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Staking out an Iraq sitrep- Gordon Housworth [ 1/11/2007 - 19:39 ] # In a rare opportunity to delve below the level of sound bites, I have two three-hour presentations on 16-17 January to groups of CEOs on Islamic issues and their implications. An assumption that attendees would ask for an Iraqi sitrep (situation report) was confirmed when the group leader distributed Iraq reverberates across globe analysis as part of the briefing package. I may tinker with this Iraq sitrep before Tuesday, but only to extend it, not to alter it. Following the sitrep is the abstract and 'benefit to members' of the presentation: Iraq Sitrep: Key points:
The Nelson Report summed it: In
stepping back to survey the situation in Iraq. . .and not just US
politics. . .you can see that for whatever set of reasons you chose to
credit, the
Administration now appears trapped in a classic "Catch 22" situation:
in order to reach the political resolution needed to restore military
stability, military stability is needed; but it can't get military
stability until it has a real political solution in action. Dates of interest to me:
Concerns:
Recommendations:
I believe that VPOTUS continues to press for a strike against Iran, and that his appointees within government will facilitate information flowing to support such a mission (and we know that the Israelis are cheering for it, lest they perceive that they must undertake a unilateral strike). The extraordinary hardening of the wider Iranian opinion against the US is bleak to contemplate, but for the purposes of this note, I believe that the best Iranian response to a US limited strike (the baiting strike) is not to make a peer state response, even though it could, but to make an asymmetric response against both the US and GCC states. Iran should not admit to its asymmetric response lest that admission lead to a US counter-response, but should immediately go to the UN as the aggrieved rational party, denying the US its entry to a wider strike (the weapons strike). The upshot will be a further deterioration of the US diplomatic position, a heightening of Iran's position and further praise to Iran from the Arab street (the same praise that flowed to Hezbollah after its victory over Israel in Lebanon). Listen to Brzezinski very closely for strategic overview while ignoring the modestly embarrassing Mead. Read Lang for the killing flaw in "Counterinsurgency = Counter-guerrilla operations + Political Action + Civic Action." (No surprise here to the thoughtful.) Read Robb for understanding why "country-wide chaos" will shift into "social disintegration," with the implication that "building a stable Iraq would require a level of effort that is beyond our ability to provide." Following is the session abstract and the benefit to members statement: Abstract: The monumentality of the task of defeating al Qaeda, its adherents and inheritors cannot be underestimated. Strategic options reduce to “Cure, kill, or contain," none of which are cheap or quick. All options possess great threats and as yet indefinable secondary effects. Unlike Cold War targets "that were easy to find but hard to kill," the modern, well armed terrorist only "presents targets that are hard to find but relatively easy to kill." The weapons systems and tactics of WWII, Korea, even Vietnam, are inappropriate and as often counterproductive in attacking this class of asymmetrical opponent. The intelligence satellites forming the backbone of "national technical means of collection" against the Soviets was far less effective in producing the human intelligence or "humint" needed to interdict close-knit tribal and sectarian groups. The increasing availability of "first world" weaponry provides a startling force multiplier to "third world" attackers - witness Hezbollah's recent victory over Israel. These asymmetrical opponents often had better intelligence on us than we had on them. US and Israeli counterattacks on the core leadership group and the highly connected operations leaders have made large operations more difficult by decentralizing the network. Unfortunately, the opportunity for smaller operations is growing as are the number of potential actors. September 11, 2001, was executed by the core leadership and operational cadres whereas the July 7, 2005 London bombings were likely carried out by loosely coupled third tier actors. We are facing diminishing returns as we create more volunteers to the Islamist cause than we kill. Smaller teams armed with increasingly available means of producing chemical and "designer" bioagents offer the specter of swarm attacks. Value to Members: Participants will leave with an understanding of the actors and drivers propelling confrontation between Islamist groups, the West and local Arab governments; what drives them and what does not; who is more likely to become a terrorist; the divisions of Islam and the difference between political and traditional Islam; the Arab exploitation of the West (US) and the Soviets, and when the USSR imploded, the Arab decision to take matters into their own hands; the generations of warfare and how small terrorist groups, Islamic and otherwise, are using Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) against the West as well as their local governments; how increasingly lethal weaponry is improving the ability of even small groups to carry out crisis-level attacks; the dangers of the "Arc of Instability" and "Trashcanistan;" Islamists skillful exploitation of Western communication tools and the Internet; how US direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated radical Islamists while diminishing support for the US; how Israel is the linchpin of Arab - and increasingly Muslim - anger against the US; that not all Muslims are enemies; and how Hezbollah has the chance to unite Sunni and Shia, creating an Islamist movement. Did the President Declare "Secret War" Against Syria and Iran? Steve Clemons Washington Note January 11, 2007 04:14 PM Plan to Increase Troop Numbers Comes Under Broad Scrutiny JIM LEHRER interviews Zbigniew Brzezinski, now CSIS, and Walter Russell Mead, now CFR NewsHour January 11, 2007 The Fatal Flaw… Patrick Lang Sic Semper Tyrannis 2007 11 January 2007 JOURNAL: Surge? Posted by John Robb Global Guerrillas January 11, 2007 at 07:42 AM Report: U.S. Troops Raid Iranian Consulate in Iraq By Howard Schneider and Joshua Partlow Washington Post January 11, 2007 Iran Summons Swiss, Iraqi Diplomats The Associated Press January 11, 2007; 6:57 AM Mideast Skeptics Blast Bush's Iraq Plan By MAGGIE MICHAEL The Associated Press January 11, 2007; 9:17 AM Bush's New Plan for Iraq Echoes Key Parts of Earlier Memo By Glenn Kessler Washington Post January 11, 2007 Bush to Add 21,500 Troops In an Effort to Stabilize Iraq By Michael Abramowitz and Robin Wright Washington Post January 11, 2007 The Nelson Report on Bush's Iraq War Escalation Plans and Condi's Iraq Testimony Steve Clemons Washington Note January 08, 2007 04:18 PM The Smart Surge: Diplomacy By Wesley K. Clark Washington Post January 8, 2007 US failure to talk to Iran is a key contributor to the region's instability By Trita Dr Parsi FT Published: January 3 2007 02:00 | Last updated: January 3 2007 02:00 Partitioning Iraq? John Robb John Robb's Website October 31, 2006 Gordon Housworth InfoT Public Strategic Risk Public Terrorism Public |
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