operate it , the government can't defend it. This is the first time where we have a potential foreign threat to the United States where the military can't save us.

Compare that to Clarke's recent 2008 reply on the vulnerability of fiber optic networks to physical attack:

No one has the responsibility to insure there are redundant lines. Each company makes a decision based on market forces as to whether to invest in building new capacity. Nobody pays the private firms that own the fiber to build excess capacity. In some places it exists, but there are many point-to-point connections that have single points of failure and insufficient work-arounds available. There ought to be a public-private partnership, an international one, that insures there is adequate capacity to handle large scale outages caused by malevolent actors. That means back up dark fiber, rapid repair and replacement capability, and research to increase the bandwidth for laser uplink/downlink satellite comms.

Substitute 'cable system companies' for 'electric power companies' in this 2003 comment by Clarke:

[Our] electric power companies, both the generating companies and the distribution companies, have paid very little attention to security in cyberspace... They are beginning to understand that they need to have security. And the Federal Electric Regulatory Commission is beginning to understand that it needs to regulate that, in order to create an even playing field...

Unless power companies are required to do [this] by the federal government, they will never do it, because they're now in competition with each other. They're all willing to do it if they're all forced to do it... no one has competitive disadvantage by proving security...

We, as a country, have put all of our eggs in one basket... It could be that, in the future, people will look back on the American empire, the economic empire and the military empire, and say, "They didn't realize that they were building their whole empire on a fragile base."

In researching this note I thought to see what Clarke had said about the recent cable outages in the Eastern Med and the Persian Gulf, forgetting that he wrote a novel, Breakpoint, (excerpt here) that included an attack against fiber optic backbone:

Breakpoint [shows] was how much more damage could be done if an organized group set about to create havoc by attacking these strand that unite the global village. Disconnect cyberspace in key places and the unified global village and world economy can't operate. And we have no backup economic system... And while undersea lines were cut in the novel, there were also attacks on the places where the cables come up from under the water and go on the beach. Those places are well known and unprotected.

Spot on. My read surfaced few public analysts that spoke systematically and realistically about the threats to submarine cables. Of those, fewer identified their unprotected "landing stations" - where the cables come ashore - as a high vulnerability. (This analyst found it interesting that landing stations highlighted in discussions of telecom cooperation with federal eavesdropping were forgotten in assessing the cable threat.)

A simple search on "submarine cable landing" will produce a List of international submarine communications cables as well as 983 locations where undersea cables come ashore, most all of them in rural to remote areas. There are so many ways to identify landing points. Bluewater sailors know where cables congregate to come ashore as they are clearly marked on their nav charts.

The Eyeball series highlights the landing stations along the US East Coast. (Scroll down past the text to the paired aerial photo-highway maps for the landing stations. But note that the text you skipped over cites sources for these locations. My point is that it is a trivial problem. My compliments to Cryptome for flagging that triviality.)

Separating hysteria and excessive calm from legitimate risk

It appeared that the only procedural rigor at play among amateur reporters was to repeat Auric Goldfinger's line that, "Once is happenstance, twice is coincidence, three times is enemy action" and then assign multiple, geographically dispersed cable breaks to enemy action, usually Jihadist, without further investigation.

The relatively uncomplicated sovereign state environment in effect when Neal Stephenson wrote Mother Earth Mother Board in 1996 is now complicated by the emergence of the stateless aggressor against whom retaliation is difficult:

There is also the obvious threat of sabotage by a hostile government, but, surprisingly, this almost never happens. When cypherpunk Doug Barnes was researching his Caribbean project, he spent some time looking into this, because it was exactly the kind of threat he was worried about in the case of a data haven. Somewhat to his own surprise and relief, he concluded that it simply wasn't going to happen. "Cutting a submarine cable," Barnes says, "is like starting a nuclear war. It's easy to do, the results are devastating, and as soon as one country does it, all of the others will retaliate.

There are more than one stateless aggressors that will be pleased to sever submarine cables or other communications services in the pursuit of their aims. (Mother Earth Mother Board is otherwise still worth the read.)

TeleGeography's Eric Schoonover does a nice job of describing what happened in the wake of the Egyptian outages, what was required to compensate and who suffered with what consequences. By far the best routing intelligence was the highly recommended five-part series showing who was affected when, by Earl Zmijewski:

Christopher Rhoads does a yeoman analysis of the structure of the fiber sector, much of it still dark since the bust of the late 1990s fiber boom. (Unfortunately, the unused dark links are often not in the areas of current demand.) A useful summary of cable maintenance, grappling and repair is here. It was amusing to hear FLAG Telecom state a new third cable, the FLAG Mediterranean Cable, between Egypt and France would be "fully resilient" against cuts as it was taking "a different route from the severed cables." FLAG knows that the cables emerge in shallow water to terminate at the same landing points.

A respondent to Bruce Schneier's Fourth Undersea Cable Failure in Middle East argued more systematically for "undersea damage associated with seismic activity" in Turkey and Southern Greece than any of the handwringing Cassandras. That may not be the ultimate cause for the Med breaks but its rigor shames many of the high street press journalists. (And if you hear a rumor that Iran has been knocked offline, use traceroute (tracert) (prepackaged sets here and here) to verify it rather than running the rumor. That skill will separate you from most journalists.)

As to the comments from Egyptian authorities that no ships were operating in the restricted area where the breaks were said to occur, and thus had no opportunity to drag an anchor, I say anything is possible in a land where a bureaucrat will accept payment to look the other way. This comment from a diver is useful:

Having dived around Alexandria, a common site is a bunch of locals in a 10m boat throwing a grappling hook over the side over known or suspected wrecks in an attempt to snag some scrap metal and haul it up. Several times we had to abort to alternate dive sites to avoid locals who were tearing up wrecks like this. As for the egyptian military being able to contain a restricted area ... their training makes mcdonalds workers seem well trained.

Ryan Singel nicely outlined the "Cable cut fever" racing about the web. But when Johna Till Johnson answered "Is it likely the cable cuts were intentional? And more importantly, are we at the dawn of a new era of "cable terrorism," in which malcontents try to disrupt global communications via cable cuts?," she got the first right and, overlooking shallow water and the landing stations, got the second quite wrong:

Nope. Cutting cables is a lot more difficult than it looks. For one thing, you have to first locate the cables - no small feat when they're somewhere in the middle of an ocean, under miles of water. Even with the latest-and-greatest technology, this is no easy task. According to the delightful book Blind Man's Bluff, the United States spent a fair amount of time in the 1960s and 1970s attempting to locate and tap Soviet cables. Although there reportedly were noteworthy successes, they required decades of focused effort and investment in a fleet of nuclear submarines. Terrorists have easier ways to make trouble.

Ovum's Matt Walker made the best non-military analysis:

[C]ables are nearly impossible to secure. Cable landing stations are often located in remote areas and usually staffed with a handful of technical employees, not teams of armed guards. Moreover, a typical transpacific system stretches around 20,000km. Even if the private cable owners increase security for the "dry plant" segment of such networks, securing the wet plant is problematic. Cable owners work hard to minimize accidental damage, making cable routes available to those that need to know, such as fishermen, navies, and research vessels. Cable routes also deliberately avoid, as possible, such hazards as earthquake-prone zones and rocky seabed. However, there is an unspoken assumption that the networks are safe from deliberate human sabotage. The recent spate of cable failures in a politically volatile region has called this assumption into question...

In deep waters, cable cuts are rare... 60% of all cable cuts occur in waters less than 100 meters deep. Of all cable faults, roughly three-fourths are due to "external aggression," the bulk of which is accidental human activity, namely, fishing, anchors, and dredging...

Intentional sabotage [is] probably more feasibly done in shallow waters than deep, and cable security in shallow waters is only modestly more practical. Clearly, undersea cables are a ripe target for those with an interest in wreaking havoc on international communications, whatever their motivation. Another consideration is that undersea cables have been used for submarine/surface surveillance purposes as far back as World War II, with the cooperation of private industry...

And here a scent of Clarke:

It is not enough to have multiple independent operators of ring- or mesh-based networks, with built-in restoration capabilities, optical equipment and power redundancy, multiple redundant links between cable stations and city gateways, etc. Physical security from deliberate human attack or sabotage must also be considered. If ports, railways, gas pipelines, and other types of networks are being secured against possible sabotage, we must similarly increase the security of undersea optical highways. Guaranteeing reliability is impossible, but an improvement on the current hands-off approach is long overdue. The economic cost of losing, or even just slowing down, international communications is extremely high. This risk has to be factored into the calculations behind the investment level and design of undersea optical networks.

Technical assist: For those struggling with unfamiliar communications vocabulary in a subsea cable network, a nice pictographic introduction of general data communications in any medium can be found here (actually the introduction to a data communications course).

The highly vulnerable landing station

RAND highlighted the landing station vulnerability as least as early as 2000; the problem has only grown more critical while commercial cable firms remain obtuse:

[W]iring companies have focused on redundancy as an important aspect of the cable network. While early fiber optic cables were "point-to-point" systems, modern systems are configured as loops, connecting two landing stations - at least 100 kilometers away from one another - in one country to two in another. Because it would be unlikely for an isolated nautical event - a sudden shift in the seabed on which the cables rest, for instance, or an inadvertent break caused by a fishing net or a ship's anchor - to affect both cables, the systems are thought of as secure...

However, the desire for security against inadvertent nautical events may have been counterproductive. When seeking adequate termination points for cables, companies have faced a relative paucity of suitable sites (relatively isolated from heavy fishing activity and strong ocean currents), particularly on the East Coast... Because of this lack of sites, and given the considerable effort in digging a trench on the seabed for the last kilometers of the cable, then tunneling from the ocean bed up into a beach manhole, to bring the cable ashore, cable companies have, again, especially on the East Coast, repeatedly placed cable termination points on the same shore...

The results of this "stacking" [can be seen in ten cable systems terminating in New Jersey. Of the ten] six terminate in only one of the same three cities, Tuckerton, Manasquan, and Manahawkin, New Jersey. One - a self-healing loop - terminates in both Tuckerton and Manasquan. A sixth terminates in both Manasquan and Charlestown, Rhode Island. Theoretically, an attack on two or three of these sites - at the point where the cables come together in the undersea trench before coming ashore - could cause enormous damage to the entire system...

Similarly, all submarine cables but one terminating in the south of the United States terminate at one of three points in Florida: Vero Beach, Palm Beach, and Hollywood.

[The US is less isolated than other states]- some transmissions could be rerouted through systems in Canada and South and Central America. However, given that the vast majority of transatlantic and transpacific cables terminate in the United States, the prospect of a concerted attack on these cables is troubling.

[However, a state such as Taiwan, unlike the US,] would be unable to depend on a vast overland information infrastructure beyond its borders in the event of damage to its fiber optic lifelines. A [then] recent example of the chaos potentially caused by communications outages is that of Australia. One cut cable in the SEA-WE-ME-3 network leading from Australia to Singapore caused Australia's largest Internet provider - Telstra - to lose up to 70 percent of its Internet capacity...

Pulsing the system as part of an information gathering exercise

I do not rule out an effort by state or nonstate assets to pressure the network, forcing the defender to enable comm links that normally remain dark. We often probed Soviet air defenses with aircraft flying a possible penetration profile, hoping to force the Russians to turn on defense in depth assets normally used in combat. These two comments to Schneier's post on the Middle East cable failures speak to my point:

Think about entities responsible for researching cyber attacks from a viewpoint of national security. Their main endeavors are mapping and monitoring global infrastructure and simulating possible scenarios. As with every simulation (e.g. development of nuclear warheads) you need real world data to make your simulation behave like the real world would do.

These entities do likely own warehouses full of real world netflow data, but only for more or less regular operation of the global network. To be really sure, that their virtual attack scenarios can be trusted, they need real world feedback for their own "interactions" with those networks. Now think about the interesting load of data you can collect when cutting undersea cables: number of nodes immediately offline, congestion on alternative routes, average response times of responsible institutions, measures taken by those institutions, unexpected backlash, general short, mid, and long term effects, on and on... Endless highly interesting parameters...

If this is deliberate, I suspect that it's a probe. If I was interested in knocking out access for a country, I'd probe it for uplinks. I'd search for all of the announced AS paths behind each uplink. Once I knew say, the top five fiber drops, cutting a few may fill the rest to capacity. Assuming that one is watching BGP, you'll see some changes. If they have emergency fiber or VSAT uplinks, they're probably going to route over them. This would be a useful method of observing a target. This doesn't mean that it requires a later attack, it could simply be an information gathering exercise...

Submarine cable operators: the sitting duck on the pond

The group that seems oblivious to asymmetrical threat risk appears to be the subsea fiber optic cable operators. An effort to locate robust risk analysis practices in general and this threat in particular went dry. The best was Cook's Risk Management which had the core of a useful method but it seemed more a proposal that evidence of sustained practice. Marine Survey & Cable Routing short course for "a safe and economic route" cited the principal hazards as:

  • Pre-Survey Route Position List (RPL)
  • Seafloor Morphology and Geology
  • Natural Hazards e.g. Seismic events, submarine volcanism
  • Oceanography and Meteorology
  • Human Activities e.g., mineral extraction, oil & gas, fishing
  • Man-Made Hazards e.g. anchoring, dredging
  • Other cables/pipelines/lease blocks

Its detailed Cable Route Study (CRS) had more to do with visiting local landing station authorities and other industries operating in the area, permits and regulatory issues, and cultural and environmental issues than asymmetrical or sovereign threats.

A forward leaning Blips on the Radar Screen for future cable capacity mentioned no threat profiles. In the search period where I should have found a working threat assessment model, I found none.

Writing in 2000, RAND noted a gap between the defense community and commercial cable operators that has not been closed:

By 1969, [defense] analysts had perceived vast potential military and economic benefits in cable's exploitation... With the explosion in importance of fiber optic networks [this] potential has been realized and will continue to grow; at the same time, however, so will the attendant vulnerability. The submarine fiber optic cable network is of great importance to the United States... Moreover, constraints on cable laying mean that several cables are likely to be bundled together, offering a potentially lucrative target for sabotage.

In most industry publications, however, little attention is given to the possibility of deliberate attack on the fiber optic network. Indeed, one of the few discussions of the possibility says simply that "while undersea cables could be cut, the practice of burying the in-shore segments makes this difficult; the mid-ocean portions are hard to find without a map and help from shore-based monitoring stations"...

Given the above, however, it is clear that more attention should be paid to the potential for deliberate attacks on the global fiber optic cable network... Currently, for instance, shore authorities have positioned radars and occasionally scheduled flyovers for areas in New Jersey that might be targeted...

Areas of high cable density are common: expect more multiple outages

"Cairo has become a communications hub to the Middle East..." The Suez Canal and the new overland "electronic Suez canal" comprise one of the globe's highest cable densities with massive fiber projects on the way:

Nearly all the new fiber cables recently built or planned for South Asia, the Middle East and east Africa funnel through Egypt, due to its unique location between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The other undersea path to the European and Atlantic networks is the much longer and costlier way around the southern tip of Africa...

The nine fiber projects planned across Egypt's Sinai desert compare with a total of four built over the past 20 years. "We call it the electronic Suez canal," says [the] Egyptian telecom regulator, likening the country's emergence as a communications hub to its importance last century for shipping by virtue of its Suez canal.

Suez in not unique in its high density of laid cables; The seabed offers many points where geography conspires to group submarine cables, thereby increasing the potential of cascaded damage. Take, for example, the Luzon Strait where the 2006 magnitude 7.1 Hengchun earthquake created "one of the largest disruptions of modern telecommunications systems. Nine submarine cables in the Strait of Luzon, between Taiwan and the Philippines, were broken thus disabling vital connections between SE Asia and the rest of the world."

Luzon Strait is the preferred of three routes to "link South East & Northern Asia":

  1. Luzon Strait between Taiwan & Philippines
    • 320 km width
    • 2600m sill depth in Bashi Channel (north)
  2. Route south of the Philippines
    • adds lots of mileage & hence latency
  3. Formosa Strait
    • Narrowest part is 130 km width
    • 70 m depth (too close to fishermen)

With nine cables transiting the earthquake epicenter in the Bashi Channel (2500-4000 meters deep), Hengchun created "multiple failures causing the entire cable system to be out of service." With no available cables for rerouting, Asia had to wait weeks for marine repairs:

21 faults were recorded in the 9 cables and it took 11 ships 49 days to restore everything back to normal. This length of time was due to the number of faults, the availability of cable repair vessels, adverse sea conditions and the occurrence of faults in water depths down to 4000 m. The repair effort was hampered further by the burial of some cables under a layer of mud and the huge size of the area that was affected...

Sovereign state weaponization of the sea floor

Terrorist efforts aside, it is clear that the major powers have a sustaining interest in the seabed, fiber optic cables and deep diving submarines.

As to subsea cables, Bamford notes:

[NSA] taps into the cables that don't reach our shores by using specially designed submarines, such as the USS Jimmy Carter, to attach a complex "bug" to the cable itself. This is difficult, however, and undersea taps are short-lived because the batteries last only a limited time. The fiber-optic transmission cables that enter the United States from Europe and Asia can be tapped more easily at the landing stations where they come ashore. With the acquiescence of the telecommunications companies, it is possible for the NSA to attach monitoring equipment inside the landing station and then run a buried encrypted fiber-optic "backhaul" line to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, where the river of data can be analyzed by supercomputers in near real time.

Tapping into the fiber-optic network that carries the nation's Internet communications is even easier, as much of the information transits through just a few "switches" (similar to the satellite downlinks). Among the busiest are MAE East (Metropolitan Area Ethernet), in Vienna, Virginia, and MAE West, in San Jose, California, both owned by Verizon. By accessing the switch, the NSA can see who's e-mailing with whom over the Internet cables and can copy entire messages. Last September, the Federal Communications Commission further opened the door for the agency. The 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act required telephone companies to rewire their networks to provide the government with secret access. The FCC has now extended the act to cover "any type of broadband Internet access service" and the new Internet phone services - and ordered company officials never to discuss any aspect of the program.

As to deep diving submarines. RAND produced an interesting 2002 monograph on the requirements for a successor to the NR-1, a deep-diving nuclear research submarine built in 1969. A small vessel (12 foot diameter, 150 foot length, 400 ton displacement and crew of seven), the NR-1 is set apart from other research submersibles and SSN submarines by its "prolonged (30-day) operation [limited only by its food and air supply] on or near the sea bottom [2,375 foot operating depth] at a speed of up to 4 knots" as well as its viewports, manipulators to "handle small objects... two retractable rubber-tired wheels that support it on the ocean bottom [and] thrusters to maintain depth without forward movement, to move laterally, and to rotate within its own length."

NR-1 missions "included support to national agencies, which had found other assets limited in their ability to complete such tasks as mapping the Challenger debris field despite inclement weather or locating important forensics information from the Egypt Air Flight 990 disaster... support of maritime archaeology, scientific research, and military operations." Command of the NR-1 does appear to be a career enhancing billet. Admiral Edmund Giambastiani commanded NR-1 earlier in his career.

Based upon NR-1 performance and expected NR-2 capability, a "military expert group" identified seven "core missions" for the NR-2 as part of an analysis of highest priority "military and scientific missions [for] their deep-diving research submarines":

  • Selected Covert Operations
  • Protection of National Assets on the Seabed
  • Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)
  • Forensics/Investigation
  • Expanded ISR [Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance]
  • Offensive Information Operations
  • Defensive Information Operations

The NR-2 would require "magnetic and acoustic" quieting and enhanced endurance and should be able to operate under three support environments:

  • Fully autonomous operation... as is any SSN...
  • Operation in consort with an SSN [with] SSN transport/tow to an AOI [area-of-interest] and escort/protection within an AOI as desired...
  • Operation in consort with a surface support vessel [for] extensive logistics support... tow and communications support... and enable transfer and offload of objects...

Interestingly, little is written of the NR-2 despite the fact that the navy 'anticipated' "that the NR-1 will require [a third] refueling or replacement by 2012." There is an interesting oblique reference in a comment about a LTJG nuclear engineer with the Advanced Submarines Division at Naval Reactors Headquarters who:

uses his skills to keep the country's only nuclear-powered, deep-diving research submarine in top operating condition. [The officer] recently completed studies of concept designs for a nuclear-powered deep-diving research submarince including the sizing reactor and propulsion plant components, plant arrangement, and overall ship integration aspects.

In sum, subsea fiber optic networks are more vulnerable than the electricity grid. Fiber is not so much a case of raising security standards as it is introducing the concept of security. Richard Clarke's admonitions ring loudly.

Internet Logjams Spur Cable Boom
Outages in Mideast Expose Global Need For Fast Fiber Lines
February 8, 2008

FLAG Telecom: Abandoned ship's anchor caused cut in Internet cable between Emirates, Oman
Posted: 2008-02-08 10:58:35

Hotter under the water: A look at the undersea Internet cable "conspiracy" and the impact on global networks
Interview with Eric Schoonover, TeleGeography
Network Performance Daily
February 07, 2008

What those oceanic cable cuts mean to you
By Johna Till Johnson
Eye on the Carriers 
Network World, 02/07/08

Mediterranean Cable Break - Part IV
February 07, 2008 | By Earl Zmijewski at 02:03 PM
Renesys Corporation

Undersea cables extremely vulnerable say analysts
Comments by Matt Walker, Posted by andrewdonoghue
Recycled Green Tech News
Thursday 7 February 2008, 3:36 PM

07-Feb-08 - Update on Submarine Cable Cut Repairs - Daily Bulletin
FLAG Telecom
Press Releases

Three undersea cables seen fixed by weekend
Thu Feb 7, 2008 9:23am EST

New Cable Taking New Route After Web Cut
Associated Press
February 6, 2008 - 2:58pm

Cable Cut Fever Grips the Web
By Ryan Singel
Threat Level
February 06, 2008 | 4:50:11 PM

Analyzing the Internet Collapse
Multiple fiber cuts to undersea cables show the fragility of the Internet at its choke points.
By John Borland
Technology Review
February 05, 2008

Repairs start on undersea cable cut near UAE
Feb 5, 2008 8:39am EST

Cable damage hits 1.7m Internet users in UAE
By Asma Ali Zain
Khaleej Times
5 February 2008

Underwater Fiber Cuts in the Middle East
Steven Bellovin
4 February 2008

Ruptures call safety of Internet cables into question
By Heather Timmons
Published: February 4, 2008

ATTENTION: Iran is not disconnected!
February 03, 2008 | By Earl Zmijewski at 06:15 PM
Renesys Corporation

Cable cuts, conspiracies, and submarines...
Jesse Robbins
O'Reilly Radar

Mediterranean Cable Break - Part III
February 02, 2008 | By Earl Zmijewski at 06:17 AM
Renesys Corporation

India Internet capacity at 80 pct after cables break
Feb 1, 2008 2:32am EST

Web Disruptions Persist Overseas
Cables Could Take Weeks to Fix, Pressuring Business in India, Mideast
February 1, 2008

Mediterranean Cable Break - Part II
January 31, 2008 | By Earl Zmijewski at 07:20 PM
Renesys Corporation

Cable Cuts Disrupt Internet in Middle East and India
Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Mediterranean Cable Break
January 30, 2008 | By Earl Zmijewski at 06:53 PM
Renesys Corporation

Foundation [of Data Communications]
Data Communications and Computer Networks
Hongwei Zhang
Department of Computer Science, Wayne State University
Fall 2007

Enabling Global Communications - From Risk to Reward: Why must we learn our own lessons before we change risk management behaviour?
Keith Schofield
Pioneer Consulting (Dotdash Consulting)
Sub Optic 2007
May 17, 2007

Research & Security Applications of Submarine Technologies
Seymour Shapiro
Tyco Telecommunications Laboratories
SubOptic 2007

Jeremy Featherstone, Andrew Thomas
Sub Optic 2007
May 15, 2007

Thomas A. Soja, John Manock, S. Hansen Long
T Soja & Associates, Inc.
Sub Optic 2007
May 15, 2007

The regulation of undersea cables and landing stations
Steve Esselaar, Alison Gillwald and Ewan Sutherland
IDRC 2007

Subsea Landslide is Likely Cause of SE Asian Communications Failure
Graham Marle, ICPC Secretariat
21 March 2007

Taiwan Earthquake Fiber Cuts: a Service Provider View
Sylvie LaPerrière, Director
Peering & Commercial Operations
nanog39 - Toronto, Canada

Excerpt: 'Breakpoint,' by Richard Clarke
Veteran Counterterrorism Official Writes a Futuristic Thriller
ABC News Internet Ventures
Jan. 17, 2007

by Richard A. Clarke
Putnam Adult
ISBN-10: 0399153780
January 16, 2007

Earthquake Highlights Asian Dependency on Submarine Cables
January 2007

Taiwan Earthquake Severs Undersea Data Cables
Geology News
Friday, December 29, 2006

Taiwan Quake Shakes Confidence in Undersea Links
By Jon Herskovitz and Rhee So-eui
Dec 28, 2006

Earthquakes Disrupt Internet Access in Asia
A series of powerful earthquakes damages undersea cables and interrupts Internet connections in Asia.
Sumner Lemon
IDG News Service
December 27, 2006 11:00 AM PST

Earthquake in Taiwan
Status Report No: EQT-1
CAT-i, Guy Carpenter
Date: 26 December 2006
Time: 12:26:21 UTC (20:26:21 local time)
Position: 21.819N, 120.543E
Depth: 6.2 miles (10 km)
Magnitude: 7.1
Region: Taiwan Region

Big Brother Is Listening
by James Bamford
Atlantic Monthly
April 2006

Stephen Dawe (Cable & Wireless), Tony Frisch (formerly Alcatel), Barbara O'Dwyer (Level 3) and Denise Toombs (ERM)
Tu A2.3, SubOptic 2004
March 30, 2004

Rick Cook
Tu A2.6, SubOptic 2004
March 30, 2004

Marine Survey & Cable Routing
Short Course
Submarine Cable Improvement Group
Sub Optic 2004

A Concept of Operations for a New Deep-Diving Submarine
By: Frank W. Lacroix, Robert W. Button, Stuart E. Johnson, John R. Wise
RAND MR-1395
ISBN/EAN: 0-8330-3045-0
Executive summary
Submarine Cable Infrastructure

Eyeballing: Transatlantic Cable Landings Eastern US
Various dates 2002

Spy agency taps into undersea cable
By Neil Jr.
Published on ZDNet News
May 23, 2001 12:00:00 AM

Mother Earth Mother Board
The hacker tourist ventures forth across the wide and wondrous meatspace of three continents, chronicling the laying of the longest wire on Earth.
By Neal Stephenson
Issue 4.12, Dec 1996

Gordon Housworth

Cybersecurity Public  InfoT Public  Infrastructure Defense Public  Risk Containment and Pricing Public  Strategic Risk Public  Terrorism Public  Weapons & Technology Public  
In order to post a message, you must be logged in
message date / author

There are no comments available.

In order to post a message, you must be logged in